United States v. Cruz, Cr. No. 81-189(PG).
| Decision Date | 04 May 1982 |
| Docket Number | Cr. No. 81-189(PG). |
| Citation | 539 F. Supp. 231 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Carlos Rodriguez CRUZ. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Jose A. Quiles and Jose Aguayo, Asst. U. S. Attys., Hato Rey, P. R., for plaintiff.
There are pending before the Court two motions filed in relation to defendant Carlos Rodríguez Cruz, to wit: (1) Motion to Dismiss Information and Proceed to Trial in Original Indictment, dated December 23, 1981; and (2) Motion in Opposition to Motion and for Dismissal of Information, dated January 7, 1982. A brief history of the case is appropriate at this time.
On June 26, 1981, a complaint was filed before a U. S. Magistrate of this Court charging Carlos Rodríguez Cruz (Rodríguez) and three other co-defendants with a violation of Title 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2, 111, 1114.1 Subsequent proceedings in the District Court produced a two-count indictment, filed on July 8, 1981.2 On August 20, 1981, the case is set for trial for September 21, 1981. A series of motions and hearings on preliminary matters transpired after the case was set for trial, being one of those motions a motion by defendant Flecha Salcedo for a mental competency hearing, filed on September 18, 1981, which necessarily postponed the trial setting of all defendants since a previous motion for severance had been denied by the Court. The mental competency hearing was held and on October 11, 1981, the Court ordered defendant Flecha Salcedo to be committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. 4246.3
In the meantime, the other co-defendants, including Rodríguez, plea bargained their cases with the U. S. Attorney's Office. Defendants Nieves Hernández and Medina Negrón both plead guilty to Count One of the Indictment on October 19, 1981, and were subsequently sentenced on December 11, 1981, to four and eight years imprisonment, respectively, and each received a special parole term of three years.
The case of Rodríguez was different. On October 19, 1981, instead of pleading guilty to the indictment, the U. S. Attorney filed a one-count information charging Rodríguez with simple possession of cocaine.4 During the procedure followed pursuant to Rule 11 of the F.R.Cr.P., the Assistant U. S. Attorney present in court and the attorney for Rodríguez informed the Court that a plea agreement had been reached in the case. The extent of said plea bargaining, as reflected in the record, is that in exchange for defendant's plea the government agreed to file an information charging a misdemeanor drug violation, and at the time of sentencing recommend to the Court that the defendant be placed on probation pursuant to 844(b)5 and that the felony indictment be dismissed.
Following the recital for the record of the plea agreement, the Court advised the defendant, in so many words, that it would follow the recommendation of the government at the time of sentencing to dismiss Count One of the Indictment,6 but that as to the sentence to be recommended, the Court would not know what it would be doing until it received the pre-sentence report, and, therefore, the Court was not bound7 by said recommendation and it could impose maximum punishment under 844(a).8 Thereafter, the Court accepted the plea of guilty, requested a pre-sentence report and set the case down for sentence on December 11, 1981.9
After the Court had sentenced the other two co-defendants the Court refused to sentence this defendant in what it felt was doing an injustice in the case. The Court, after receiving a complete pre-sentence report, realized that this defendant was the midpoint of the criminal activity that culminated in the arrest and charge of the four defendants. He was the one that made possible the transaction by bringing together the various participants, thus, inuring to himself a $1,000.00 profit. The official version of the transaction reveals that the original demand was for one fourth kilogram of cocaine for $16,000.00, but that the defendants Medina and Rodríguez were able to produce one eighth kilogram of cocaine of excellent quality for only $10,000.00. Since the amount of cocaine was not what had been promised, the undercover agents did not accept the package containing the narcotics and instead negotiated with Medina (defendant's partner) for the delivery of the full eight ounces of cocaine the next day. Thereafter, the arrest of the defendant was effectuated after a high-speed chase ensued, and weapons and the cocaine were thrown out of the car by defendant.
The thorny issue of this case in its present posture is whether the Court rejected the plea agreement and must now proceed under Rule 11(e)(4)10 upon defendant's insistence on his plea of guilty to the Information, or can the Court, in its inherent power to see that justice is done, vacate defendant's plea over his objection, order the Information filed dismissed, and proceed to try him on the original Indictment.
This is not the customary case of a defendant entering a plea of guilty, and upon being sentenced, moving the Court at some later date to vacate his sentence and allow him to withdraw his plea for any number of reasons not relevant herein. Nor is this the case of a defendant moving the Court under Rule 32(d) F.R.Cr.P.11 to withdraw his plea. To the contrary, the gist of Rodríguez' motion of January 7, 1982, is to maintain his plea of guilty and have another Judge of this Court sentence him pursuant to the plea agreement.
Upon review of the record of this case, Rodríguez' pre-sentence report, the procedures followed by the Court during the hearings held on October 19, and December 11, 1981, the Court is of the opinion that it has sound reasons for rejecting the plea agreement, vacating the plea of guilty, dismissing the Information, and setting the case down for further proceedings on the Indictment before another Judge of this Court.12
The cornerstone for our ruling was laid down in 1971 when the Supreme Court decided the case of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). The Court, speaking thru the Chief Justice, stated at page 262: . Appropriately, when a court is going to vacate a plea of guilty previously entered it cannot exercise its judicial discretion in a vacuum for "(t)his phase of the process of criminal justice, and the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances.". Santobello, supra, at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499.
The record before the Court paints a picture of a defendant getting off with a very light sentence when the circumstances of the case tend to indicate that a miscarriage of justice is in the making, not only to the public, but also to the two co-defendants who plead to felony charges. This Court does not shun away from plea bargainings and, on the contrary, recognizes the many advantages it has for the whole criminal justice system. But, that does not mean that the Court must stand by idle, with arms folded, and allow each bargain brought before it without inquiring whether the totality of the circumstances and the rights and expectations of the various components of the system are accounted for.
The duty required of a court in pondering the decision to accept or reject a bargain, or as in the specific circumstances of this case, to vacate a plea of guilty already accepted, has been limpidly stated in the case of U. S. v. Munroe, 493 F.Supp. 134 (E.D.Tenn., 1980). Speaking in terms of encouraging plea bargains, the court, at page 136, stated:
In U. S. v. Bednarski, 445 F.2d 364 (1 Cir., 1971) the basic question presented was whether the court was required to accept or not a plea of guilty. (Defendant denied knowledge of the falsity of his understated tax at the time of filing.) The Court found no requirement in Rule 11 that obliges a court to accept a guilty plea merely because it was warranted in so doing. Equally important the Court also recognized that the public must also be taken into consideration in contemplating the conviction of a person. Bednarski teaches us that "... the public might well not understand or accept the fact that a defendant who denied his guilt was nonetheless placed in a position of pleading guilty and going to jail.". Ibid., at 366.
It can well be argued, with equal force, that the public might well not understand or accept (a matter of grave concern in this case in light of the heavy sentences imposed upon parties in-pari-delicto) the fact that a defendant that participated as fully in the criminal enterprise as the other co-defendants was nonetheless placed in a much more favorable position of pleading to a misdemeanor and being recommended for probation for a maximum term of one year, with the concomitant negativeness of criminal record. In U. S. v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700 (5 Cir., 1977), as in our case, the Court's decision that the plea bargain was going to...
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