United States v. Deleon-Ramirez
| Decision Date | 09 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | Criminal No. 3:12CR39 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LUCIO DELEON-RAMIREZ |
Lucio Deleon-Ramirez, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, submitted this motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence ("§ 2255 Motion," ECF No. 32).1 Deleon-Ramirez contends that he experienced ineffective assistance of counsel2 and prosecutorial misconduct and was denied due process in conjunction with his guilty plea and sentencing. Specifically, Deleon-Ramirez demands relief because:
Deleon-Ramirez submitted a memorandum in support of his § 2255 Motion (ECF No. 33). The Government has responded, asserting that Deleon-Ramirez's claims lack merit. (ECF No. 36.) Deleon-Ramirez has filed a reply. (ECF No. 37.) For the reasons set forth below, Deleon-Ramirez's § 2255 Motion (ECF No. 32) will be denied.
On March 6, 2012, a grand jury charged Deleon-Ramirez with one count of illegal reentry. (Indictment 1, ECF No. 1.) On April 25, 2012, Deleon-Ramirez appeared before the United States Magistrate Judge and pled guilty to the one-count Indictment. (Apr. 25, 2012 Tr. 13-14.)
On August 9, 2012, the Court entered judgment against Deleon-Ramirez and sentenced him to 4 8 months of imprisonment, to be served consecutively to his state sentence. (J. 2, ECF No. 21.) On appeal, Deleon-Ramirez argued that his sentence was unreasonable, and that the Court erred by imposing three (3)years of supervised release given that Deleon-Ramirez was a deportable alien. See United States v. Deleon-Ramirez, 542 F. App'x 241, 242 (4th Cir. 2013). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed this Court's judgment. Id. at 247.
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a convicted defendant must show first, that counsel's representation was deficient and second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To satisfy the deficient performance prong of Strickland, the convicted defendant must overcome the "'strong presumption' that counsel's strategy and tactics fall 'within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" Burch v. Corcoran, 273 F.3d 577, 588 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). The prejudice component requires a convicted defendant to Strickland, 4 66 U.S. at 694. Inanalyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, it is not necessary to determine whether counsel performed deficiently if the claim is readily dismissed for lack of prejudice. Id. at 697.
In the context of a guilty plea, the Supreme Court has modified this second prong of Strickland to require the convicted defendant to "show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Of course, in conducting the foregoing inquiry, the representations of the convicted defendant, his lawyer, and the prosecutor during the plea proceedings, "as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). In light of the strong presumption of verity that attaches to a petitioner's declarations during his plea proceedings, "in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, allegations in a § 2255 motion that directly contradict the petitioner's sworn statements made during a properly conducted Rule 11 colloquy are always 'palpably incredible' and 'patently frivolous or false.'" United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 221 (4th Cir. 2005) (citationsomitted). Thus, the Fourth Circuit has admonished that "in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the truth of sworn statements made during a Rule 11 colloquy is conclusively established, and a district court should, without holding an evidentiary hearing, dismiss any § 2255 motion that necessarily relies on allegations that contradict the sworn statements." Id. at 221-22. No circumstances exist here that would lead the Court to consider Deleon-Ramirez's prior sworn statements as other than truthful.
In Claim One, Deleon-Ramirez asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to "timely negotiate a favorable plea agreement." (§ 2255 Mot. 4.) In his Memorandum, Deleon-Ramirez suggests that counsel should have negotiated a written plea agreement pursuant to a "fast-track program." (Mem. Supp. § 2255 Mot. 5.)
As this Court has previously stated:
Fast-track programs began informally in districts along the Mexican border, where district courts were increasingly overwhelmed by high caseloads related to immigration violations. To alleviate this burden, federal prosecutors engaged in charge-bargaining and agreed to move for downward departures in return for expedited guilty pleas. Congress formally sanctioned such early disposition programs in the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 ("PROTECT Act"), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003), in which it authorized the Attorney General to createand implement programs to aid jurisdictions overwhelmed by high caseloads related to a particular offense or category of offenses. Congress also directed the Sentencing Commission to promulgate a policy statement authorizing a departure of not more than four levels in cases where the United States moved for a downward departure pursuant to an early disposition program. The Commission complied in U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1.
United States v. Hernandez-Montealegre, 445 F. Supp. 2d 646, 658 (E.D. Va. 2006) (citing United States v. Perez-Pena, 453 F.3d 236, 238 (4th Cir. 2006)). "However, no such early disposition program has been authorized in the Eastern District of Virginia." Id. at 659. Because no such fast-track program has been authorized in the Eastern District of Virginia, Deleon-Ramirez cannot demonstrate deficiency or prejudice. Given this, the Court cannot conclude that counsel's performance was deficient by failing to attempt to negotiate for a "fast-track" plea agreement that had no chance of success. Cf. Beamon v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 2d 350, 357 (E.D. Va. 2002) ().
In his Memorandum, Deleon-Ramirez expands upon his claim to argue that counsel was ineffective because she "failed to advise [him] 'that he could be sentenced to a longer term of imprisonment' than the two-year sentence for the underlyingoffense." (Mem. Supp. § 2255 Mot. 5.) However, during the Rule 11 proceedings, the Magistrate Judge informed Deleon-Ramirez that the maximum penalty was ten (10) years of incarceration. (Apr. 25, 2012 Tr. 7.) Deleon-Ramirez responded that he understood. (Apr. 25, 2012 Tr. 7.) The Magistrate Judge further informed Deleon-Ramirez that any sentencing estimate he may have received from counsel "can only be a prediction and no kind of promise." (Apr. 25, 2012 Tr. 12.) Deleon-Ramirez again responded that he understood. (Apr. 25, 2012 Tr. 12.) He further agreed that he understood that the Court could "depart upward or downward from the recommended guideline range." (Apr. 25, 2012 Tr. 12.) Because the Magistrate Judge properly informed Deleon-Ramirez of the maximum penalty and that he could not rely upon any estimate provided by counsel, Deleon-Ramirez cannot demonstrate prejudice following from any misinformation, or lack of information, from his counsel with respect to his sentence. See United States v. Foster, 68 F.3d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1995).
Deleon-Ramirez also claims that "he was not warned of the effect of his immigration status on his sentence including deportation as expected in Padilla v. Kentucky," 559 U.S. 356 (2010). (Mem. Supp. § 2255 Mot. 6.) In Padilla, the Supreme Court held that "[i]t is quintessentially the duty of counsel toprovide her client with available advice about an issue like deportation and the failure to do so clearly satisfies the first prong of the Strickland analysis." 559 U.S. at 371 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
During the Rule 11 proceedings, counsel for the Government stated that Deleon-Ramirez would be subject to immigration consequences, including "deportation at the conclusion of these proceedings." (Apr. 25, 2012 Tr. 3.) Furthermore, the Magistrate Judge informed Deleon-Ramirez that by pleading guilty to a felony, he "would be removed from the United States and it could affect [his] ability to reenter the United States on any kind of legal basis again." (Apr. 25, 2012 Tr. 8.) Deleon-Ramirez replied that he understood. (Apr. 25, 2012 Tr. 8.) Even with those warnings, Deleon-Ramirez still chose to plead guilty to the charge of illegal reentry. (Apr. 25, 2012 Tr. 13-14.) Moreover, the Court takes judicial notice that in 2010, when...
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