United States v. Demille
| Decision Date | 04 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:18-cr-594-SI,Case No. 3:18-cr-149-SI |
| Citation | 465 F.Supp.3d 1144 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Julie Ann DEMILLE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Donna Maddux, U.S. Attorney's Office District of Oregon, Portland, OR, for United States of America.
On April 16, 2020, Defendant Julie Ann DeMille ("Ms. DeMille") filed an Emergency Motion for Compassionate Release, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). ECF 75.1 The Government objected, arguing that Ms. DeMille had not yet exhausted her administrative remedies. The Court agreed and denied Ms. DeMille's motion without prejudice and with leave to renew. On April 29, 2020, Ms. DeMille timely filed a Motion to Reconsider Emergency Motion for Compassionate Release. ECF 80. The Government opposes Ms. DeMille's renewed motion on the merits. For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Ms. DeMille's motion for reconsideration.
A district court generally "may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) ; see Dillon v. United States , 560 U.S. 817, 824-25, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010). Congress, however, has expressly authorized a district court to modify a defendant's sentence in three limited circumstances: (1) when granting a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) ; (2) when expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ; or (3) when a defendant has been sentenced based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). The motion before the Court seeks compassionate release.
Before 2018, § 3582(c)(1)(A) required that a motion for compassionate release could be brought only by the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). The First Step Act ("FSA"), Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (Dec. 21, 2018), amended § 3582 to authorize courts to grant a motion for compassionate release filed by a defendant. A defendant, however, may only bring a motion for compassionate release after : (1) petitioning the BOP to make such a motion on the defendant's behalf; and (2) either (a) the defendant has exhausted all administrative appeals after the BOP denied the defendant's petition or (b) thirty days has elapsed after the warden of the defendant's facility received the defendant's petition, whichever is earlier. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) authorizes a court to modify a defendant's term of imprisonment if the court finds that two conditions have been satisfied. The first is that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The second is that "such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The court also must consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent they are applicable. Id.
The Sentencing Commission policy statement for reducing a term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(1)(A) is found in the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("USSG") at § 1B1.13. That policy statement explains the phrase "extraordinary and compelling reasons." USSG § 1B1.13(1)(A) and cmt. 1. According to the policy statement, extraordinary and compelling reasons are: (1) the medical condition of the defendant (defined as whether the defendant is suffering from a terminal illness; or is suffering from a serious physical or medical condition, serious functional or cognitive impairment, or deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process, "that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover"); (2) the age of the defendant (defined as whether the defendant is at least 65 years old, is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process, and has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less); (3) family circumstances (defined as the death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant's minor child or minor children or the incapacitation of the defendant's spouse or registered partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered partner); and (4) any other extraordinary and compelling reason determined by the Director of the BOP. USSG § 1B1.13 cmt. 1.
We are currently in a global health crisis caused by the 2019 novel Coronavirus ("COVID-19"), which already has taken the lives of more than 105,000 people just in the United States during the past several months. When a defendant has a chronic medical condition that may substantially elevate the defendant's risk of becoming seriously ill or dying from COVID-19, that condition may satisfy the standard of extraordinary and compelling reasons. Under these circumstances, a chronic medical condition (i.e. , one from which a defendant is not expected to recover) reasonably may be found to be both serious and capable of substantially diminishing the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility, even if that condition would not have constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason absent the heightened risk of COVID-19. See generally USSG § 1B1.13 and cmt. 1(A)(ii)(I).
Alternatively, USSG § 1B1.13, as currently written, does not constrain the Court's ability to find extraordinary and compelling reasons here. Because the Sentencing Commission's policy statement was not amended after enactment of the First Step Act, "a growing number of district courts have concluded the Commission lacks an applicable policy statement regarding when a judge can grant compassionate release" ... "because the Commission never harmonized its policy statement with the FSA." United States v. Mondaca , 2020 WL 1029024, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2020) () (quotation marked omitted); see also United States v. Redd , 444 F.Supp.3d 717, 724 (E.D. Va. Mar. 16, 2020) (); United States v. Barber , 2020 WL 2404679, at *3 (D. Or. May 12, 2020) () (citations and quotation marks omitted).
As explained by one court, "a majority of federal district courts have found that the most natural reading of the amended § 3582(c) and [ 28 U.S.C.] § 994(t) is that the district court assumes the same discretion as the BOP director when it considers a compassionate release motion properly before it." United States v. Perez , 2020 WL 1180719, at *2 (D. Kan. Mar. 11, 2020). Indeed, the Government previously conceded this point in United States v. Young , agreeing that "the dependence on the BOP to determine the existence of an extraordinary and compelling reason, like the requirement for a motion by the BOP Director, is a relic of the prior procedure that is inconsistent with the amendments implemented by the First Step Act." 2020 WL 1047815, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 4, 2020). The court in Young followed many other district courts in recognizing that § 1B1.13's defined categories are not exclusive: "In short, federal judges are no longer constrained by the BOP Director's determination of what constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction." Id. The Court agrees with this alternative analysis as well.
The policy statement further provides that, in addition to finding extraordinary and compelling reasons, a court also must find that "the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)." USSG § 1B1.13(2). The factors to be considered in deciding whether a defendant is a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense (including whether the offense is a crime of violence, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591, a federal crime of terrorism, or involves a minor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destructive device); (2) the weight of the evidence; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant (including, among other things, the defendant's character, physical and mental condition, and family ties and whether at the time of the offense or arrest the defendant was on probation, parole, or other release); and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant's release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
Finally, as provided in both § 3582(c)(1)(A) and the policy statement, a court must consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent they are applicable. These factors include the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and characteristics of the defendant; and the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and provide the defendant with needed training, medical care, or other treatment in the most effective manner. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The policy statement also recognizes that the sentencing court "is in a unique position to determine whether the circumstances warrant a reduction ..., after...
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