United States v. Deaver
| Decision Date | 01 January 1882 |
| Citation | 14 F. 595 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. DEAVER. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
James E. Boyd, Dist. Atty., for the United States.
C. M McLoud and James W. Gudger, for defendants.
DICK D. J., (charging jury.)
This is the first time that it has been my duty in the course of a trial to construe this statute, and I am not aware of any direct judicial decision upon the subject. I will endeavor to ascertain the meaning of the statute by applying certain well-settled rules of construction which have been adopted by the courts and learned text-writers.
In the construction of a statute we should endeavor to find the intent, object, and purpose of the legislature in enacting the law, and this must be done by considering the words, the context, and the subject-matter. Generally, words must be taken in their ordinary and familiar signification, but when they have acquired a legal and technical signification we must presume that the legislature used them in their legal and technical sense. The ordinary meaning of the word 'extortion' is the taking or obtaining of anything from another by means of illegal compulsion or oppressive exaction. If an officer of the law has a prisoner in custody, and either by promises or threats induces him to make a confession of crime, such confession is regarded as extorted or forced, and is not admissible in evidence against the prisoner. If such confessions are made to a person not in authority, and in no way directly connected with the prosecution, the strictness of the rule is somewhat modified. The word 'extortion' has acquired a technical meaning in the common law, and designates a crime committed by an officer of the law, who, under color of his office unlawfully and corruptly takes any money or thing of value that is not due to him, ore more than is due, or before it is due. The officer must unlawfully and corruptly receive such money or article of value for his own benefit or advantage.
We may well infer that congress used this word in the statute in its restricted and technical sense, as in the same clause the word 'oppression' is used, which has a more extensive signification, and will embrace many other acts of official malfeasance and misfeasance. If a judicial officer, in the discharge of his official functions, acted partially, maliciously, and corruptly, he was indictable at common law for the crime of oppression in office. Gross misconduct on the part of an inferior or ministerial officer was denominated malfeasance, or misfeasance in office. If a ministerial officer arrests and ties a person for some petty offense who makes no resistance, but quietly submits to legal authority, there would be a strong presumption that the officer acted from improper motives of oppression; but if the prisoner was a man of desperate and lawless character, and manifested a purpose to resist or escape, and he is charged with a serious crime, then it would be the duty of the officer to secure the prisoner by the best means in his power.
The word 'oppression' has not acquired a strictly technical meaning, and may in this statute be taken in its ordinary sense, which is an act of cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, domination, or excessive use of authority. When a revenue officer, under color of law, willfully and unlawfully takes the property of another, or subjects him to greater hardships than are necessary for the proper enforcement of the law, he is guilty of oppression. It is not essential that an unlawful act should be a serious injury to a person to make it oppressive. The exercise of unlawful power or others means, in depriving an individual of his liberty or property against his will, is generally an act of oppression. One of the wisest and best rulers that ever governed ancient Athens was called a tyrant because he exercised sovereign power contrary to the constitution and laws of the state. He established justice, insured domestic tranquillity, and promoted the general welfare of his people, and yet his numerous beneficences did not atone for his usurpation of authority, and his name, fame, and splendid achievements are associated in history with the odium of tyranny.
In some instances a person may be deprived of his rights and his property without the ordinary process of law, and still the acts not be official oppression. I will illustrate this position by instances which have sometimes occurred in the courts. A person willfully and unlawfully does some serious bodily injury to another. He may be indicted for a crime against the peace and dignity of the state, and he is also liable to an action for the civil injury. If he is indicted and convicted of the crime, the judge, before passing sentence, may properly tell the defendant that if he will make suitable compensation for the civil injury the sentence will be greatly mitigated. The defendant acts upon this suggestion, and pays a large sum of money by way of compensation to the injured party. In such a case the defendant is deprived of his property without the right of trial by jury, and yet this is not judicial oppression; and such proceedings have often been adopted in the courts of the common law, both in this country and in England.
At the federal court in Greensboro some time ago a number of tobacco manufacturers were indicted for violations of the internal-revenue laws. They became satisfied, from the careful preparation of the cases by the assistant district attorney, that they would be convicted, and they pleaded guilty, and on suspension of judgment offered terms of compromise to the commissioner of internal revenue. The terms offered were not accepted, and a sum of money was exacted by way of compromise which made nearly all of the defendants insolvent; and yet these proceedings were not acts of official oppression, as they were done under authority of law. The defendants accepted the terms to avoid the severe punishments to which their violations of law had subjected them. In this court there have been frequent instances of defendants pleading guilty, or, upon conviction, paying sums of money by way of compromise, or in lieu of penalties, in order to obtain suspension of judgment on the crimes charged.
To make an act oppressive on the part of an officer, under this statute, it must be done willfully, 'under color of law,' and without legal authority. You must carefully consider all the evidence relating to the several counts in the indictment upon this clause of the statute, and if you are fully satisfied from the evidence that the defendant under...
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...senator accepted money in exchange for blocking a defendant's extradition and agreeing to introduce legislation); cf. United States v. Deaver, 14 F. 595, 597 (W.D.N.C.1882) (under the “technical meaning [of extortion] in the common law, ... [t]he officer must unlawfully and corruptly receiv......
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Cashin v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 7168.
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