United States v. Denedo

• Decision Date: 08 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08–267.,08–267.
• Citation: 173 L.Ed.2d 1235,556 U.S. 904,129 S.Ct. 2213,77 USLW 4466
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Petitioner, v. Jacob DENEDO.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

556 U.S. 904

129 S.Ct. 2213

173 L.Ed.2d 1235

77 USLW 4466

UNITED STATES, Petitioner,

v.Jacob DENEDO.

No. 08–267.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued March 25, 2009.

Decided June 8, 2009.

Syllabus^*

Military authorities charged respondent, a native Nigerian serving in the U.S. Navy, with violating of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). With counsel's assistance, respondent agreed to plead guilty to reduced charges. The special court-martial accepted the plea and convicted and sentenced respondent; the Navy–Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA) affirmed; and he was discharged from the Navy in 2000. In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against respondent based on the conviction. To avoid deportation, he filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis under the authority of the All Writs Act, asking the NMCCA to vacate the conviction it had earlier affirmed on the ground that his guilty plea resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel, who had assured him his plea bargain carried no risk of deportation. Though rejecting the Government's contention that it lacked jurisdiction to grant the writ, the NMCCA denied relief for lack of merit. Agreeing that the NMCCA has jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) remanded for further proceedings on the merits.

Held:

1. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1259(4), which permits it to review CAAF decisions in cases “in which [that court] granted relief.” Respondent's parsimonious view that the CAAF did not “ ‘gran [t] relief’ ” in this case, but simply remanded to the NMCCA, is rejected. Though § 1259 does not define “relief,” the word's familiar meaning encompasses any redress or benefit provided by a court. The CAAF's judgment reversing the NMCCA satisfies that definition. Pp. 2219 – 2220.

2. Article I military courts have jurisdiction to entertain coram nobis petitions to consider allegations that an earlier judgment of conviction was flawed in a fundamental respect. Pp. 2220 – 2224.

(a) Military courts' power to issue extraordinary writs under the All Writs Act, see Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 695, n. 7, 89 S.Ct. 1876, 23 L.Ed.2d 631, does not determine the anterior question whether those courts have jurisdiction to entertain a coram nobis petition . As recognized by the All Writs Act—which permits “courts established by Act of Congress” to issue “all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions,”28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)—a court's power to issue any form of relief, extraordinary or otherwise, is contingent on its subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or controversy. Such jurisdiction is determined by Congress. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96. Thus, to issue respondent a writ of coram nobis on remand, the NMCCA must have had statutory subject-matter jurisdiction over respondent's original judgment of conviction. Pp. 2220 – 2222.

(b) Pursuant to the UCMJ, the NMCCA and the CAAF have subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. The NMCCA has jurisdiction to entertain respondent's coram nobis request under UCMJ Article 66, which provides: “For the purpose of reviewing court-martial cases, the [NMCCA] may sit ....” 10 U.S.C. § 866(a). Because respondent's coram nobis request is simply a further “step in [his] criminal” appeal, United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 505 n. 4, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248, the NMCCA's jurisdiction to issue the writ derives from the earlier jurisdiction it exercised under § 866(a) to hear and determine the conviction's validity on direct review. Respondent's coram nobis request is not barred by the requirement that the NMCCA “act only with respect to the findings and sentence as approved by the convening authority.” § 866(c). An alleged error in the original judgment predicated on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel challenges the conviction's validity, see Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 173 L.Ed.2d 251, so respondent's Sixth Amendment claim is “with respect to” the special-court-martial's “findings” of guilty. Because the NMCCA has jurisdiction, the CAAF has jurisdiction to review the NMCCA's denial of respondent's petition challenging the validity of his original conviction. That the CAAF's authority is confined “to matters of law” connected to “the findings and sentence as approved by the convening authority and as affirmed or set aside by the Court of Criminal Appeals,” § 867(c), poses no obstacle to respondent's requested review. His Sixth Amendment claim presents a “matte[r] of law” “with respect to the [guilty] findings ... as approved by the [special court-martial] and as affirmed ... by” the NMCCA. Pp. 2221 – 2223.

(c) The Government's argument that UCMJ Article 76 affirmatively prohibits the type of collateral review respondent seeks errs in “conflating the jurisdictional question with the merits” of respondent's petition, Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 129 S.Ct. 1896, 173 L.Ed.2d 832. Article 76 provides for the finality of judgments in military cases. Just as the finality principle did not jurisdictionally bar the court in Morgan, supra, from examining its earlier judgment, neither does it bar the NMCCA from doing so here. The Government's contention that coram nobis permits a court to correct its own errors, not those of an inferior court, is disposed of on similar grounds. Pp. 2222 – 2224.

66 M.J. 114, affirmed and remanded.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. ROBERTS, C.J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which SCALIA, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined.

Pratik A. Shah, Washington, DC, for petitioner.

Matthew S. Freedus, Washington, DC, for respondent.

Edwin S. Kneedler, Acting Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for United States.

Matthew S. Freedus, Counsel of Record, Eugene R. Fidell, Feldesman Tucker Leifer Fidell LLP, Washington, D.C., Lt. Cdr. Brian L. Mizer, Lt. Dillon J. Ambrose, Navy-Marine Corps, Appellate Defense Division, Washington, D.C. 20374, for respondent.

Daniel J. Dell'Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel, Department of Defense, Louis J. Puleo, Col., USMC Director, Brian K. Keller, Deputy Director, Timothy H. Delgado, Lt., JAGC. USN, Appellate Government Division, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., Gregory G. Garre, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Matthew W. Friedrich, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Pratik A. Shah, Assistant to the Solicitor General, John F. De Pue, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for United States.

Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

The case before us presents a single issue: whether an Article I military appellate court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for a writ of error coram nobis to challenge its earlier, and final, decision affirming a criminal conviction. The military court which had affirmed the conviction and where the writ of coram nobis was sought is the Navy–Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA). Its ruling that it had jurisdiction to grant the writ, but then denying its issuance for lack of merit, was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF). After the CAAF agreed that the NMCCA has jurisdiction to issue the writ, it remanded for further proceedings on the merits. The Government of the United States, contending that a writ of coram nobis directed to a final judgment of conviction is beyond the jurisdiction of the military courts, now brings the case to us.

I

Respondent Jacob Denedo came to the United States in 1984 from his native Nigeria. He enlisted in the Navy in 1989 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1990. In 1998, military authorities charged him with conspiracy, larceny, and forgery—in contravention of Articles 81, 121, and 123 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 881, 921, 923—all for his role in a scheme to defraud a community college. With the assistance of both military and civilian counsel, respondent made a plea bargain to plead guilty to reduced charges. In exchange for his plea the convening authority referred respondent's case to a special court-martial, § 819, which, at that time, could not impose a sentence greater than six months' confinement.

The special court-martial, consisting of a single military judge, accepted respondent's guilty plea after determining that it was both knowing and voluntary. The court convicted respondent of conspiracy and larceny. It sentenced him to three months' confinement, a bad-conduct discharge, and a reduction to the lowest enlisted pay grade. Respondent appealed on the ground that his sentence was unduly severe. The NMCCA affirmed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a–67a. Respondent did not seek further review in the CAAF, and he was discharged from the Navy on May 30, 2000.

In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against respondent based upon his special court-martial conviction. To avoid deportation, respondent decided to challenge his conviction once more, though at this point it had been final for eight years. He maintained, in a petition for a writ of coram nobis filed with the NMCCA, that the conviction it had earlier affirmed must be deemed void because his guilty plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent alleged that he informed his civilian attorney during plea negotiations that “ ‘his primary concern and objective’ ” was to avoid deportation and that he was willing to “ ‘risk ... going to jail’ ” to avert separation from his family. 66 M.J. 114, 118 (C.A. Armed Forces 2008). On respondent's account, his attorney—an alcoholic who was not sober during the course of the special court-martial proceeding—erroneously assured him that “ ‘if ...