United States v. Deer, C-8313.
Citation | 131 F. Supp. 319 |
Decision Date | 17 May 1955 |
Docket Number | No. C-8313.,C-8313. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. T. W. DEER, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Washington |
William B. Bantz, U. S. Atty., Spokane, Wash., for plaintiff.
Harvey Erickson, Spokane, Wash., for defendant.
The charge against the defendant in this case is stated in the indictment as follows:
"That on or about the 4th day of November, 1954 T. W. Deer did ship a trunk on an interstate common carrier and did pack within said trunk a loaded 22 caliber rifle; that said trunk was handled in the regular course of business by said common carrier and while handling said trunk at Spokane, in the Northern Division of the Eastern District of Washington, one Jack Wilbur Hubbard, an employee of the common carrier, suffered severe bodily injury as a result of a bullet being discharged from the loaded 22 rifle packed or shipped in the trunk by T. W. Deer, the shipping on an interstate common carrier of a loaded 22 rifle being contrary to and in violation of Title 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 835 and CFR Title 49, Secs. 73.58(a)(b) (c) and 73.101."
The defendant moves to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it does not state an offense against the United States for the reason that it fails to allege that the defendant acted "knowingly."
The statute on which the indictment is based, Title 18 U.S.C. § 835, provides that the Interstate Commerce Commission shall formulate regulations for the safe transportation of explosives and other dangerous articles, and that "whoever knowingly violates any such regulations" shall be punished as therein provided.
In United States v. Boyce Motor Lines, 3 Cir., 188 F.2d 889, 891, the trial court held a regulation formulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the same statute to be invalid for the reason that it was so vague and indefinite as to make uncertain the standard of guilt sought to be set up by the regulation. The court took the position that the violation of the regulation was malum prohibitum and that intent and guilty knowledge were not essential elements of the offense. The court of appeals, however, did not agree but on the contrary held that, in view of the language of the statute under which the regulation was promulgated, its violation was not merely malum prohibitum, and that, "a specific wrongful intent, i. e., actual knowledge of the existence of a duty under the regulation and a wrongful intent to evade it, is of the essence of the offense." The decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 72 S.Ct. 329, 331, 96 L.Ed. 367. That court also held that, wrongful intent and knowledge are essential elements of the offense. Referring to Section 835 of Title 18 U.S.C., the Court said, ...
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