United States v. Crumpton
| Decision Date | 11 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 13–20842. |
| Citation | 88 F.Supp.3d 796 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Kelvin Alexander CRUMPTON, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Susan E. Gillooly, U.S. Attorney's Office, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff.
Federal Defender, Federal Defender Office, Wright W. Blake, Jr., Detroit, MI, for Defendant.
Order and Opinion Granting Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal [44], Denying Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Judgment of Acquittal [46], and Denying the Government's Motion to Strike [47]
After a three-day trial, a jury convicted Defendant under, inter alia, the Armed Career Criminal Act. The only evidence the Government offered to support that conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act were twenty-three bullets recovered from the living area of another person adjacent to Defendant's living area and the unwarned, non-voluntary, and unknowing inculpatory statements Defendant made during custodial interrogation. Because the Court now holds that Defendant's inculpatory statements were improperly admitted, there is not substantial and competent evidence to support Defendant's conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act. This is because contraband recovered from premises over which Defendant had nonexclusive possession, without more, as a matter of law cannot establish that Defendant had constructive possession of the bullets.
Before the Court now is Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal [44], the Government's Response [45], Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Judgment of Acquittal [46], and the Government's Motion to Strike Defendant's Pro Se Filing [47]. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal [44] as to his conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(e),—for possessing ammunition following three felony convictions—is GRANTED and Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Judgment of Acquittal [46] and the Government's Motion to Strike Defendant's Pro Se Filing [47] are both DENIED.
On October 18, 2013, law enforcement officers executed a state search warrant at 735 South Sloan Street, a residential structure that had been roughly divided into several apartments. Law enforcement obtained the search warrant after a confidential informant made a controlled purchase of crack cocaine from the location. When police executed the search warrant, they found Defendant with his girlfriend, Kimethia Tally, in the back section of the roughly divided apartments. Police also discovered several other people who were living or staying in the front area of the building. These people included Defendant's cousin, Ernest Crutchfield, tethered felon Brandon Navarre, William Tretyak, and Joseph Lucas. Some of the occupants —but not Defendant—attempted to flee when the police began to execute the search warrant. During the search police recovered twenty-three bullets from the front area of the building, away from Defendant's living area. Police also recovered cocaine, heroin, and marijuana.
During the execution of the search warrant, an ATF Agent recorded conversations he had with Defendant in which Defendant made inculpatory statements. The Government played three recorded conversations between the Agent and Defendant for the jury. The chronology of the recordings is first Exhibit 41, then Exhibit 29, and lastly Exhibit 30. Exhibit 41 contains the Agent's first insufficient set of warnings. Exhibit 29 contains Defendant making inculpatory statements, specifically that he knew there were bullets in the front area of the building. Exhibit 30 contains the Agent's second insufficient set of warnings and Defendant making further inculpatory statements, specifically that someone gave him the bullets and that he planned to give them away at some point.
The Government indicted Defendant—who has never been arrested for a violent crime—under the Armed Career Criminal Act on the basis of the twenty-three bullets recovered from the front of the structure away from his living area. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(e). Convictions under the Armed Career Criminal Act impose a minimum sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment. The Government also indicted Defendant under 21 U.S.C. § 841 —for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute—which carries a minimum sentence of five years of imprisonment.
During trial, Exhibit 41 revealed that the Agent's initial Miranda warning to Defendant was insufficient because the Agent neglected to inform Defendant of his right to discontinue questioning at any time.1 As a result, the Court instructed the jury to disregard Exhibit 29 because it contained audio of Defendant making inculpatory statements after the insufficient Miranda warning contained in Exhibit 41.
During trial, the Court admitted Defendant's inculpatory statements in Exhibit 30. Defendant did not raise any objection about the sufficiency of the Agent's second Miranda warning in Exhibit 30 during trial or in his post-trial motions.2 On September 5, 2014, following a three day trial, a jury convicted Defendant on both counts of the indictment.
In deciding Defendant's Motions [44, 46], the Court reviewed the Agent's second attempt to Mirandize Defendant recorded in Government Exhibit 30. During the Court's post-trial review, it became clear that, in fact, the Agent's second attempt to Mirandize Defendant was also insufficient and even if it were not insufficient, Defendant's waiver was invalid.3 Consequently, Defendant's inculpatory statements contained in Exhibit 30 were improperly before the jury.
Defendant now moves for a Judgment of Acquittal, or in the Alternative, a Conditional New Trial pursuant to Rule 29. Defendant's Motion [44] seeks to vacate only his conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(e) —the Armed Career Criminal Act. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c)(2) allows a court to set aside a jury's guilty verdict and enter an acquittal if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the court determines no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Mack, 729 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir.2013). To reverse, the Court must determine that the verdict is not supported by “substantial and competent evidence” on the record as a whole. United States v. Grubbs, 506 F.3d 434, 438 (6th Cir.2007).
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits any individual from being “compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. Amend. V. An individual who is “taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning,” must be provided information on the following “[p]rocedural safeguards” to protect his right against self-incrimination:
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).4
“Statements made by a defendant in response to interrogation while in police custody are not admissible unless the defendant has first been apprized [sic] of the constitutional right against self-incrimination and has validly waived this right.” United States v. Cole, 315 F.3d 633, 636 (6th Cir.2003) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ). Here, there are two bases that are each independently sufficient to entitle Defendant to acquittal on the Armed Career Criminal Act conviction. First, Defendant was not sufficiently warned that his custodial statements could be used against him in court. Second, even presuming arguendo that the warnings were sufficient, the totality of the circumstances indicates that Defendant did not validly waive his Miranda rights. Under either rationale, Defendant's inculpatory statements were inadmissible, Cole, 315 F.3d at 636, and the remaining evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction.
A suspect may validly waive his Miranda rights only if the waiver is made “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Waiver validity analysis contains two dimensions: voluntariness and comprehension. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). First, whether the right was relinquished voluntarily turns on whether the waiver was the product of a “free and deliberate choice” rather than the result of “intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Id. And second, whether it was waived knowingly and intelligently—or with comprehension —turns on whether the waiver was made “with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id. In evaluating both factors, courts must consider the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” Id. The culpability of an officer—that is, the intentionality or inadvertence of his actions—is irrelevant to the questions of both voluntariness and comprehension. Id. at 423.
The objective of Miranda warnings is not to mold police conduct for its own sake. Moran, 475 U.S. at 424–25, 106 S.Ct. 1135. Rather, Miranda and its “corollary,” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)5 have dual purposes: safeguarding a suspect's exercise of his constitutional rights in the face of the state's disproportionate power and providing clear guidance to law enforcement in how to handle custodial interrogations. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680, 108 S.Ct....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
United States v. Brown
...merits, it would fail. He identifies error based on: (1) United States v. Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019); (2) United States v. Crumpton, 88 F. Supp. 3d 796 (E.D. Mich. 2015), rev'd in part, 824 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2016); and (3) United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). None aids his c......
-
United States v. Walker, Criminal No. 15-20262
...Fraser's recital was clear and provided Defendant with a reasonable understanding of his rights at that time. See U.S. v. Crumpton, 88 F.Supp.3d 796 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (in determining whether a law enforcement officer adequately conveyed the Miranda warnings, a court's inquiry focuses on whe......