United States v. Deschambault
| Docket Number | 2:19-cr-00187-JAW |
| Decision Date | 03 August 2023 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. RAYEVON DESCHAMBAULT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
This case revolves around the sexual exploitation of a minor through the production of pornographic videos. After a two-day jury trial ending in a guilty verdict, the defendant brings a motion for new trial for four reasons. The Court denies the defendant's motion for new trial because it concludes that: (1) supplying the jury with a copy of the indictment listing the victim as “Victim #1” did not deny the defendant a fair trial; (2) the Court did not improperly instruct the jury on the requisite intent during trial or jury deliberations; (3) the prosecution's opening and closing statements did not deny the defendant a fair trial; and (4) the prosecution's trial strategy does not constitute a miscarriage of justice.
A. Procedural History
On October 11, 2019, a federal grand jury indicted Rayevon Deschambault with two counts of sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). Indictment (ECF No. 1). On February 21, 2020, Mr Deschambault filed three motions to suppress; the last motion to suppress included a request for a Franks[1] hearing. Mot. to Suppress (ECF No. 40); Mot. to Suppress II (ECF No. 41); Mot. to Suppress and Req. for Franks Hr'g (ECF No. 42). The Government filed a consolidated response to these motions on April 27, 2020. Gov't's Resp. to Def.'s Mots. to Suppress and Req. for a Franks Hr'g (ECF No. 49). Mr. Deschambault filed replies on May 11, 2020. Reply Re: Mot. to Suppress (ECF No. 51); Reply Re: Mot. to Suppress and Req. for Franks Hr'g (ECF No. 52).
On September 21, 2020, the Court denied Mr. Deschambault's three motions to suppress without holding an evidentiary or Franks hearing. Order on Mot. for Franks Hr'g and Mots. to Suppress (ECF No. 60) (First Order on Mots. to Suppress). On September 29, 2020, Mr. Deschambault moved for reconsideration of the Court's order denying his motions to suppress. Resp. to Ct. Order on Def.'s Mots. to Suppress (ECF No. 62). On October 21, 2021, the Court denied Mr. Deschambault's motion for reconsideration of his motions to suppress. Order on Mot. for Recons. on Mots. to Suppress (ECF No. 109).
On September 22, 2021, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Mr. Deschambault with a new count of possession of material containing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A). Superseding Indictment (ECF No. 103). Also on September 22, 2021, the grand jury returned an indictment in a new drug case, charging Mr. Deschambault with one count of distribution of cocaine base and one count of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. No. 2:21-cr-00146-JAW, Indictment (ECF No. 1).
On December 3, 2021, Mr. Deschambault filed a motion to dismiss Count Three for vindictive prosecution. Mot. to Dismiss Count Three for Vindictive Prosecution and Rule 48(b) (ECF No. 118). On January 6, 2022, the Government filed its opposition. Gov't's Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss for Vindictive Prosecution (ECF No. 122). On February 2, 2022, Mr. Deschambault filed his reply. Def.'s Reply to Gov't's Obj. to Mot. to Dismiss Based on Vindictive Prosecution (ECF No. 127). On July 25, 2022, the Court dismissed without prejudice Mr. Deschambault's motion to dismiss for vindictive prosecution. Order on Pending Mots. (ECF No. 141). On December 30, 2022, the Government filed a notice of dismissal, dismissing without prejudice Count Three of the Superseding Indictment. Notice of Dismissal (ECF No. 199).
The case was tried before a jury from January 18, 2023 to January 19, 2023, and on January 19, 2023, the jury issued a verdict against Mr. Deschambault. Jury Verdict (ECF No. 232). On April 7, 2023, after being granted the requested time extensions, Mr. Deschambault filed a motion for acquittal, Mot. for J. of Acquittal Pursuant to F.R.Crim.P. 29(c)(1) (ECF No. 258), and a motion for new trial. Pl.'s Mot. for New Trial (ECF No. 259) (Def.'s Mot.). On May 12, 2023, the Government responded to Mr. Deschambault's motion for acquittal, Gov't's Response to Def.'s Mot. for Acquittal (ECF No. 265) and to his motion for new trial. Gov't's Response to Def.'s Mot. for New Trial (ECF No. 266) (Gov't's Opp'n). On June 9, 2023, Mr. Deschambault replied to the Government's opposition to a new trial. Reply Re: Mot. for New Trial (ECF No. 271) (Def.'s Reply).
Mr. Deschambault submits that “[t]he Government and Defendant engaged in pre-trial negotiations relating to stipulations where the Government referred to the victim as ‘Victim #1' and where Defendant objected to such terminology and succeeded in removing any such references.” Def.'s Mot. at 11. He explains that the Indictment also referred to the victim as “Victim #1,” which was “not properly noted by Defendant and was thus not objected to.” Id. He insists that this reference “clearly raises the certain inference that there was more than one ‘victim,'” and having “sent this back for the jury to contemplate during deliberations constitutes obvious error and denied the Defendant a [f]air [t]rial.” Id.
During deliberations, the jury sent a note asking: (1) “does intent have to exist prior to the sex act or can it be formed at any time during?” and (2) “as used in the second element does ‘engage' mean start or does it mean the entirety of the conduct?” Id. at 1. The Court responded: “In response to your questions, the Court advises . . . the intent does not have to exist prior to the sex act and may be formed during the act.” Tr. of Proceedings at 237:17-20 (ECF Nos. 249 and 250) (Trial Tr.). Mr. Deschambault submits that the Court's response to the jury's note requesting clarification on the required intent was improper and explains that he “objected to this instruction, arguing that whether the actual statement was true or not, a more subtle and nuanced response was necessary and [he] requested the jury be reinstructed on the necessary elements, especially concerning specific intent.” Def.'s Mot. at 2. According to Mr. Deschambault, “[w]hether the Court's answer to the jury note was an accurate statement of the law or not . . . in refusing to give the jury the full instruction, and in refusing to re-instruct on specific intent . . . and in refusing to place the issue in context relative to the relevance of a lack of prior planning and a spontaneous decision, the Court committed reversible error.” Id. at 4. Mr. Deschambault now proposes what he asserts would have been an appropriate instruction, although he “did not explicitly offer the [proposed] language in the moment the [Court's] prepared instruction was discussed.” Id. at 5.
Mr. Deschambault submits that “[t]he fundamental flaw in the instruction as given is that it did not answer the actual question asked” by the jury when “[t]he question itself betrays confusion in the jury concerning the correct legal standards.” Id. at 6. He further submits that “[e]ven if the instruction given by the Court was an accurate statement in and of itself, in isolation, it neither addressed the specific, and critical, question posed by the jury nor offered any true clarification of the legal principles at play in this circumstance,” making it “reversible error.” Id.
Mr. Deschambault contends that the prosecution “in both opening and closing statements profoundly prejudiced Defendant and deprived him of a [f]air [t]rial by continually referencing the age and school status of the victim which was not even a contested issue in the trial and was in fact an issue Defendant was forbidden to even raise with the jury.” Id. at 6. According to Mr. Deschambault, “[r]aising the issue, and the manner in which it was raised, was designed to prejudice the jury and influence their verdict on improper bases.” Id. He further contends that the Court “barred Defendant from introducing any evidence of [his] belief concerning the victim's age as well as any representations the victim had made concerning her age,” yet “despite this ruling, the Government continually placed before the jury representations of the victim's age even though it was not a contested issue in the case.” Id. at 7.
Mr. Deschambault asserts that “[t]he only possible motivation” of the Government in making representations of the victim's age was “to prejudice the jury against the Defendant and induce them to decide the case on improper bases, injecting issues broader than what is relevant to guilt or innocence under the statute and clearly meant to inflame emotions.” Id. For example, Mr. Deschambault specifically asserts that the Government should not have “ask[ed] about each grade [the victim] had been in and in what year, going from 12th to 11thto 10th to 9th grade, again placing her age unnecessarily in the mix” and should not have said that the victim had “just finished the eighth grade” in its closing arguments. Id. at 8. According to Mr. Deschambault, “[t]he comments by the prosecution, repeated again and again, were completely irrelevant to any fact at issue in the case,” and the Government was “asking the jury to punish the Defendant for having sex with an 8th grader, not addressing the elements of the offense.” Id. at 9.
He submits that the prosecution's comment that the victim was “[f]ourteen and unable to consent under the law” is “[n]ot accurate, wholly irrelevant, not backed by any...
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