United States v. Davila
Decision Date | 13 June 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 12–167.,12–167. |
Citation | 186 L.Ed.2d 139,133 S.Ct. 2139,569 U.S. 597 |
Parties | UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. Anthony DAVILA. |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Eric J. Feigin, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Robert M. Yablon, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Kathryn Keneally, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Eric J. Feigin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Frank P. Cihlar, S. Robert Lyons, Deborah K. Snyder, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
This case concerns Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs guilty pleas. Two provisions of that rule are key here. The first, Rule 11(c)(1), instructs that "[t]he court must not participate in [plea] discussions." The second, Rule 11(h), states: "A variance from the requirements of th[e] rule is harmless error if it does not affect substantial rights." Rule 52(a), which covers trial court errors generally, similarly prescribes: "Any error ... that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded."
Anthony Davila, respondent here, entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to defraud the United States by filing false income tax returns. He maintains that he did so because a U.S. Magistrate Judge, at a pre-plea in camera hearing and in flagrant violation of Rule 11(c)(1), told him his best course, given the strength of the Government's case, was to plead guilty. Three months later, Davila entered a plea on advice of counsel. The hearing on Davila's plea, conducted by a U.S. District Judge, complied in all respects with Rule 11.
The question presented is whether, as the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held, the violation of Rule 11(c)(1) by the Magistrate Judge warranted automatic vacatur of Davila's guilty plea. We hold that Rule 11(h) controls.
Under the inquiry that Rule instructs, vacatur of the plea is not in order if the record shows no prejudice to Davila's decision to plead guilty.
In May 2009, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Georgia returned a 34–count indictment against respondent Anthony Davila. The indictment charged that Davila filed over 120 falsified tax returns, receiving over $423,000 from the United States Treasury as a result of his fraudulent scheme.
In January 2010, Davila sent a letter to the District Court expressing dissatisfaction with his court-appointed attorney and requesting new counsel. His attorney, Davila complained, offered no defensive strategy, " ‘never mentioned a defense at all,’ " but simply advised that he plead guilty.1 In response to Davila's letter, a U.S. Magistrate Judge held an in camera hearing at which Davila and his attorney, but no representative of the United States, appeared.
At the start of the hearing, the Magistrate Judge told Davila that he was free to represent himself, but would not get another court-appointed attorney. See App. 148.
Davila's Sentencing Guidelines range, the Magistrate Judge said, would "probably [be] pretty bad because [his] criminal history score would be so high." Id., at 160. To reduce his sentencing exposure, the Magistrate Judge suggested, Davila could "cooperate with the Government in this or in other cases." Ibid. As the hearing concluded, the judge again cautioned that "to get the [sentence] reduction for acceptance [of responsibility]," Davila had to "come to the cross":
Nearly a month after the in camera hearing, Davila filed a motion demanding a speedy trial. The District Court set a trial date for April 2010, which was continued at the Government's request.
In May 2010, more than three months after the hearing before the Magistrate Judge, Davila agreed to plead guilty to the conspiracy charge in exchange for dismissal of the other 33 counts charged in the indictment. Davila entered his guilty plea before a U.S. District Judge six days later. Under oath, Davila stated that he had not been forced or pressured to plead guilty. Id., at 122. Davila did not mention the in camera hearing before the Magistrate Judge, and the record does not indicate whether the District Judge was aware that the pre-plea hearing had taken place. See id., at 82–99, 115–125.
Before he was sentenced, Davila moved to vacate his plea and to dismiss the indictment. The reason for his plea, Davila asserted, was "strategic." Id., at 58. Aware that the prosecutor had a duty to disclose all information relevant to the court's determination whether to accept the plea bargain, he stated that his purpose in entering the plea was to force the Government to acknowledge timeframe errors made in the indictment. Id., at 58–59. By pleading guilty, Davila said, he would make the court aware that the prosecution was "vindictive." Id., at 59.
The District Judge denied Davila's motion. In so ruling, the court observed that, at the plea hearing, Davila had affirmed that he was under no "pressure, threats, or promises, other than promises [made] by the government in the plea agreement." Id., at 70. Furthermore, he had been fully advised of his rights and the consequences of his plea. Id., at 71. It was therefore clear to the District Judge, who had himself presided at the plea hearing, that Davila's guilty plea "was knowing and voluntary." Id., at 72. In view of Davila's extensive criminal history, the court sentenced him to a prison term of 115 months. Id ., at 75–77. Again, neither Davila nor the court mentioned the in camera hearing conducted by the Magistrate Judge. Id., at 55–80.
On appeal, Davila's court-appointed attorney sought leave to withdraw from the case, asserting, in a brief filed pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), that there were no issues of arguable merit to be raised on Davila's behalf. The Eleventh Circuit denied counsel's motion without prejudice to renewal. App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a–8a. It did so based on a discovery the appeals court made upon "independent review" of the record. That review "revealed an irregularity in the statements of a magistrate judge, made during a hearing prior to Davila's plea, which appeared to urge [him] to cooperate and be candid about his criminal conduct to obtain favorable sentencing consequences." Id., at 7a. The court requested counsel to address whether the "irregularity" constituted reversible error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1). Id., at 7a–8a.
Following the court's instruction, counsel filed a brief arguing that Davila's plea should be set aside due to the Magistrate Judge's comments. In response, the Government conceded that those comments violated Rule 11(c)(1). Even so, the Government urged, given the three-month gap between the comments and the plea, and the fact that a different judge presided over Davila's plea and sentencing hearings, no adverse effect on Davila's substantial rights could be demonstrated. Pursuant to Circuit precedent, the appeals court held that the Rule 11(c)(1) violation required automatic vacatur of Davila's guilty plea. Under the Circuit's "bright line rule," the court explained, there was no need to inquire whether the error was, in fact, prejudicial. 664 F.3d 1355, 1359 (C.A.11 2011) (per curiam ).
We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit conflict concerning the consequences of a Rule 11(c)(1) violati...
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