United States v. De La Cruz
Decision Date | 26 May 2021 |
Docket Number | No. 18-1710,18-1710 |
Citation | 998 F.3d 508 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ángel DE LA CRUZ, Defendant, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Kevin E. Lerman, with whom Eric Alexander Vos, Federal Public Defender, Vivianne M. Marrero, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Supervisor, Appeals Section, and Franco L. Pérez-Redondo, Research & Writing Specialist, San Juan, PR, were on brief, for appellant.
Antonio L. Pérez-Alonso, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, San Juan, PR, and Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee.
Before Lynch, Selya, and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Ángel De la Cruz and two others were intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard while smuggling drugs on a small ship in the waters north of Puerto Rico. The Coast Guard seized a large amount of cocaine from the ship and arrested De la Cruz and the other two crewmembers. They were brought to Puerto Rico and charged by indictment with several drug-related offenses, including violations of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act ("MDLEA"), 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503 and 70506. The MDLEA offenses carried a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years' imprisonment. See id. § 70506(a) - (b) ; 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B) (2018).
De la Cruz pleaded guilty to all counts. As to sentencing, he argued that he qualified for "safety valve" relief, which authorizes a district court to impose a sentence below the statutorily prescribed mandatory minimum sentence for certain enumerated offenses if the court makes several specific factual findings at sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2018). The district court held that De la Cruz was ineligible for safety valve relief for his MDLEA offenses because they were not among those offenses specifically enumerated in the safety valve statute, and it sentenced him to the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years' imprisonment under the MDLEA. We now join the majority of circuits in holding that MDLEA offenses were not safety-valve eligible under the then-applicable safety valve provision and so affirm.
Because De la Cruz pleaded guilty, "we draw the facts from the plea colloquy, the unchallenged portions of the presentence investigation report, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing." United States v. Padilla-Colón, 578 F.3d 23, 25 (1st Cir. 2009).
On December 10, 2017, the U.S. Coast Guard detected a suspicious vessel traveling at a high rate of speed north of Fajardo, Puerto Rico. A Coast Guard team intercepted and boarded the ship and found three Dominican nationals on board, including De la Cruz, as well as fifty-three bales of suspected narcotics. The government of the Dominican Republic did not claim nationality over the ship. De la Cruz does not question that both he and the ship were subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
The Coast Guard team conducted field tests of the bales of suspected narcotics and they tested positive for cocaine. All three crewmembers were arrested and brought to Puerto Rico. About 1,325 kilograms of cocaine were seized from the ship.
De la Cruz was indicted on one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of a controlled substance on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in violation of the MDLEA, 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503 and 70506 ; one count of aiding or abetting the MDLEA offense in violation of §§ 70503 and 70506 and 18 U.S.C. § 2 ; and one count of conspiracy to import into the United States five kilograms or more of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960, and 963.
In March 2018, De la Cruz entered a straight plea of guilty to all three counts. He argued for a safety valve reduction, and the government opposed and argued that he was ineligible for safety valve relief as a matter of law because the applicable safety valve provision did not apply to MDLEA offenses. The government argued that Congress had deliberately chosen in the text of the safety valve statute to exclude MDLEA offenses from those eligible for safety valve relief by explicitly including other offenses in the safety valve statute, but not MDLEA offenses.
The district court agreed with the government and ruled that De la Cruz was ineligible for safety valve relief in a written memorandum and order in June 2018. The district court relied on a previous decision it had written in which it had held that the plain language of the safety valve statute did not apply to offenses under the MDLEA and that the history of the MDLEA and safety valve statute and case law from other circuits further confirmed that conclusion. See United States v. Espinal-Mieses, 313 F. Supp. 3d 376, 381-85 (D.P.R. 2018). The court went on to conclude that even though De la Cruz had also been convicted of non-MDLEA offenses, his sentence could not fall below the mandatory minimum of ten years' imprisonment for the MDLEA offenses. De la Cruz filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied.
At the sentencing hearing in July 2018, the district court denied De la Cruz's request for a minor role reduction.1 Nonetheless, it varied downward and imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years' imprisonment as to each count to be served concurrently.
De la Cruz timely appealed his sentence.
De la Cruz makes two primary arguments: (1) that the district court erroneously determined that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) safety valve provision did not apply to MDLEA offenses such that it could not sentence him below the ten-year mandatory minimum; and (2) that the court erred in denying the minor role reduction.2 The parties agree that, because the district court imposed the minimum statutory sentence required under the MDLEA, De la Cruz's challenge to the denial of the minor role reduction is moot if this Court rejects his safety valve argument.3
The government does not challenge De la Cruz's assertion that, if eligible, he would meet the five fact-based criteria for safety valve relief. We review de novo the issue of whether the safety valve applied to MDLEA offenses because it is a purely legal issue of statutory interpretation. See Padilla-Colón, 578 F.3d at 29.
Three of our sister circuits have already decided this precise issue and held that the safety valve provision did not apply to offenses under the MDLEA under the plain language of the statute. See United States v. Anchundia-Espinoza, 897 F.3d 629, 633-34 (5th Cir. 2018) ; United States v. Pertuz-Pertuz, 679 F.3d 1327, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 2012) ; United States v. Gamboa-Cardenas, 508 F.3d 491, 496-502 (9th Cir. 2007). Only one circuit has held that the safety valve provision did apply to such offenses, reasoning that it did so based on the interaction between the MDLEA and the penalty provision of 21 U.S.C. § 960. See United States v. Mosquera-Murillo, 902 F.3d 285, 292-96 (D.C. Cir. 2018). We agree with the majority view and hold that the applicable safety valve provision did not apply to offenses under the MDLEA based on the plain language of the statute as well as the history and structure of that statute and others.4
Because the language of the MDLEA, 21 U.S.C. § 960, and the safety valve provision is essential to both parties' arguments, we first discuss the language of those statutes and provide a brief history of each.
Congress enacted the MDLEA in 1980 "to facilitate increased enforcement by the Coast Guard of laws relating to the importation of controlled substances, and for other purposes." Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159, 1159 (1980) ( ).5 The MDLEA provides that "[w]hile on board a covered vessel, an individual may not," among other things, "knowingly or intentionally ... manufacture or distribute, or possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance." 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a). A separate penalty section of the MDLEA, in turn, provides that an offense or a conspiracy or attempt to commit an offense under § 70503(a)(1) "shall be punished as provided in [ 21 U.S.C. § 960 ]" if it is the person's first felony drug offense. 46 U.S.C. § 70506(a) - (b) ; see also 21 U.S.C. § 962(b).
Congress enacted 21 U.S.C. § 960 in 1970 as part of the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1010, 84 Stat. 1236, 1290 (1970) ( ). Section 960 has several subsections. Section 960(a) provides the "[u]nlawful acts" which are punishable under the statute and specifically lists six other statutes which constitute those unlawful acts under § 960. 21 U.S.C. § 960(a) (2018) ( ). MDLEA offenses are not among those listed as "[u]nlawful acts" under § 960(a). Although the MDLEA did not exist at the time § 960 was first enacted, § 960 was later amended a number of times after the MDLEA was enacted, including in the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Prosecution Improvements Act of 1986. See Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1005, 1302, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-6, 3207-15 to -18 (1986). None of those later amendments to § 960 added the MDLEA to the list of offenses which constituted "[u]nlawful acts" under § 960(a).
Section 960(a) provides that the enumerated unlawful acts "shall be punished as provided in subsection (b)." It is pursuant to § 960(b) that MDLEA offenses under § 70503(a)(1) are punished. See 46 U.S.C. § 70506(a) - (b).
Section 960(b), titled "[p]enalties," describes how the drug-related offenses to which it applies should be punished based on the drug type and amount involved. It provides that when the violation involves "5 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of [cocaine] ... the person committing such violation shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years" if there was no...
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