United States v. DeBlasis
Decision Date | 07 June 1962 |
Docket Number | Crim. No. 24497. |
Citation | 206 F. Supp. 38 |
Parties | UNITED STATES v. Guiseppe William DeBLASIS. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Stephen H. Sachs, Asst. U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., for the United States.
James B. Murphy, Baltimore, Md., for defendant.
Petitioner has filed an application captioned "Vacate Sentence Writ of Habeas Corpus Title 28 U.S.C.A. 2255." Petitioner correctly asserts that on March 6, 1959 he was sentenced under U.S.C., Title 18, Section 4208(b) and that on July 13, 1959 he was committed to the custody of the Attorney General (for a period of five years, "pursuant to U.S.C., Title 18, Section 4208(a) (2), said term of imprisonment to be computed as beginning the 6th day of March 1959; Defendant to become eligible for parole at such time as the Board of Parole may determine") without having been re-called to court. He claims such sentence has been declared illegal by the United States Supreme Court in Grabina v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 880.
Petitioner has previously raised the same question, without of course reliance upon the Grabina case. Although the facts, and the court's ruling adverse to the contention of Petitioner, are set forth in this judge's opinion in United States v. DeBlasis, D.Md.1959, 177 F. Supp. 484, a brief résumé may prove helpful. On August 5, 1958, Petitioner was indicted for two violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2312, and one of 18 U.S.C. § 2313. He was arrested, released on bail, and arraigned on September 12, 1958, at which time through his privately retained attorney he entered pleas of not guilty on all three counts. On December 12, 1958, at the request of his counsel, he was re-arraigned, and after the court had satisfied itself by interrogation of petitioner that he knew the nature of the charges against him, the possible penalties that could be imposed if the pleas were accepted, his rights to plead not guilty and to a jury trial, and that the pleas were voluntary, without promises, threats or inducements, the court accepted pleas of guilty on counts 1 and 2 and not guilty on count 3. The court then stated its desire for a presentence investigation and report. In order that petitioner could remain at large without securing a new bond, the court permitted him to withdraw his pleas. On March 6, 1959, after receipt of the presentence report, and study thereof by the court and petitioner's counsel, petitioner was again arraigned and again pleaded guilty to the two transportation counts and not guilty to the receiving count. A nolle prosequi was entered on the receiving count. The court thereupon heard from petitioner's attorney, and from petitioner, who was given and accepted full opportunity to be heard on his own behalf before the imposition of sentence. The court thereupon imposed sentence and committed petitioner to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4208(b), under which the commitment was "deemed to be for the maximum sentence of imprisonment prescribed by law", namely, ten years.
On July 13, 1959, after receipt of the Recommendations and Report of the Director of Bureau of Prisons under 18 U. S.C. § 4208(c), study thereof by the court and petitioner's counsel, and conference between court and counsel, petitioner was "committed to the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative for imprisonment for a period of Five (5) years, pursuant to U.S. C., Title 18, § 4208(a) (2), said term of imprisonment to be computed as beginning the sixth day of March, 1959; Defendant to become eligible for parole at such time as the Board of Parole may determine."
By letter dated September 13, 1959, and received September 15, 1959, petitioner requested the court "to please review my sentence to see if you can possibly cut my time," and stated that he "would not ask a reduction of time if I thought I had a chance of making parole." The court replied on September 15, 1959, pointing out that petitioner's letter had been mailed more than sixty days after the commitment; that the court had no authority to reduce the sentence, and even if it had authority, would not do so. (Petitioner was an habitual offender, then aged thirty-four, having been involved in various offenses since the age of seventeen, and having been confined during most of his adult life.)
The court concluded that as petitioner's original commitment, "deemed to be" for ten years, had been reduced to five years (with eligibility for parole at such time as the Board of Parole may determine, instead of only after the service of one-third of his sentence) there was no legal requirement that petitioner be present in court for a valid reduction of sentence. The sole question therefore is whether the Grabina decision requires a reversal of this conclusion.
The per curiam decision in Grabina is not too enlightening upon this question. It reads:
From the memorandum submitted by the Solicitor General it would appear that the only relevant question was No. 5:
"Whether the sentencing procedure was proper."
On this question, the memorandum of the Solicitor General states:
The record seems adequately to support the memorandum of the Solicitor General that Grabina was not accorded the...
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...v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 156 F.2d 507. We have considered United States v. De Blasis, 177 F.Supp. 484 (D.Md.1959); United States v. De Blasis, 206 F.Supp. 38 (D.Md.1962) and United States v. Johnson, 207 F.Supp. 115 (E.D.N.Y. 1962) in each of which it is held that the presence of the defendant ......
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