United States v. Davenport
| Decision Date | 29 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 2:11cr191-MHT (WO) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JASON TERRELL DAVENPORT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
With Amendment 782 in 2014, the United States Sentencing Commission revised the Sentencing Guidelines applicable to the drug-trafficking offense for which this court sentenced defendant Jason Terrell Davenport. The Commission simultaneously promulgated Amendment 788, making Amendment 782 retroactive. This court established a Retroactivity Screening Panel to determine whether defendants such as Davenport might be eligible for a sentence reduction.
Davenport's case was submitted for review, but the Panel was unable to reach a unanimous recommendation due to a disagreement over the applicable law.
In 2012, the court sentenced Davenport on one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base. See 21 U.S.C. § 846. The sentence was entered pursuant to a binding Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement ("Type-C agreement"), which permits the parties to "agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case" and "binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement." At the time of sentencing, after adjustments for minor role and acceptance of responsibility, Davenport's initial Guidelines range was 87 to 108 months, based on an offense level of 27 and a criminal history category of III. However, a mandatory-minimum sentence of 120 months applied. The plea agreement recommended a sentence of 63 months. The court granted the government's motion for a three-level downward departure for substantial assistance, which both reduced Davenport's total offense level to 24 and authorized the court to give a sentence below the mandatory minimum. The adjusted Guidelines range, starting from the original range of 87 to 108 months, was 63 to 78 months. Davenport was sentenced to 63 months.
Despite having been sentenced pursuant to a binding plea agreement, Davenport is eligible for a sentence reduction now only if he was sentenced "based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Recently, in Hughes v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that defendants sentenced pursuant to a Type-C agreement are nonetheless eligible for a sentence reduction "so long as that range was part of the framework the district court relied on in imposing the sentence or accepting the agreement." 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1775 (2018).
That is not Davenport's only hurdle to receiving a sentence reduction. When he was originally sentenced, he was subject to a mandatory-minimum sentence of 120 months, which was entirely above his otherwise-applicable Guidelines range. He was sentenced below the mandatory minimum solely because the court granted the government's motion for a downward departure of three levels on the basis of substantial assistance, pursuant to United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1 (Nov. 2016) (USSG) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). In 2014, the Commission, weighing in on a circuit split, promulgated Amendment 780, which states that the defendant's Guidelines range should be calculated without regard to the mandatory minimum when the court departed below the minimum based on a substantial-assistance motion. On its face, the amendment, if applied, makes defendants in Davenport's shoes eligible for retroactive sentencing relief, because, in general, it asks courts on resentencing to look solely to the otherwise-applicable Guidelines range, not the mandatory minimum, when determining statutory eligibility for relief.
In Koons v. United States, released the same day as Hughes, the Supreme Court held that where five defendants were subject to mandatory-minimum sentences that exceeded their otherwise-applicable Guidelines ranges, and where the district court "scrapped the ranges in favor of the mandatory minimums, and never considered the ranges again," the sentences were not "based on" the otherwise-applicable Guidelines ranges. 138 S. Ct. 1783, 1789 (2018). However, Koons specifically declined to reach the issue of whether a defendant subject to a mandatory-minimum sentence "can never be sentenced 'based on a sentencing range' that the Commission has lowered," because, as the opinion repeatedly emphasized, in none of the five consolidated cases before it "did the [district] court consider the original drug Guidelines ranges that it had earlier discarded." Id. at 1787, 1788 n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)).
As discussed later, however, the district court in Davenport's case did not simply discard the otherwise-applicable Guidelines range. Accordingly, this case poses the next logical question that the Supreme Court avoided in Koons: whether a defendant subject to a mandatory minimum that exceeds his otherwise-applicable Guidelines range was sentenced "based on" that range for the purpose of § 3582(c)(2), where that range was in fact "part of the framework the district court relied on in imposing the sentence or accepting the agreement." Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1775.
The parties were ordered to brief the two issues necessary to rule on Davenport's eligibility for retroactive sentencing relief, albeit prior to the Supreme Court's rulings in Hughes and Koons: (1) whether Davenport is eligible for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2), although he was sentenced pursuant to a binding plea agreement; and (2) whether he is eligible for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 780, although he was originally subject to a mandatory minimum that exceeded his Guidelines range.
The court concludes that Davenport is eligible for a sentence reduction. Davenport's original sentence was "based on" a subsequently lowered sentencing range, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), despite the existence of a Type-C plea agreement, because the court's acceptance of that agreement was based on its determination that the recommended sentence was compatible with the Guidelines, as explained in more detail later. Further, the court finds that the mandatory minimum does not impede his eligibility for relief under § 3582(c)(2). After careful consideration of the Supreme Court's decisions in Koons, Hughes, and related cases; the law in this circuit; the recent decisions in other circuits; and the record of sentencing in this case, this court concludes that the Sentencing Commission did not exceed its authority in promulgating Amendment 780 with regard to cases such as Davenport's, and that he is eligible for a reduction because he was in fact sentenced "based on" his applicable Guidelines range rather than the mandatory minimum.
Finally, the court finds that a sentence reduction is warranted in Davenport's case. Accordingly, the sentence of imprisonment of 63 months previously imposed on him (as reflected in the last judgment issued) is reduced to 51 months, or, in the event that he has served longer than he would have served on a 51-month sentence factoring in good-time credit and any other factors relevant to the Bureau of Prisons' calculation, to a sentence of time served.
The court first discusses Davenport's eligibility for a sentence reduction in light of the court's adoption of a binding plea agreement. Federal courts are forbidden to "modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed," 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), subject to a few narrow exceptions. The relevant exception here permits defendants whose Guidelines sentencing range has been lowered by a retroactive amendment, such as Amendment 782, to move for a sentence reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) provides:
"[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), ... the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."
(Emphasis added).
At sentencing, the court accepted the parties' plea agreement pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C), which permits the parties to "agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case, ... [a request which] binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement." Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). Because binding plea agreements allow the parties themselves to set the sentence (subject to the court's approval), the question is raised whether a defendant sentenced pursuant to such an agreement may be said to have been sentenced "based on" a Guidelines sentencing range such that he is eligible for retroactive relief under § 3582(c)(2).
The Supreme Court first answered that question in Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011) (plurality opinion). Five Justices there agreed that the district court could reduce Freeman's sentence even though it had originally sentenced him pursuant to a binding Type-C agreement, but the Justices differed in their reasoning.
The plurality, written by Justice Kennedy, concluded that, where the "judge's decision to accept the plea and impose the recommended sentence is ... based on the Guidelines," the defendant should be eligible to seek § 3582(c)(2) relief. Id. at 534. The judge's decision to accept the plea would "likely" be based on the Guidelines because district courts are required to evaluate the recommended sentence in light of the defendant's applicable sentencing range and "may accept an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement 'only if the court is satisfied either that such sentence is an appropriate sentence within the applicable guideline range or, if not, that the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons.'" Id. at 529 ...
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