United States v. Decker, 19981.
Court | United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Maryland) |
Citation | 51 F. Supp. 20 |
Docket Number | No. 19981.,19981. |
Parties | UNITED STATES v. DECKER et al. |
Decision Date | 24 July 1943 |
51 F. Supp. 20
UNITED STATES
v.
DECKER et al.
No. 19981.
District Court, D. Maryland.
July 24, 1943.
William Curran and R. Palmer Ingram, both of Baltimore, Md., for defendant, Decker.
Simon E. Sobeloff, of Baltimore, Md., for defendant, Kann.
Bernard J. Flynn, U. S. Atty., of Baltimore, Md., Wm. A. Paisley, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., and Ellis L. Arenson, Sp. Atty., Department of Justice, of Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.
CHESNUT, District Judge.
The above criminal case was tried to a jury on May 31 to June 8, 1943. After several hours deliberation the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the second count of the indictment and not guilty on the first count (as instructed by the court as to the first count) against both defendants, with recommendation to the mercy of the court. Within due time thereafter both defendants have separately filed motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial. The only proper ground for arrest of judgment is the overruling of the demurrer to the indictment. This question has not been reargued on the motion in arrest. The motion in arrest of judgment is, therefore, overruled as to both defendants.
The motion for a new trial presents numerous assigned grounds therefor. The principal ground now urged upon the court in support of the motion is that there was no evidence in the case legally sufficient to support the charge in the second count of the indictment that the defendants "furnished to the Secretary of the Navy of the United States, through the Price Adjustment Board of the Navy Department, pursuant to the provisions of section 403 of the `6th Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act of 1942' statements of the actual cost of production of said Triumph Explosives, Inc., in the manufacture of ordnance materials under said contracts for the United States of America, which said statements, as the said defendants and each of them then and there well knew, contained false and misleading information in the following respects, to wit: said statements consisted of the totals of operating expense accounts of the corporation taken from the books of account of said corporation kept in the regular order of business."
The nature of the whole case and an outline of the evidence is contained in the court's charge to the jury which has been transcribed by the stenographer. Reference is made thereto in order to avoid repetition and unnecessary extension of this memorandum opinion.
While the point now urged was made in general terms in argument on the facts at the trial of the case, it is now presented and emphasized in a somewhat different way from its presentation at the trial. There the principal emphasis was on the insufficiency of the evidence to show that what the defendants did amounted to furnishing a statement. The point as now emphasized is that what was furnished did not constitute a statement within the meaning of section 403(e) of the Act of Congress approved April 28, 1942 cited as the "6th Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942". Public Law 528, 77th Cong. c. 247, sec. sess. 41 U.S.C.A. note preceding section 1. Section 403(e) reads in part as follows: "In addition to the powers conferred by existing law, the Secretary of each Department shall have the right to demand of any contractor * * * statements of actual costs of production and such other financial statements, at such times and in such form and detail, as such Secretary may require. Any person who willfully fails or refuses to furnish any statement required of him under this subsection, or who knowingly furnishes any such statement containing information which is false or misleading in any material respect, shall, upon conviction thereof be punished" etc. (Italics supplied.)
The evidence as to the defendants' action on this issue was outlined in the charge and will not be here repeated. The main point that is now emphasized is that when the representative of the Bureau, one Zipf, presented his letter of authority dated June 18, 1942, on July 7, 1942, to the defendant Decker, the latter did not then or thereafter give to Zipf any written statement of cost figures, and did not give to Zipf then or thereafter any oral statement of specific figures. It will be remembered that the letter presented by Zipf to the defendant Decker said "Triumph Explosives, Inc., is hereby requested to furnish the Navy Department with statements of actual costs of production under contracts with the Navy Department", etc. This letter was presented in person by Zipf to Decker, the executive vice president of the corporation, in the absence of Kann, the president. Zipf testified that he talked the matter over with Decker for about half an hour and that the substance of the conversation was that the corporation did not keep accounts which segregated costs of production for Navy contracts from other business, although it appeared from other evidence that in 1942 the United States Government's business with the corporation comprised about 90% of all the business of the corporation and the great majority of the government business was for the Navy
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