United States v. Curtin
| Docket Number | 22-10509 |
| Decision Date | 28 August 2023 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAWRENCE F. CURTIN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20102-wfjg-1
Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
Lawrence Curtin-who has long struggled with serious mental-health issues-has a pattern of threatening judges. This case arises out of a threat that he recently made against a federal magistrate judge in his hometown of Fort Pierce, Florida. Curtin was convicted in federal court of (1) mailing a threatening communication, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c), and (2) threatening a federal official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). For his crimes, he was sentenced to 60 months in prison. Curtin now challenges his convictions and sentence on five grounds. After careful consideration, we affirm.
The story underlying this appeal begins in 2012, when Curtin was injured in a car wreck. The accident eventually spawned four lawsuits and, more troublingly, two letters threatening judges-including the one underlying the convictions at issue here. Here are the details: Curtin initially filed but lost a personal-injury action in Florida state court. He followed up with back-to-back civil suits in federal court. Both cases were initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Shaniek Maynard who recommended that they be dismissed. Curtin separately complained to the Florida Judicial Qualification Commission about the handling of his original case by state-court Judge Janet Croom. The commission referred Curtin for prosecution on the ground that his complaint contained a threat-it invoked the "Biblical law which states an 'eye for an eye'" and expressed Curtin's view that he had an "obligation . . . to stop Croom." The charges were ultimately dismissed, however, when a Florida court found Curtin incompetent to stand trial.
Continuing his litigation flurry, Curtin filed yet another federal suit challenging the state-court decisions-this time adding the "Florida State Court System" as a defendant alleging that it was (or its members were) part of an organized-crime conspiracy. That case, too, was assigned to Judge Maynard, who again recommended dismissal. The objection that Curtin lodged in response to Judge Maynard's report and recommendation forms the basis of this case. Judge Maynard interpreted Curtin's objection as containing a threat to her and her family. Here's the key passage:
The YouTube clip featured a video of Curtin listening to the gospel hymn "Road to Glory" in a church, approaching the pulpit, and taking a black preacher's hand. Judge Maynard is black, and her father was a pastor who had been working in the Fort Pierce community-where both Curtin and Judge Maynard lived-for about 20 years.
A jury convicted Curtin of mailing a threatening communication, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c), and of threatening a federal official, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). He now appeals, raising several challenges to his convictions and sentences. We will take up Curtin's contentions in turn, and we will provide additional factual and procedural detail as necessary.
Curtin first contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him. We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges de novo, United States v Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 739-40 (11th Cir. 1989), making "[a]ll factual and credibility inferences" in the government's favor, United States v. Cooper, 203 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2000). "In order to find the evidence sufficient, we need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or find the evidence wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided that a reasonable factfinder could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Kelly, 888 F.2d at 740. We consider Curtin's challenges to each of his convictions separately.
To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 876(c), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) knowingly sent a message through the mail, (2) knew that the mailing contained a "true threat," and (3) intended (or at least knew) that the statement would be viewed as a threat.[2] 18 U.S.C. § 876(c); cf. United States v. Oliver, 19 F.4th 512, 517 (1st Cir. 2021) (reciting § 876(c)'s elements). Curtin concedes that he knowingly mailed the objection to Judge Maynard's report and recommendation. The questions, therefore, are whether he knew that the mailing contained a true threat and intended that Judge Maynard would view it as such.[3]
Curtin's mental state, of course, is provable through circumstantial evidence. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 434 (1985); United States v. Hawley, 755 F.2d 788, 790 (11th Cir. 1985). With respect to § 876(c)'s second and third elements, the strongest items of evidence illustrating Curtin's state of mind are his own words. In plain terms, Curtin stated in his objection that he thought "[i]t [was] obvious from the totality of words in the song including its title that [he was] threatening Maynard with death and bodily harm" and, further, that he was "threatening Maynard who is a woman of color with death." And as if to underscore his seriousness, Curtin buttressed his words with all caps accusations (e.g., "SHE COVERED IT UP"), underlined emphasis ("Maynard is unable to understand this"), and an explicit reference to Judge Maynard's race.
Curtin now implies that he was being sarcastic and insists that, in any event, he didn't intend the statement as a threat. Perhaps. All that matters for present purposes, though, is that it wouldn't be unreasonable for a factfinder to conclude, as the jury here clearly did, that Curtin meant what he said and that he meant to threaten Judge Maynard. And indeed, we have already rejected a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge in similar circumstances- there, where a defendant called his threat to assassinate the President "political hyperbole." United States v. Callahan, 702 F.2d 964, 965-66 (11th Cir. 1983) (distinguishing Watts v United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969)).
For similar reasons, we needn't get bogged down in the parties' competing interpretations of the song, "Road to Glory"- whether it was, as Curtin insists, an innocuous attachment or instead, as the government says, a broadening of the threat to include Judge Maynard's family. Given the applicable standard of review, and construing the facts in the government's favor, we have no trouble concluding that a reasonable jury could have found that the video corroborated rather than mitigated Curtin's plain-language threats.
In sum, there was ample evidence to support the jury's determination that Curtin knowingly sent a true threat and intended that it would be viewed as such-and thus to convict him under § 876(c).
For the same reasons, there was sufficient evidence to convict Curtin of threatening a federal judge in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). That statute requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) "threaten[ed] to assault, kidnap, or murder" a federal judge (2) with "intent to retaliate" against her "on account of the performance of official duties." Id. As we have explained, a jury could reasonably have concluded from the text and context of Curtin's objection that he meant to threaten Judge Maynard with "death" and "bodily injury"-i.e., "murder" and "assault" within the meaning of the statute. And because he lodged his objection in response to Judge Maynard's report and recommendation, the jury could also have reasonably concluded that he threatened her in an effort to "retaliate" against her "on account of [her] performance of official duties."
Curtin next argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the government violated 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). In relevant part, that provision states that a district court may commit a defendant to the "custody of the Attorney General" to be hospitalized for "treatment in a suitable facility" if the "court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent." Id. Importantly here the statute goes on to say that the defendant's hospitalization is authorized only for "a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward." Id. § 4241(d)(1).
Here are the facts relevant to Curtin's § 4241(d) challenge: Curtin was originally arrested and detained on August 24, 2020, and a week later he was denied release under the Bail Reform Act on the ground...
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