United States v. Denedo
| Citation | 556 U.S. 904,173 L.Ed.2d 1235,129 S.Ct. 2213 |
| Decision Date | 08 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 08–267.,08–267. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES, Petitioner, v. Jacob DENEDO. |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
556 U.S. 904
129 S.Ct. 2213
173 L.Ed.2d 1235
UNITED STATES, Petitioner
v.
Jacob DENEDO.
No. 08–267.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 25, 2009.
Decided June 8, 2009.
Pratik A. Shah, Washington, DC, for petitioner.
Matthew S. Freedus, Washington, DC, for respondent.
Edwin S. Kneedler, Acting Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for United States.
Matthew S. Freedus, Counsel of Record, Eugene R. Fidell, Feldesman Tucker Leifer Fidell LLP, Washington, D.C., Lt. Cdr. Brian L. Mizer, Lt. Dillon J. Ambrose, Navy-Marine Corps, Appellate Defense Division, Washington, D.C. 20374, for respondent.
Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel, Department of Defense, Louis J. Puleo, Col., USMC Director, Brian K. Keller, Deputy Director, Timothy H. Delgado, Lt., JAGC. USN, Appellate Government Division, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., Gregory G. Garre, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Matthew W. Friedrich, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Pratik A. Shah, Assistant to the Solicitor General, John F. De Pue, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for United States.
Opinion
Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The case before us presents a single issue: whether an Article I military appellate court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for a writ of error coram nobis to challenge its earlier, and final, decision affirming a criminal conviction. The military court which had affirmed the conviction and where the writ of coram nobis was sought is the Navy–Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA). Its ruling that it had jurisdiction to grant the writ, but then denying its issuance for lack of merit, was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF). After the CAAF agreed that the NMCCA has jurisdiction to issue the writ, it remanded for further proceedings on the merits. The Government of the United States, contending that a writ of coram nobis directed to a final judgment of conviction is beyond the jurisdiction of the military courts, now brings the case to us.
I
Respondent Jacob Denedo came to the United States in 1984 from his native Nigeria. He enlisted in the Navy in 1989 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1990. In 1998, military authorities charged him with conspiracy, larceny, and forgery—in contravention of Articles 81, 121, and 123 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 881, 921, 923 —all for his role in a scheme to defraud a community college. With the assistance of both military and civilian counsel, respondent made a plea bargain to plead guilty to reduced charges. In exchange for his plea the convening authority referred respondent's case to a special court-martial, § 819, which, at that time, could not impose a sentence greater than six months' confinement.
The special court-martial, consisting of a single military judge, accepted respondent's guilty plea after determining that it was both knowing and voluntary. The court convicted respondent of conspiracy and larceny. It sentenced him to three months' confinement, a bad-conduct discharge, and a reduction to the lowest enlisted pay grade. Respondent appealed on the ground that his sentence was unduly severe. The NMCCA affirmed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a–67a. Respondent did not seek further review in the CAAF, and he was discharged from the Navy on May 30, 2000.
In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against respondent based upon his special court-martial conviction. To avoid deportation, respondent decided to challenge his conviction once more, though at this point it had been final for eight years. He maintained, in a petition for a writ of coram nobis filed with the NMCCA, that the conviction it had earlier affirmed must be deemed void because his guilty plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent alleged that he informed his civilian attorney during plea negotiations that “ ‘his primary concern and objective’ ” was to avoid deportation and that he was willing to “ ‘risk ... going to jail’ ”
to avert separation from his family. 66 M.J. 114, 118 (C.A. Armed Forces 2008). On respondent's account, his attorney—an alcoholic who was not sober during the course of the special court-martial proceeding—erroneously assured him that “ ‘if he agreed to plead guilty at a special-court-martial he would avoid any risk of deportation.’ ” Ibid. Petitioner argued that the NMCCA could set aside its earlier
decision by issuing a writ of coram nobis under the authority of the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
The Government filed a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. It contended that the NMCCA had no authority to conduct postconviction proceedings. In a terse, four-sentence order, the NMCCA summarily denied both the Government's motion and respondent's petition for a writ of coram nobis . App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a. Respondent appealed and the CAAF, dividing 3 to 2, affirmed in part and reversed in part. The CAAF agreed with the NMCCA that standing military courts have jurisdiction to conduct “collateral review under the All Writs Act.” 66 M.J., at 119. This is so, the CAAF explained, because “when a petitioner seeks collateral relief to modify an action that was taken within the subject matter jurisdiction of the military justice system ... a writ that is necessary or appropriate may be issued under the All Writs Act ‘in aid of’ the court's existing jurisdiction.” Id., at 120 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) ).
Satisfied that it had jurisdiction, the CAAF next turned to whether the writ of coram nobis should issue. It held that a nondefaulted, ineffective-assistance claim that was yet to receive a full and fair review “within the military justice system” could justify issuance of the writ. 66 M.J., at 125. Finding that respondent's ineffective-assistance claim satisfied “the threshold criteria for coram nobis review,” the CAAF remanded to the NMCCA so it could ascertain in the first instance “whether the merits of [respondent's] petition can be resolved on the basis of the written submissions, or whether a factfinding hearing is required.” Id., at 126, 130.
Judge Stucky filed a dissenting opinion. Assuming that the majority had correctly determined its jurisdiction to grant the requested relief, he concluded that respondent's ineffective-assistance claim lacked merit. Id., at 131. Judge Ryan also dissented. Reasoning that the majority had misapplied this Court's holding in Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 119 S.Ct. 1538, 143 L.Ed.2d 720 (1999), she concluded that the UCMJ does not confer jurisdiction upon military tribunals to conduct “post-finality collateral review.” 66 M.J., at 136. We granted certiorari, 555 U.S. 1041, 129 S.Ct. 622, 172 L.Ed.2d 474 (2008), and now affirm.
II
Before we address another court's subject-matter jurisdiction we must first determine our own. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1945, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction ... should be considered when fairly in doubt”). The Government, upon which the burden to demonstrate subject-matter jurisdiction lies, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006), claims that our power to hear this appeal rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1259(4). That jurisdictional provision permits us to review CAAF decisions in “ ‘cases ... in which the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ... granted relief.’ ” Respondent maintains that we lack jurisdiction because the CAAF did not “ ‘grant relief’ ”; “all it did was remand” to the NMCCA. Brief for Respondent 6–7 (brackets omitted).
Respondent's parsimonious construction of the word “relief” need not detain us long. Though § 1259 does not define the term, its familiar meaning encompasses any “redress or benefit” provided by a court. Black's Law Dictionary 1317 (8th ed.2004). The CAAF's judgment reversing the NMCCA satisfies that definition. The NMCCA denied respondent's petition for a writ of coram nobis, while the CAAF's decision reversed and remanded
so that the NMCCA could determine anew if the writ should issue. That decision conferred a palpable benefit on respondent; for
a chance of success on the merits, however slight, is superior to no possibility at all.
To be sure, respondent would have preferred the CAAF to issue a writ of coram nobis or to direct the NMCCA to do so rather than remanding for the NMCCA to conduct further proceedings. We have jurisdiction, however, to review any decision granting “relief,” not just those providing “ultimate relief” or “complete relief.” Indeed, appellate courts reverse and remand lower court judgments—rather than issuing complete relief—with regularity. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 129 S.Ct. 1896, 173 L.Ed.2d 832;FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 129 S.Ct. 1800, 173 L.Ed.2d 738. There is no merit to the view that a decision granting partial relief should be construed as granting no relief at all.
Because the CAAF “granted relief” to respondent, the text of § 1259 is satisfied here. We have jurisdiction to determine whether the CAAF was correct in ruling that the NMCCA had authority to entertain the petition for a writ of coram nobis .
III
A
The writ of coram nobis is an ancient common-law remedy designed “to correct errors of fact.” United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 507, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954). In American jurisprudence the precise contours of coram nobis have not been “well defined,” Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U.S. 410, 416, 26 L.Ed. 797 (1882), but the writ traces its origins to the King's Bench and the Court of Common Pleas. United States v. Plumer, 27 F. Cas. 561, 573 (No. 16,056) (CC Mass. 1859) (opinion for the court by Clifford, Circuit Justice); see also...
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