United States v. Delaney

• Decision Date: 17 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-3093,18-3093
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee v. Antwan C. DELANEY, Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

955 F.3d 1077

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee

v.Antwan C. DELANEY, Appellant

No. 18-3093

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued January 30, 2020

Decided April 17, 2020

Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Tony Axam Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Daniel J. Lenerz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jessie K. Liu, U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman and Chrisellen Kolb, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Tatel, Pillard, and Wilkins, Circuit Judges.

Tatel, Circuit Judge:

This case illustrates the difficulties inherent in applying the Fourth Amendment’s generalized prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures to the vagaries of everyday police activity. After being charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, Antwan Delaney moved to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his vehicle on the ground that the seizure preceding the search violated the Fourth Amendment. Finding it a close call, the district court denied the suppression motion. Although we too find the question close, we reach the opposite conclusion: when officers seized Delaney, they lacked the requisite suspicion to justify the stop, meaning the subsequent search violated the Fourth Amendment.

I.

The following comes from the district court’s detailed factual findings, which, with two minor exceptions noted below, neither Delaney nor the government challenges.

On December 31, 2017, officers Richard Willis and Jason Boockholdt were patrolling a residential area east of the Anacostia River. They conducted the patrol in uniform and in a marked police cruiser, with Willis driving and Boockholdt riding shotgun. The officers "were specifically patrolling the area for New Year’s Eve celebratory gunfire or other crime." Hearing Tr. 71 (July 10, 2018).

Shortly after midnight, the officers heard "repeated gunfire in multiple directions, including shots that the officers believed to be close by." Hearing Tr. 9 (July 12, 2018). The officers began canvassing the immediate area to determine the location of the shots. They first stopped at an alley, exiting the cruiser to investigate. The officers saw no one there but, while looking about, heard "seven to eight gunshots coming from multiple directions," a "few" of which "sounded particularly close by." Id . at 9–10. The officers got back into their cruiser to "chas[e]" or "attempt to follow and investigate the sounds." Id . at 10.

After driving "for approximately one minute, reversing direction[,] and turning a few times," they pulled into a "narrow parking lot." Id . at 6, 10. Activating the cruiser’s "take-down light, a spotlight that enabled them to better observe the area," the officers encountered a line of parked cars. Hearing Tr. 72 (July 10, 2018). One, a Jeep backed-in "close to an adjacent building and/or cement block," was occupied by two individuals: Delaney, sitting in the driver’s seat, and his companion, Jalisa Boler, sitting in the passenger seat. Id . at 73. As the officers pulled into the lot, Delaney and Boler "beg[an] to kiss one another intensely." Id . at 72.

The officers stopped their cruiser near the parking lot’s entrance, "more than 3 feet away from the nose of the Jeep." Id . at 72–73. Although "the marked police car did not completely block the Jeep from exiting the parking lot, ... it would have taken some maneuvering, a number of turns for the Jeep to get out of the parking lot." Id . at 73.

The officers exited their cruiser and approached the Jeep with their weapons holstered. Willis approached the passenger side, and Boockholdt approached the driver side. Meanwhile, Delaney and Boler continued to kiss passionately, with Delaney "star[ing] at the police officers while kissing"—a reaction Willis found "odd." Id . "Neither officer," however, "observed either of the passengers make any furtive gesture." Id .

As Willis reached the Jeep’s passenger-side window, Delaney and Boler stopped kissing and raised their hands. Willis then asked if they had heard gunshots. One of the passengers—"it’s not clear who"—replied that they had and then "said something to the effect of ‘we were just kissing.’ " Id . at 73–74. Willis replied, "I can see that," id . at 74, to which one of the passengers—again, it’s unclear who—stated "I apologize, sir; I apologize," Hearing Tr. 15 (July 12, 2018).

While Willis questioned the passengers, Boockholdt surveyed the parking lot with a flashlight. Returning to the Jeep, Boockholdt instructed Delaney to "pop the door real quick," to which Delaney replied, "you got it." Hearing Tr. 74 (July 10, 2018). Boockholdt then opened the door himself and shouted, "he’s got one, 95," signaling to Willis the presence of a firearm. Id . at 75. After a brief scuffle, the officers detained Delaney. A subsequent search of the Jeep uncovered a handgun under the passenger seat and spent casings on the passenger seat and outside both sides of the Jeep.

A federal grand jury charged Delaney, who had previously been convicted of a felony, with possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Arguing that his seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, Delaney moved to suppress the firearm recovered from the Jeep. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion, at which Willis testified and the government introduced a handful of exhibits, including body-camera footage that captured the officers’ actions from the time they left the alley up and through Delaney’s arrest. After hearing the testimony and "reviewing the exhibits in detail, particularly the body camera footage," the district court made the above factual findings. Hearing Tr. 2–3 (July 12, 2018).

It then turned to the merits of Delaney’s motion. The district court first found that no seizure occurred when the officers drove into the parking lot and activated their take-down light because, "[c]onsidering all of the circumstances surrounding the officers’ entrance into the parking lot, I do not find that a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would feel not free to leave the scene." Id . at 8. In the alternative, the district court found that "even if a seizure did occur at the moment that the officers parked their vehicle in the parking lot," no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because, at that time, the officers had "a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot." Id . at 8, 12. The district court next rejected Delaney’s argument that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred "when [the officers] exited their vehicle and approached the Jeep," explaining that such conduct fell short of a seizure and that, in any event, the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Delaney. Id . at 13, 14. Finally, the district court found that "an investigatory stop occurred when Officer Boockholdt directed Mr. Delaney to open the driver-side door" and that reasonable suspicion existed to justify the stop. Id . at 17. The district court therefore denied Delaney’s motion to suppress.

Because the government refused to offer Delaney a conditional plea that would have allowed him to appeal the district court’s ruling, the parties agreed to a stipulated trial, at which the district court found Delaney violated 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court then sentenced Delaney to a term of forty-six months imprisonment, and this timely appeal followed.

II.

The Fourth Amendment protects citizens "against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. This case concerns the latter protection.

A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs "when physical force is used to restrain movement or when a person submits to an officer’s ‘show of authority.’ " United States v. Brodie , 742 F.3d 1058, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting California v. Hodari D. , 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) ). A show of authority sufficient to constitute a seizure occurs where "the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business," Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted), or, put another way, where "a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave," United States v. Mendenhall , 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). In making that determination, courts consider the totality of the circumstances, including "whether the suspect was physically intimidated or touched, whether the officer displayed a weapon, wore a uniform, or restricted the defendant’s movements, the time and place of the encounter, and whether the officer’s use of language or tone of voice indicated that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled." United States v. Castle , 825 F.3d 625, 632–33 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The person challenging the seizure "bears the burden of demonstrating that he was seized." Id . at 633.

Although the Fourth Amendment generally requires that officers have probable cause and a warrant to seize an individual, they need neither probable cause nor a warrant to "briefly detain a citizen" where they "ha[ve] a reasonable, articulable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be afoot.’ " United States v. Edmonds , 240 F.3d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ). To "seize[ ] a person on less than probable cause," "a police officer ... must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, support a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity." Castle , 825 F.3d at 634 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The government...