United States v. Crittenden
| Decision Date | 18 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 18-50635 |
| Parties | United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Samuel Tanel Crittenden, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:17-CR-2039-2
Before RICHMAN, Chief Judge, and JONES, SMITH, STEWART, DENNIS ELROD, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES, HIGGINSON, COSTA, WILLETT HO, DUNCAN, ENGELHARDT, OLDHAM, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge, joined by RICHMAN, Chief Judge, and JONES, SMITH, STEWART, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, HIGGINSON, WILLETT HO, DUNCAN, ENGELHARDT, OLDHAM, and WILSON, Circuit Judges:
This appeal involves tension between two rules of deference. When trial judges exercise discretion, appellate judges can reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Ordering a new trial is one such discretionary act. But when a jury renders a verdict, all judges owe deference to the decision of the constitutionally-designated factfinder. What happens, then when a trial judge sets aside a verdict and grants a new trial based on the court's different assessment of the evidence? How closely do we review that new trial grant?
This case began with a tip to federal agents that methamphetamine was being stored at a house in El Paso. The agents instructed an informant to attempt a controlled buy. The informant called the number associated with the tip and spoke with Carla Dominguez. Dominguez confirmed that she had "windows" for sale-a street name for methamphetamine. She in turn asked whether the informant could source "kush," a strong strain of marijuana that customers often "ask [her] husband for." After several days of negotiation, Dominguez and the informant agreed to meet in a parking lot to exchange 10 pounds of "crystal meth" for $35,000.
Shortly before the scheduled meet, agents observed Dominguez and her husband, Samuel Crittenden, depart their home in separate cars. One of the agents followed Crittenden, who drove to another house on Byway Drive and went inside. Dominguez pulled up to the same house 45 minutes later. Crittenden emerged from the residence and handed Dominguez a bag through the passenger-side window. Dominguez then drove towards the parking lot where she was to meet the informant.
Police intercepted Dominguez before she reached the parking lot. On the passenger floorboard of her vehicle, officers found a black leather handbag containing ten bundles (4.2 kilograms) of methamphetamine.
Federal agents spoke with Crittenden later that evening. Crittenden admitted that he had stored several bags in the attic of the Byway house. And he confirmed that he had given one of those bags to Dominguez that afternoon. He claimed that they were his "wife's bags" and said he "thought" or "believed" they contained marijuana. Crittenden said he knew he was "going to get in trouble" because of these statements. Indeed, Crittenden's interview prompted agents to search the Byway house, where they found three suitcases filled with 3 more bundles (1.65 kilograms) of methamphetamine and 90 bundles (47 kilograms) of marijuana.
A grand jury charged Crittenden and Dominguez with three offenses: conspiracy to deal methamphetamine; possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine; and conspiracy to deal marijuana. At trial, the government introduced the testimony of the agents and informant involved in the investigation, along with audio and video recordings of the events described above. Crittenden's friend, who lived at the Byway house, also testified. He explained that Crittenden had asked to store some clothes and other personal items at the house. When his friend agreed, Crittenden brought suitcases over and stored them in the attic.
After the government rested, both defendants unsuccessfully sought an acquittal.
In the defense case, Dominguez took the stand. She testified that Crittenden "had nothing to do with" the drugs, which were allegedly sent to their home by an old acquaintance without warning or permission. The delivery arrived as 100 unmarked bundles in a plastic tub. When Dominguez told Crittenden about the mysterious delivery, Crittenden was alarmed that drugs were in the house with his children, so he moved the bundles to the Byway attic. When it came time to deliver the methamphetamine to the informant, Crittenden then retrieved the bundles for Dominguez because he was the only one who knew where they were.
At the close of evidence, Crittenden against moved for an acquittal, this time only on the conspiracy counts. The court again denied the motion.
The jury convicted Crittenden and Dominguez on all counts.
Crittenden filed a motion seeking an acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court granted the second request-a new trial-in a one-page order that stated an opinion would follow. The order did not divulge the grounds for the new trial. But shortly after trial, at Dominguez's sentencing, the court said the following:
[H]is guideline range is 292 to 365 months and he's facing a 20-year mandatory minimum. I can't . . . even go the 20-year mandatory minimum on him and I'm certainly not going to go 292 months. He had a limited role in what his wife was doing and she got him into this. Very limited role.
At the end of the hearing, the court turned to Crittenden and warned what would happen if he continued to refuse a plea deal[1]: "If you go to trial again and you lose, those guidelines are not going to change and I've given you every opportunity."[2]
Almost five months later, the court issued the opinion giving reasons for the new trial. It made no mention of Crittenden's sentence but instead held that the verdict went against the great weight of evidence. The court concluded that the jury's verdict on the two conspiracy charges was erroneous because there was no proof that Crittenden had entered into an agreement to sell narcotics. As for the charge of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, the court vacated the verdict because "no direct or circumstantial evidence was presented" at trial showing that Crittenden knew that the bags in his possession contained a controlled substance. In the court's view, Crittenden's admission that he "believed" the bags contained marijuana was "insufficient to establish knowledge."
The government moved for reconsideration. At a status conference, the court conceded that "if it was up to the Fifth Circuit, I'm going to get reversed." Still, the court reiterated: "Crittenden is facing 292 to 365 months and I think that's the reason I considered . . . granting a new trial because I was very reluctant to issue that type of sentence." The court later denied the motion for reconsideration "for the same reasons" discussed in the opinion.
The government had timely appealed the new trial grant for the possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine count. A divided panel of this court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial.[3] 25 F.4th 347 (5th Cir. 2022). The appeal is now before the full court.
The jury requirement for criminal cases is one of only two topics addressed in both the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights (the other is the more obscure topic of venue in criminal trials). U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI; see also THE FEDERALIST NO 83, at 521 (Alexander Hamilton) ( that if the Founders agreed on "nothing else," they concurred "at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury"). The jury right's reappearance in the Sixth Amendment is no mere encore. The Bill of Rights includes the jury right among many guarantees for criminal defendants, whereas Article III requires juries as a structural protection. This original jury requirement ensures that unelected judges are not the only actors in our judiciary. "Just as suffrage ensures the people's ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary." Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
The jury's constitutional role in deciding criminal trials leaves little room for judicial second-guessing. Review of verdicts is thus "quite limited." See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978). A trial or appellate court can acquit a defendant found guilty by a jury only if "no rational juror could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Sanjar, 876 F.3d 725, 744 (5th Cir. 2017); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.
Trial courts, however, have a different path for setting aside a verdict: ordering a new trial. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(a). A court's power to grant a new trial has deep roots in our legal system. As early as the fourteenth century, English courts possessed the authority-in both civil and criminal cases-to award a second trial when it was clear that "justice ha[d] not been done" by the first. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 387-88 (1772); Bright v. Eynon (1757) 97 Eng. Rep. 365 (KB).
This discretionary power was not meant to supplant the jury right but to "perfect" it. 3 BLACKSTONE 390-91 ( that the new trial was thought to be an essential means of sustaining public confidence in the jury system). It entitled courts to order a second round of jury consideration when the first jury brought in a verdict that was "contrary to the evidence." Id. at 387.
Motions for new trials have been allowed since the beginning of the federal judiciary. Even before the Bill of Rights was ratified, Congress authorized federal courts to grant new trials for the reasons they had "usually been granted in the courts of law." See Judiciary Act of 1789 ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. Just over 150 years later,...
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