United States v. Crutch
| Decision Date | 13 June 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 650,Docket 72-1047.,650 |
| Citation | 461 F.2d 1200 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Eugene CRUTCH, a/k/a Charles Jenkins, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Howard J. Stechel, Asst. U.S. Atty. (with David G. Trager, Asst. U.S. Atty., E.D.N.Y., on the brief), for appellant.
Robert G. Harley, of Clark & Harley, Jamaica, N.Y., for appellee.
Before CLARK, Associate Justice,* LUMBARD, Circuit Judge, and TYLER, District Judge.**
This appeal reflects an infelicitous impasse that arose between the district judge and the assistant U. S. attorney in their respective efforts to dispose of this litigation with dispatch. The two-count indictment filed July 8, 1971, charged the appellee Eugene Crutch, with mail fraud in devising a scheme to induce the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company of New York to issue him a credit card by means of false representations as to name and other material facts. The indictment did not allege any loss and no loss has been incurred on the issuance of the credit card.
The Government had filed a notice of readiness in the case on July 27, 1971, and counsel was appointed for Crutch who had been released on his own cognizance. Crutch entered a plea of not guilty on September 22, 1971; pre-trial was held and concluded and only handwriting exemplars remained to be furnished. The trial was set for October 26, 1971. Thereafter Crutch agreed to appear on October 18 and give handwriting samples. When he failed to appear, a bench warrant was issued for him and a conference set for October 21, 1971. At that time Crutch and his counsel appeared but the exemplars had not been furnished. When the Government indicated that it would not be able to proceed on the 26th because of this and other reasons, which the prosecutor said he would outline "immediately," the defense counsel stipulated to the signature on the application for the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company credit card. The prosecutor then requested a brief adjournment or a dismissal on the ground that subsequent to the indictment, the Government had obtained new evidence that indicated that Crutch was operating on a very large scale, having obtained some 15 additional credit cards in similar fashion and had used them to buy merchandise or receive credit in excess of $10,000. The judge in a colloquy with the prosecutor said that he was not going to permit the indictment to be dismissed and that the trial would go forward on the next Tuesday, October 26. The prosecutor then advised the judge that he would not be prepared to proceed on that date. The judge then suggested that the prosecutor come in on the next Monday, October 25, and tell him of the additional evidence and perhaps it could be admitted as evidence in this case to show "the state of mind" of Crutch. Upon being advised by the prosecutor, "I don't believe that we could be prepared," the judge replied:
On Tuesday the prosecutor moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he wished to seek a new indictment. In elaboration he stated that the Government intended to obtain another indictment, place the charges on all of the credit cards in it and avoid two trials. The judge indicated there that if the charges under this indictment were separate from the new charges, the charges would have to be severed. If they were not separate then the other charges would be additional evidence in this indictment and could be considered by him at the time of sentencing, as it "will of course be," since Crutch could receive a maximum of ten years. When the prosecutor stated, "The Government seeks a jury verdict on all acts we believe to be criminal," the judge replied:
The remaining colloquy need not be detailed,...
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United States v. Jenkins, 79
...we have not decided. We are not dealing with appeals by the Government before jeopardy has attached, see fn. 12, as in United States v. Crutch, 461 F.2d 1200 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 883, 93 S.Ct. 172, 34 L.Ed.2d 139 (1972); United States v. Castellanos, 478 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1973);......
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United States v. DiStefano
...order dismissing the indictment would be appealable;2 indeed, we have recently entertained precisely such an appeal, United States v. Crutch, 461 F.2d 1200 (2 Cir.1972). It is equally beyond question that the present statute does not apply since § 14(b) provides that the 1970 amendments sha......
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United States v. Bey
...the Omnibus Crime Control Act, 84 Stat. 1890 (1970). Under that section orders dismissing indictments are appealable. United States v. Crutch, 461 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. DiStefano, 464 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1972); see also 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News p. 5848. Since......
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U.S. v. Macklin
...by the United States under the 1971 amendment to section 3731. See United States v. DiStefano,supra, 464 F.2d at 846-47; United States v. Crutch, 461 F.2d 1200 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 883, 93 S.Ct. 172, 34 L.Ed.2d 139 The government concedes that if the defendant had made a timely ......