United States v. Daniels
| Decision Date | 19 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 6:20-cv-06088,Criminal No. 6:17-cr-60038 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RESPONDENT v. NICO DESHAWN DANIELS MOVANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Arkansas |
Movant is Nico Deshawn Daniels ("Daniels") who filed a pro se Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2008) to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody. ECF No. 89. Daniels filed this Motion on August 18, 2020. Id. Thereafter, Daniels was appointed counsel, and his counsel has raised no issues beyond those raised in the original Motion. ECF No. 94. On January 11, 2021, the Government responded to this Motion. ECF No. 97.
The Motion was referred for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for the disposition of the case. The Court has reviewed the Motion and the response; and based upon that review, the Court recommends this Motion be DENIED.
On October 25, 2017, Daniels was charged in a one-count Indictment issued by a Federal Grand Jury for the Western District of Arkansas. ECF No. 1. Count One charged Daniels as follows:
On or about July 30, 2017, in the Western District of Arkansas, Hot Springs Division, the defendant, NICO DESHAWN DANIELS, having been previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year knowingly possessed a firearm, specifically a Charter Arms .38 cal. Revolver, serial number 748411, which had been shipped and transported in interstate commerce, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).
Id. at 1. Daniels appeared for an initial appearance on November 6, 2017. ECF No. 8. The Federal Defender2 was appointed to represent Daniels. ECF No. 14.
On December 14, 2017, Daniels filed a motion to suppress statements he made to Arkadelphia police, arguing those statements were the product of custodial interrogation taken without the benefit of Miranda warnings. ECF No. 16. The Government responded, and a hearing was held on January 29, 2018. ECF No. 21. On February 8, 2018, the Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part Daniels's motion to suppress. ECF No. 22.
A jury trial in Daniels's case was held on March 7, 2018 and March 8, 2018. ECF Nos. 45, 49. At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury found Daniels guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, as charged in Count One of the Indictment. ECF No. 53. Before sentencing, the probation office issued Daniels's Final Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"). ECF No. 61. Daniels's base offense level (and total offense level) was set at 20 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). ECF No. 61 ¶¶ 18, 26. Daniels's criminal history score was determined to be 14, establishing a criminal history category of VI. Id. ¶¶ 43-45. Daniels faced a statutory maximum term of 10 years imprisonment. Id. ¶ 70. Daniels's advisory guidelines range was 70-87 months imprisonment. Id. ¶ 71.
On September 17, 2018, Daniels appeared before the Honorable Susan O. Hickey for sentencing. ECF No. 68. The Court sentenced Daniels to 70 months imprisonment with credit for time served in federal custody, 3 years supervised release, and a $100.00 special assessment. ECF No. 69. On September 25, 2018, Daniels filed a timely notice of appeal. ECF No. 71. On appeal, Daniels argued the Court erred in denying his motion to suppress custodial statements made in reference to a firearm and that the Court erred in its ruling on both his and the Government'smotions in limine. United States v. Daniels, 932 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 2019). The Eighth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the decision of Judge Hickey. Id. at 1126.
On August 18, 2020, Daniels filed a pro se Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody. ECF No. 89. With this Motion, Daniels raises four claims for relief:
The Government has responded. ECF No. 97. This Motion is now ripe for consideration.
A § 2255 motion is fundamentally different from a direct appeal. The Court will not reconsider an issue, which was decided on direct appeal, in a motion to vacate pursuant to § 2255. See United States v. Davis, 406 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir. 2005); Dall v. United States, 957 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir.1992) ().
"Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and, if uncorrected, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice." United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996).
The Court will individually address Daniels's claims; however, as an initial matter, the Court notes Daniels did not raise the current claims as a part of his direct appeal. Thus, the Court will first consider whether Daniels procedurally defaulted his four claims.
The failure to raise an issue on direct appeal ordinarily constitutes a procedural default and precludes a defendant's ability to raise that issue for the first time in a § 2255 motion. See Dejan v. United States, 208 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 2000). This rule applies whether the conviction was obtained through a trial or through the entry of a guilty plea. See, e.g., United States v. Cain, 134 F.3d 1345, 1352 (8th Cir. 1998).
In the present action, Daniels did not raise any of the current four claims as a part of his direct appeal. Thus, Daniels has procedurally defaulted; and unless a recognized excuse or exception for this default applies, Daniels cannot continue pursuing his claims in this Court. A defendant (here, Daniels) may avoid a procedural default only if he "can show both (1) cause that excuses the default, and (2) actual prejudice from the errors asserted." Matthews v. United States, 114 F.3d 112, 113 (8th Cir. 1997). "'[C]ause' in the formula 'cause and prejudice' means some impediment to making an argument" at the time of the direct appeal. Turner v. United States, 693 F.3d 756, 758 (2012). Here, Daniels has not suggested any external impediment prevented him from presenting his claims on direct appeal. Thus, Daniels has not presented "cause" sufficient to excuse his procedural default.
Furthermore, the only other exception that would entitle Daniels to relief is if he could prove "actual innocence." See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998). Here, once again, Daniels has made no such showing. Accordingly, the Court finds no basis for excusingDaniels's procedural default. Nevertheless, even if these claims had not been procedurally defaulted; and consistent with the following analysis, the Court finds Daniels is not entitled to relief.
Daniels's first claim is that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the initial vehicle stop wherein his unlawful weapon was discovered. ECF No. 89 at 4-5. In order to prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Daniels must show his attorney's performance was "deficient," and that the deficient performance was "prejudicial." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel a movant faces a heavy burden. See United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996). The burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel is on the movant. See United States v. Chronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). Therefore, Daniels has the burden of establishing both his counsel's deficient performance and his resulting prejudice to be entitled to relief. See, e.g., Davis v. Norris, 423 F.3d 868, 877 (8th Cir. 2005).
Daniels claims his attorney was ineffective for failure to challenge the initial traffic stop wherein his illegal firearm was discovered. The "Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government." United States v. Ramirez, 676 F.3d 755, 759 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Williams, 521 F.3d 902, 905 (8th Cir. 2008)). "It is well-settled that a warrantless search or seizure is 'per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" United States v. Rush, 651 F.3d 871, 875-76 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
One such exception permits "'an investigative stop of the vehicle if officers have a reasonable suspicion the vehicle or its occupants are involved in criminal activity.'" United States v. Smith, 648 F.3d 654, 658 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Bell, 480 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2007)). In such a case, "'officer[s] may briefly stop an individual and make reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling the suspicion.'" Smith, 648 F.3d at 658 (quoting United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2008)). "Reasonable suspicion" requires that officers have a suspicion, grounded in particularized, objective facts which "taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant suspicion that a crime [has been] committed." Smith, 648 F.3d at 658 (quoting United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 2010)).
In the present action, law enforcement did have "reasonable suspicion" to stop Daniels. The PSR supplied the facts (taken from the police reports and testimony provided at Daniels's trial) surrounding the stop as follows:
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