United States v. Crumpton

Decision Date02 June 2016
Docket NumberNos. 15–1299/1560,s. 15–1299/1560
Citation824 F.3d 593
PartiesUnited States of America, Plaintiff–Appellant (15–1299), Plaintiff–Appellee (15–1560), v. Kelvin Alexander Crumpton, Defendant–Appellee (15–1299), Defendant–Appellant (15–1560).
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

824 F.3d 593

United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellant (15–1299), Plaintiff–Appellee (15–1560)
v.
Kelvin Alexander Crumpton, Defendant–Appellee (15–1299), Defendant–Appellant (15–1560).

Nos. 15–1299/1560

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: March 11, 2016
Decided and Filed: June 2, 2016


ARGUED: Shane N. Cralle, United States Attorney's Office, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant in 15–1299 and for Appellee in 15–1560. Martin J. Beres, Clinton Township, Michigan, for Appellee in 15–1299 and for Appellant in 15–1560. ON BRIEF: Shane N. Cralle, United States Attorney's Office, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant in 15–1299 and for Appellee in 15–1560. Martin J. Beres, Clinton Township, Michigan, for Appellee in 15–1299 and for Appellant in 15–1560.

Before: DAUGHTREY, MOORE, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.

A two-count indictment charged Kelvin Crumpton with being a felon in possession of ammunition and with possessing various narcotics with the intent to distribute them. The evidence against him came largely from two sources: An October 18, 2013 search of his residence, which uncovered ammunition and narcotics, and two statements made by Crumpton to law enforcement while being interrogated during that search. Crumpton twice moved pretrial to suppress the evidence recovered from the search, but the district court denied both motions. At the close of the government's case, Crumpton argued for the first time that the first of his statements to law enforcement was made after inadequate Miranda warnings. The district court agreed, suppressed that statement, and instructed the jury not to consider it. After Crumpton was convicted by the jury on both counts, he moved for a partial judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession of ammunition. In the alternative, Crumpton sought a new trial under the theory that the jury had been prejudiced by hearing his first statement to law enforcement. The district court granted this motion, ruling sua sponte that Crumpton's second statement to law enforcement must be suppressed and that this suppression rendered the evidence insufficient to support the jury's verdict regarding the possession-of-ammunition charge. In the alternative, the district court granted Crumpton a new trial out of concern that the jury was prejudiced by hearing Crumpton's first statement to law enforcement. The government appeals the grant of Crumpton's motion for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial, and Crumpton appeals his narcotics conviction. For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE the district court's grant of Crumpton's motion for judgment of acquittal or a new trial regarding the ammunition charge and REINSTATE the jury's guilty verdict, AFFIRM Crumpton's narcotics conviction, and REMAND for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

735 Sloan Street is a single-story house located on the east side of Sloan Street in Detroit, and it is the only house on that side of an otherwise vacant, overgrown block. See R. 54 (Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 44:1–5) (Page ID #794). From the outside, it appears to be a single-family home, R. 53 (Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 64:24–65:6) (Page ID #667–68), but there are multiple mailboxes

824 F.3d 601

in front of the house, id. at 57:19–58:1 (Page ID #660–61).

In 2013, Officer Donald Farris of the Wayne County Sheriff's Office “had a confidential source ... that was providing information on [735 Sloan Street].” R. 54 (Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 44:12–13) (Page ID #794). That informant indicated to Officer Farris “that a black/male residing in this dwelling was selling crack-cocaine and heroin from this residence.” R. 15–1 (Search Warrant ¶ 3) (Page ID #102). Officer Farris investigated and “identified some individuals that were associated with that residence,” including Crumpton. See R. 54 (Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 44:16–17) (Page ID #794); R. 15–1 (Search Warrant ¶ 3) (Page ID #102). Officer Farris then presented a photograph of Crumpton to the confidential informant, who “immediately identified the photograph as the main narcotics seller at the Sloan St residence.” R. 15–1 (Search Warrant ¶ 4) (Page ID #102). The informant also indicated that Crumpton “sells narcotics on a regular basis and accepts money, firearms, vehicles, and other stolen property as payment” and that he “maintains firearms at the residence, likely to protect his drug trade.” Id. ¶ 5 (Page ID #102). Farris next utilized that confidential informant to conduct a purchase of crack cocaine from the home. See R. 54 (Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 45:2–10) (Page ID #795); R. 53 (Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 37:24–40:18, 61:4–62:2) (Page ID #640–43, 664–65); R. 15–1 (Search Warrant ¶ 4) (Page ID #102). Based upon this information, Officer Farris obtained a search warrant for the Sloan Street Residence.

The search warrant was executed on October 18, 2013. During the search, agents found that the house was divided between front and back, but “[t]here was an access way that would allow someone to move about the house from the front to the back”—“[i]t was a small kind of hole in the wall.” R. 53 (Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 9:19–23) (Page ID #612). There were also entrances to the house in both the front and back. See id. at 9:12–18 (Page ID #612). The back of the house had two rooms, one of which was set up as a bedroom while the other was “more like a closet with just a bunch of clothes and stuff scattered.” Id. at 10:23–11:5 (Page ID #613–14). The front of the house had a cluttered room with a number of items that Officer Farris suspected were stolen property, and also a “room kind of like a bedroom off of this front room that had almost a studio setup, a laptop and speakers and DJ type equipment.” Id. at 12:19–25 (Page ID #615). Although a number of the rooms in the house could have been used as bedrooms, only one bed was found in the house (in the back bedroom), id. at 64:5–11 (Page ID #667), and a single mattress was found in the front of the house, id. at 65:12–20 (Page ID #668).

The search revealed twenty-three rounds of ammunition of various types, found in a front room, id. at 12:5–13:6 (Page ID #615–16), as well as crack cocaine, powder cocaine, marijuana, and heroin in both the front and rear areas of the house, including in the bedroom in which Crumpton was found, id. at 10:15–24, 13:18–25:24 (Page ID #613, 616–28). Finally, law enforcement recovered from the rear of the house various “residency documents”—including one such document linking the Sloan Street address to Crumpton's name. See id. at 28:16–31:4 (Page ID #631–34). Law enforcement also located six people, in addition to Crumpton, including four who indicated that they lived at the Sloan Street Residence or were “staying there.” See id. at 6:14–10:2 (Page ID #609–12). Everyone was taken outside of the house while the search occurred. See id. at 103:13–22 (Page ID #706).

824 F.3d 602

At this point, Crumpton was interrogated by ATF Agent Gregory Lotoczky, who read Crumpton his Miranda rights. See id. at 104:1–5 (Page ID #707). This encounter was recorded (“the First Warnings”), and included Agent Lotoczky reciting and Crumpton confirming his understanding of the following: (1) “the right to remain silent”; (2) that “[a]nything you say can be used against you in court”; (3) “the right to consult with an attorney and have them present during questioning” and (4) that “[i]f you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to represent you prior to questioning.” R. 68–3 (Tr. of Audio Recording at 2) (Page ID #967). After briefly entering the house, Lotoczky returned and spoke with Crumpton. See R. 53 (Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 105:8–25) (Page ID #708). An audio recording of that conversation reflects that Crumpton admitted that “there might be some old bullets laying around” the house (“the First Statement”). R. 68–1 (Tr. of Audio Recording at 4) (Page ID #937).

Agent Lotoczky subsequently had another interaction with Crumpton, which took place in the Sloan Street Residence's front room. See R. 53 (Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 108:11–16) (Page ID #711). Lotoczky read Crumpton his Miranda rights (“the Second Warnings”)—this time adding a fifth warning that “if you decide to answer any questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering at any time.” R. 68–2 (Tr. of Audio Recording at 2–4) (Page ID #940–42). Agent Lotoczky then discussed Crumpton's ability to waive his rights, at which point Crumpton asked to “see the search warrant and, uh, or the arrest warrant or whatever you have.” Id. at 4 (Page ID #942). Agent Lotoczky said he would “show it to you in a little while,” and Crumpton reiterated his desire to see the search warrant. Id. at 4–5 (Page ID #942–43). At this point, Lotoczky returned to a discussion of Crumpton's Miranda rights, and Crumpton flatly stated “I want to see the search warrant before I sign anything,” then asking if “[i]t's like I'm giving consent then if I waive anything,” seeming to think that the Miranda waiver would reflect his consent to the search of his home. Id. at 5 (Page ID #943). Agent Lotoczky clarified that “the search warrant is for the house,” explaining that “[w]hat this is saying is that I read to you your rights and you understand your rights” and “that we can talk .... And if...

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