United States v. Dawkins

• Decision Date: 04 June 2021
• Docket Number: Nos. 19-3623 (L),19-3643 (Con),August Term, 2020,s. 19-3623 (L)
• Citation: 999 F.3d 767
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Christian DAWKINS, Merl Code, Defendants-Appellants, Lamont Evans, Emanuel Richardson, Anthony Bland, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

999 F.3d 767

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v. Christian DAWKINS, Merl Code, Defendants-Appellants,Lamont Evans, Emanuel Richardson, Anthony Bland, Defendants.¹

Nos. 19-3623 (L)

19-3643 (Con)

August Term, 2020

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued: October 22, 2020

Decided: June 4, 2021

David Allen Chaney, Jr., Chaney Legal Services, LLC, Greenville, SC, (Steven A. Haney, Haney Law Group PLLC, Southfield, MI, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellants

Robert L. Boone, Assistant United States Attorney (Eli J. Mark, Noah D. Solowiejczyk, Thomas McKay, Assistant United States Attorneys, on the brief), for Audrey Strauss, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee

Before: Raggi, Sullivan, and Nardini, Circuit Judges.

William J. Nardini, Circuit Judge:

Defendants-Appellants Christian Dawkins and Merl Code stand convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 666(a)(2). Dawkins also stands convicted of substantive bribery in violation of § 666(a)(2). The defendants here appeal their convictions, entered on October 22, 2019, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Edgardo Ramos, J. ). They argue that § 666(a)(2) does not cover their charged scheme to bribe college basketball coaches and is unconstitutional as applied to them. Specifically, they maintain that § 666 requires a nexus between the "agent" to be influenced or rewarded and the federal funds received by their organization, and that the "business" of a federally funded organization, to which the bribery scheme is connected, must be commercial in nature. Additionally, they argue that various evidentiary and instructional rulings were erroneous and warrant vacatur of their convictions. We are unpersuaded by these arguments.

In 18 U.S.C. § 666, Congress used broad terms to prohibit bribery in relation to federally funded programs. As relevant here, the statute prohibits certain actions taken "with intent to influence or reward an agent" of a designated recipient of federal funds, "in connection with any business" of that recipient. The defendants ask us to shorten the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), limiting the universe of "agents" to be influenced and "businesses" involved. But it is not the role of courts to engraft restrictive language onto statutes. Nor should we cabin a law that Congress wrote expansively to preserve the integrity of organizations that receive federal dollars. Today, we follow the logical course charted by longstanding precedent to reach two conclusions with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) : first, the "agent" of a federally funded organization need not have control over the federal funds, and the agent need not work in a specific program within the organization that uses those federal dollars; and second, the "business" of a federally funded organization need not be commercial in nature. With respect to the defendants’ other challenges on appeal, we identify no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of conviction.

I. Overview

On March 7, 2019, a grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment, charging Dawkins and Code with conspiracy to commit bribery,² see 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 666(a)(2) (Count One); substantive bribery, see id. §§ 666(a)(2), 2 (Count Two); conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud, see id. §§ 1343, 1346, 1349 (Count Three); and conspiracy to commit Travel Act bribery, see id. §§ 371, 1952(a)(1) & (a)(3) (Count Six). Dawkins was also individually charged with two substantive counts of honest services wire fraud. See id. §§ 1343, 1346, 1349, 2 (Counts Four and Five).

The indictment alleged a straightforward scheme: Dawkins and Code planned to pay bribes to basketball coaches at National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") Division I universities in exchange for the coaches’ agreement to steer their student-athletes toward Dawkins's sports management company after leaving college and becoming professional basketball players.

The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment before trial, challenging Counts One and Two on the ground that the Government's allegations failed to establish two elements of a § 666(a)(2) violation: (1) that the persons intended to be influenced or rewarded (here basketball coaches) were "agents" of federally funded organizations, and (2) that the scheme to influence or reward was "in connection with any business" of these organizations. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2). Upon consideration of the same arguments pursued by the defendants on their appeal, the district court orally denied the motion, and the case proceeded to a two-week trial.

On May 8, 2019, the jury found Dawkins guilty on Counts One and Two, and Code guilty on Count One. The jury acquitted the defendants of the remaining charges. After the verdict, the district court issued a written opinion explaining its earlier denial of the motion to dismiss. See Doc. No. 244, Dkt. No. 17-cr-684. It then sentenced Dawkins principally to a year and a day in prison, and Code to three months in prison. Both defendants now appeal their convictions.

II. The bribery scheme

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict,³ the trial evidence showed the following.

Christian Dawkins formerly worked as a "runner," a liaison who helps sports agents develop professional relationships with athletes. In September 2015, Dawkins became acquainted with Louis Martin Blazer, a financial and business manager who had once worked primarily for NFL players. To develop relationships with potential future clients, Blazer had at times paid college football players in hopes that they would retain his services once they turned pro. Unbeknownst to Dawkins, Blazer was cooperating with Government investigators, who recorded the men's conversations.

In December 2015, Dawkins proposed that Blazer give Dawkins money to pay basketball players whom Dawkins was attempting to recruit. In exchange, Dawkins would refer the players to Blazer for financial management services. Dawkins also proposed that Blazer take over payments Dawkins had been making to University of South Carolina assistant basketball coach Lamont Evans,⁴ who, in return, was to steer his players to retain Dawkins's then-employer, a sports management agency, when they went pro. Dawkins proposed that Blazer develop a relationship with Evans, who could refer his players to Blazer for financial advice and management. Blazer, at the Government's direction, agreed to take over the payments.

Around this time, Blazer introduced Dawkins to Munish Sood, an investment manager, who, with Blazer, took over the payments to Evans. In March 2016, Dawkins, Blazer, Sood, and Evans met and discussed recruiting and paying players as well as the value of building relationships with assistant coaches. Dawkins later explained to Blazer and Sood that paying coaches was advantageous, since coaches could refer still other players if an initial referral did not work out, and they could limit other potential agents’ and advisors’ access to their players. In exchange for the bribes Blazer and Sood began to pay, Evans introduced them to one player and to another player's mother. During trial, Blazer and Sood testified extensively about their understandings of these recorded conversations.

In June 2017, Dawkins, Sood, and "Jeff D'Angelo," an undercover FBI agent posing as a wealthy businessman, formed a sports management company, LOYD, Inc. ("LOYD"). The plan was for LOYD to develop relationships with college basketball coaches, who would in turn refer players to LOYD for sports management services upon turning pro.

Later in June 2017, two recorded meetings relevant to this appeal occurred in New York. First, Sood and D'Angelo met with University of Arizona assistant basketball coach Emanuel "Book" Richardson to discuss buying access to Richardson's players. At the close of the meeting, D'Angelo handed Richardson five thousand dollars. Second, immediately after the Richardson meeting, Dawkins, Blazer, Sood, and D'Angelo met with Merl Code—a consultant for Adidas, a major sports apparel company—who had extensive relationships with basketball coaches and players. The purpose of this meeting was to see whether Code could help LOYD generate business by introducing the LOYD group to his basketball contacts. At the end of this meeting, D'Angelo gave Code two thousand dollars.

In July 2017, Dawkins, Blazer, and D'Angelo met ten college coaches in Las Vegas and paid some of them bribes of up to $13,000. Although Code was not present for these meetings, he helped arrange them and advised the LOYD group on how to talk with the coaches; in particular, he warned that the coaches would likely be wary of accepting money from people they did not yet trust. After these meetings, some coaches began to fulfill their end of the bribery bargain by introducing the LOYD group to players’ families. Shortly thereafter, Dawkins and Code were arrested.⁵

III. The defendants’ challenges under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)

The defendants’ primary argument on appeal is that the district court misconstrued § 666(a)(2) in recognizing the basketball coaches in this case as "agents" of their federally funded university employers and in concluding that the defendants’ bribery efforts were connected to the "business" of those universities. They frame the argument primarily as a challenge to the district court's denial of their pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment. They also rely on it to maintain that the district court should have applied a narrower construction of § 666(a)(2) (presumably when instructing the jury), and that the Government failed to prove its case under the defense's proffered interpretation of the statute. As we have explained, "the pleading standard for an indictment is entirely separate from the evidentiary standard at trial,"⁶ and is different yet again from the question of whether the jury was properly instructed. W...