United States v. Dacy

• Decision Date: 10 August 2020
• Docket Number: Criminal Case No. 14-153 (RBW)
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. EDWARD DACY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. EDWARD DACY, Defendant.

Criminal Case No. 14-153 (RBW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

August 10, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On March 25, 2015, a jury found the defendant, Edward Dacy, guilty of (1) conspiracy to commit bank, mail, and wire fraud ("Count One"), see Verdict Form at 1; (2) five counts of bank fraud ("Counts Two through Six"), see id. at 1-3; and (3) four counts of mail fraud affecting a financial institution ("Counts Sixteen through Nineteen"), see id. at 6. Thereafter, the Court sentenced the defendant to a sixty-month term of incarceration for Count One and a seventy-two-month term of incarceration as to each of Counts Two through Six and Counts Sixteen through Nineteen, to run concurrent with each other. See Judgment in a Criminal Case ("Judgment") at 3. On April 25, 2017, the defendant's conviction was affirmed by the District of Columbia Circuit. See Judgment, United States v. Dacy, No. 15-3052 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 25, 2017). Currently pending before the Court are (1) the defendant's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody ("Def.'s § 2255 Mot."), in which the defendant claims that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel, see Def.'s § 2255 Mot., Exhibit ("Ex.") A (Defendant's Memorandum in Support of His § 2255 Motion ("Def.'s Mem.")) at 2-5; (2) the defendant's Motion to Appoint [a] Public Defender (the "defendant's motion to appoint counsel"); (3) the defendant's requests for the appointment of counsel, the reversal of his conviction, and a judgment of acquittal, see Letter filed October 12, 2018 (the "first set of requests"); (4) the defendant's requests to vacate, set aside, and correct his sentence and to enjoin the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Prisons from enforcing his sentence, see Letter filed February 23, 2020 (the "second set of requests"); and (5) the defendant's requests for a judgment of acquittal, the reversal of his convictions, the appointment of counsel, and an evidentiary hearing, see Letter filed July 23, 2020 (the "third set of requests"). Upon careful consideration of the parties' submissions,¹ the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must deny the defendant's § 2255 motion, his motion to appoint counsel, and his first, second, and third set of requests.²

I. BACKGROUND

On July 17, 2014, the defendant was indicted on one count of conspiracy, five counts of bank fraud, nine counts of wire fraud, and four counts of mail fraud. See Indictment at 1, 19-22, 24. He pleaded not guilty on August 8, 2014, see Minute Entry (Aug. 8, 2014), and on March 11, 2015, trial commenced in this case, see Minute Entry (Mar. 11, 2015).

During trial, the government presented evidence showing that the defendant worked for U.S. Titles, Inc. ("U.S. Titles"), see Trial Tr. 1:12, 1096:1-20, and that during his employment, the defendant worked with Frank Davis, a real estate investor, and Frederick Robinson, Sr., a contractor, to purchase, renovate, and sell properties, to defraud mortgage lenders through false loan applications associated with these purchases, see id. 320:7-321:13, 769:15-771:11. According to the testimony presented at trial, the defendant, Davis, and Robinson listed strawbuyers' names and credit profiles on settlement documents, including HUD-1 documents, as the borrower, despite the fact that the straw buyer would never occupy, own, or pay for the property, see Trial Tr. 180:24-181:14, 769:15-771:11, 938:23-939:11, and that the defendant executed the scheme by signing the HUD-1 documents on behalf of U.S. Titles, see Trial Tr. 160:2-3, 195:7, 324:23-325:25, 339:4-340:7, 563:11-23; see also Gov't's Ex. 1, 4, 6-9, 11-13, 15, 18, 73-78, 80-81, 85, 105-108. According to the evidence, the defendant knew that he was involved in a larger scale scheme when he created and signed the HUD-1 forms and when he was involved with the disbursement of the funds that were part of the real estate transactions involved in the scheme. See Trial Tr. 563:9-25, 1026:17-1027:8, 1028:16-1029:6.

After a six-day trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of ten counts of the indictment: Count One, Counts Two through Six, and Counts Sixteen through Nineteen, see Judgment at 1-2, and the Court sentenced the defendant to a total of seventy-two months of incarceration, see id. After sentencing, the defendant appealed his conviction and sentence, and the Circuit affirmed. See Judgment at 2-5, United States v. Dacy, No. 15-3052 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 25, 2017). Thereafter, the defendant filed his § 2255 motion, his motion to appoint counsel, and his first, second, and third set of requests, which are the subjects of this Memorandum Opinion.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion

28 U.S.C. § 2255 permits a person in custody to "move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside[,] or correct the sentence" on the grounds that "the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2018). If the reviewing court finds that any of these grounds exist, it "shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner orresentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate." Id. § 2255(b).

B. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Although "[t]here is no constitutional right to appointment of counsel in habeas corpus proceedings[,] . . . representation may be provided [under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2018),] 'for any financially eligible person who . . . is seeking relief under section . . . 2225 of title 28' if 'the interests of justice so require.'" United States v. King, 4 F. Supp. 3d 114, 125 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)).

To determine whether appointing counsel is in the interests of justice, a court must consider 1) the [defendant's] likelihood of success on the merits, 2) the ability of the [defendant] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved, and 3) the factual complexity of the case and whether the [defendant] has the ability to investigate undeveloped facts.

United States v. Washington, 782 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2011).

III. ANALYSIS

A. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be brought under § 2255, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which guarantees a "right to counsel . . . to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984). If the reviewing court finds that the Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim brought under § 2255 has merit, it "shall vacate and set the judgment aside[,] and [it] shall [also] discharge the prisoner[,] resentence him[,] grant a new trial[,] or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).

"To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must demonstrate both deficient performance [by his counsel] and prejudice to him [because of counsel's deficientperformance]." United States v. Williams, 488 F.3d 1004, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). An attorney's performance will be found to be deficient only when the attorney "made errors so serious that [he or she] was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [to] the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also United States v. Abney, 812 F.3d 1079, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ("Counsel's performance is 'deficient' when his representation falls below an objective standard of reasonableness." (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 676 F.3d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2012))). In other words, an attorney must provide "reasonably effective assistance," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, measured by "prevailing professional norms," id. at 688; see also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003) ("[A] defendant claiming ineffective [assistance of] counsel must show that counsel's actions were not supported by a reasonable strategy."). When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential," and courts "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

Prejudice occurs only if there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A "reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. To satisfy the high standard for prejudice, the defendant must show that the prejudice was so serious that it deprived him of a fair proceeding. See id. at 687; see also United States v. Gooch, 842 F.3d 1274, 1279-80 (finding that strong evidence influenced the jury more than fleeting testimony, and thus, there was no prejudice). "The probability of a different result must be 'substantial, not just conceivable.'" United States v. Aguiar, 894 F.3d 351, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Griffith, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011)).

In determining whether allegedly ineffective counsel prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings, a court

must consider the totality of the evidence [that was] before the judge or jury. Some of the factual findings will have been unaffected by the errors, and factual findings that were affected will have been affected in different ways. Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had an isolated, trivial effect. Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record

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