United States v. Daulong, 11010.
| Citation | 60 F. Supp. 235 |
| Decision Date | 07 May 1945 |
| Docket Number | No. 11010.,11010. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. DAULONG. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Albert E. Bryson, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Shreveport, La., for plaintiff.
Ronald Lee Davis, of Monroe, La., and Floyd Terral, of Little Rock, Ark., for defendant.
Defendant was indicted under the Act of February 14, 1917, 18 U.S.C.A. § 89, penalizing those who make threats against the life of the President of the United States. The bill consists of two counts and the language alleged to have been used is as follows:
(First Count) "If someone does not kill him (the President) he, the defendant, had a notion to do it himself * * *"; and
(Second Count) "He hoped somebody gets him (the President) tonight, and if somebody did not, he, the defendant, felt like going up there and doing it himself".
Defendant has moved to quash both counts for the reason, it is contended, the indictment "does not charge a crime against the United States * * *".
The argument is, of course, that the language thus quoted does not in either case, constitute a threat of present intention to now or in the future take the life of the President.
Threat has been defined as follows (Webster's New International Dictionary):
(The Century Dictionary):
"A declaration of intention or a determination to inflict punishment, loss or pain on another."
2 Bouv.Law Dict., Rawle's Third Revision, p. 3270:
If the accused had merely said "I have a notion to kill the President" without the preliminary statement that if someone else did not do it, would the expression have constituted a threat; and, if not, did those additional words add anything to make the statement any more of a threat than it would otherwise have been? If the defendant had simply said that someone should or ought to kill the President, with no declaration or other indication that the speaker intended or would commit the act, it seems clear that this would not amount to a threat, and the adding it to what the accused expressed as being in his mind, does not constitute a threat unless the two together can under the rule of...
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Watts v. United States
...relies, however, on two cases in which there was found to be no statement of apparent intention to inflict harm. In United States v. Daulong, 60 F.Supp. 235 (W.D. La.1945), the indictment was quashed because it charged that the accused only stated he "had a notion" to kill the President and......
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United States v. Stock
...the argument that simply expressing a wish that a person suffer harm cannot constitute a true threat) with United States v. Daulong, 60 F.Supp. 235, 236 (W.D.La.1945) (holding that a federal threat statute “d[id] not penalize the imagining, wishing or hoping that the act w[ould] be committe......
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U.S. v. Hoffman, 85-2252
...who aught to be arrested and shot are protected! There can therefore be no respect for any law or its Officers!"); United States v. Daulong, 60 F.Supp. 235 (W.D.La.1945) ("If someone does not kill him (the President) he, the defendant, had a notion to do it himself" and "He hoped somebody g......
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United States v. Stock
...the argument that simply expressing a wish that a person suffer harm cannot constitute a true threat) with United States v. Daulong, 60 F. Supp. 235, 236 (W.D. La. 1945) (holding that a federal threat statute "d[id] not penalize the imagining, wishing or hoping that the act w[ould] be commi......