United States v. Daniels

• Decision Date: 06 January 1922
• Docket Number: 47.
• Citation: 279 F. 844
• Parties: UNITED STATES ex rel. HARRIS v. DANIELS, Secretary of the Navy, et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

279 F. 844

UNITED STATES ex rel. HARRIS v. DANIELS, Secretary of the Navy, et al.

No. 47.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

January 6, 1922

Wallace E. J. Collins, U.S. Atty., of Jamaica, N.Y. (Henry J. Walsh Asst. U.S. Atty., of Brooklyn, N.Y., of counsel), for appellants.

Emery C. Weller, of New York City, for respondent.

Before ROGERS, MANTON, and MAYER, Circuit Judges.

ROGERS Circuit Judge.

This appeal brings here for review the proceedings of a naval summary court-martial which sentenced the relator, after what purports to have been a trial, to a discharge from the Navy. It is claimed that this sentence was subsequently disapproved and set aside by the Secretary of the Navy, and that this resulted in restoring the relator's status to that of an enlisted man, entitling the navy officials to place him in confinement pending a trial by a second naval summary court-martial upon a charge of desertion. The appeal is from an order entered on November 18, 1920, sustaining a writ of habeas corpus and discharging the relator, Harris, from the custody of the United States Navy.

It appears that the relator enlisted in the Navy of the United States on February 21, 1919, for a period of four years. On March 18, 1920, he was tried on charges by a summary court-martial on board the United States ship Bernadou. He was convicted and sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge. The proceedings, findings, and sentence of the court-martial were approved by the convening authority and the immediate superior in command on March 19, 1920, and on March 25th he was discharged from the Navy under the sentence above stated.

On June 1, 1920, he received a letter from the Navy Department Bureau of Navigation, declaring that the sentence of the court-martial had been disapproved by the Secretary of the Navy, and directing and ordering him to report to the recruiting officer at Scranton, Pa. Pursuant to that order but under protest, he reported to the recruiting officer at Scranton, turned over his discharge, and resumed his duties in the Navy. He thereafter reported every day on board the United States ship Iowa, upon which vessel he remained until July 26, 1920, when he returned to his home and remained away from the Navy.

About 61 days later, acting on the advice of his father, he surrendered himself to the authorities of the Navy for the purpose of having his status adjudicated. He was immediately placed in custody, and the Secretary of the Navy ordered that he be placed on trial by a Navy general court-martial on a charge of absence from station and duty after leave had expired. This charge and a specification thereunder in due form was signed and issued by the Secretary of the Navy, and a copy thereof was served on him, and he was placed under arrest for trial. While awaiting his trial by the second court-martial, he obtained his discharge from the custody of the naval authorities by means of the writ of habeas corpus, which is the subject of this appeal. On his return to the Navy under protest on June 1, the relator did not re-enlist, nor extend his enlistment, and no papers were signed by him at that time.

Federal court-martial are tribunals created by acts of Congress, with authority to determine finally any case over which they have jurisdiction, and their proceedings are open to review by the civil courts only for the purpose of ascertaining whether the court-martial had jurisdiction, and if it had, whether it exceeded its powers. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 347, 27 Sup.Ct. 749, 51 L.Ed. 1084, 11 Ann.Cas. 640; Carter v. Roberts, 177 U.S. 496, 498, 20 Sup.Ct. 713, 44 L.Ed. 861; Swain v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, 17 Sup.Ct. 448, 41 L.Ed. 823; Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 6 Sup.Ct. 570, 29 L.Ed. 601; Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 15 L.Ed. 838.

A court-martial organized under the laws of the United States is a court of special and limited jurisdiction. It is called into existence for a special purpose and for the performance of a particular duty. That its sentences may be recognized it must appear affirmatively and unequivocally that the court which rendered them was constituted according to law, that it had jurisdiction, that it complied with all the statutory regulations governing it, and that its sentence conformed to the law. Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 555, 7 Sup.Ct. 1141, 30 L.Ed. 1167. Its authority is derived from the statute, and it must proceed in conformity therewith. Being an inferior court of limited jurisdiction its judgments may be attacked collaterally, and the validity of its proceedings can be raised upon a hearing on habeas corpus. McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49, 69, 22 Sup.Ct. 786, 46 L.Ed. 1049. If one is held under a sentence absolutely void, he is entitled, upon a writ of habeas corpus, to a discharge therefrom. Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 23, 25 L.Ed. 538.

The right to order summary courts-martial is given by the Articles for the Government of the Navy in article 26, which provides as follows:

'Summary courts-martial may be ordered upon petty officers and persons of inferior ratings, by the commander of any vessel, or by the commandant of any navy yard, naval station, or marine barracks to which they belong, for the trial of offenses which such officer may deem deserving of greater punishment than such commander or commandant is authorized to inflict, but not sufficient to require trial by a general court-martial. ' U.S. Comp. Statutes Ann. 1916, vol. 4, c. 10, Sec. 2994, p. 4266.

And the right of summary courts-martial to pronounce sentence is conferred by article 30, which reads as follows:

'Summary courts-martial may sentence petty officers and persons of inferior ratings to any one of the following punishments, namely:

'First. Discharge from the service with bad-conduct discharge. * * * ' U.S. Comp. Statutes Ann. 1916, vol. 4, c. 10, Sec. 2998, p. 4267.

The relator having enlisted in the Navy as a fireman, third class, concededly came within the class of persons triable by a summary court-martial. And if the court was justified in pronouncing any sentence it is conceded that it was justified in pronouncing the sentence it imposed. Whether under the circumstances of the case the sentence was valid is the question to be determined.

The Articles for the Government of the Navy, in article 34, require the proceedings of summary courts-martial to be transmitted to the Navy Department, where they are to be kept on file for a period of two years, after which time they may be destroyed in the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy. U.S. Comp. Statutes Ann. 1916, vol. 4, c. 10, Sec. 3002, p. 4268; U.S. St. at L. vol. 35, part I, c. 131, Sec. 14, p. 622.

On April 15, 1920, the record of the proceedings of this particular summary court-martial was received by the Navy Department; and on April 22d the Secretary of the Navy sent a communication to the commanding officer of the United States ship Bernadou in relation to the summary court-martial of the relator, from which the following excerpt is taken:

'2. It is the opinion of the department that the specification is insufficient and fails to state an offense, as set out in Court-Martial Order 237, 1919, page 15. The specimen specification on page 120, Naval Courts and Boards, which was followed in this case, has been corrected by changes No. 3, Naval Courts and Boards.

'3. In view of the foregoing, the proceedings, finding and sentence in the case of the above-named man are hereby disapproved, and you will cause his record to be corrected accordingly. (Signed) Josephus Daniels.'

It is claimed that this disapproval of the proceedings of the court-martial rendered them void ab initio. The argument is that no sentence could become final until the Secretary of the Navy had reviewed the proceedings and approved them; that as the Secretary disapproved, and found that the specification on which the relator was tried failed to state an offense against him, the court-martial was without jurisdiction and the sentence was of no effect.

If the proceedings of the court-martial have been declared by competent authority void, and its sentence has been set aside as a nullity, on the ground that the relator had been tried on a specification which failed to state an offense against him, it needs no argument to establish the fact that his status as an enlisted man was not changed in contemplation of law in any particular by reason of the sentence which was imposed. A void sentence can no more affect the status of the person upon whom it is pronounced than a void judgment can affect the property against which it is rendered. In re Bird, 3 Fed.Cas. 425, No. 1,428. This makes it necessary for us to consider the effect of the action taken by Secretary Daniels in disapproving the proceedings of the court-martial The act of March 2, 1855, Sec. 8, provided:

'That no sentence of a summary court-martial shall be carried into effect without the approval of the officer ordering the court, who shall have power to remit, in part or altogether, but not to commute any such sentence. ' U.S. St. at L. vol. 10, c. 136, p. 627.

The act of March 2, 1867, Sec. 5, so amended the act of 1855 that the authority therein given to the commander of any vessel in the Navy to convene summary courts-martial--

'shall require the approval of the proceedings by the commander-in-chief, when present in port, and, in his absence, that of the senior officer present, in all cases before carrying the sentence into execution; and in all cases where the sentence involves loss of pay, that part of such sentence shall be subject to the approval or disapproval of the Secretary of the Navy. ' U.S. Stat. L. vol. 14, c. 174, p. 516.

The act of February 16,...