United States v. Dewald
| Decision Date | 18 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:17-CR-00025,4:17-CR-00025 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. David DEWALD, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Francis P. Sempa, U.S. Attorney's Office, Scranton, PA, for United States of America.
Before the Court is Defendant David Dewald's Motion to Suppress Evidence. For the following reasons, that motion will be denied.
In 2016, David Dewald was arrested in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, and charged with rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, statutory sexual assault, unlawful contact with a minor, and kidnapping of a minor—10 offenses in total.1
Police were able to intercept Dewald after his victim, a 14-year-old girl named B.P., described to law enforcement how Dewald communicated with her. According to B.P., Dewald made contact with B.P. using an internet messaging application called "KIK." Dewald sent her sexually aggressive messages and eventually, he persuaded her to meet. When Dewald arrived at B.P.'s home in Eddystone, Delaware County, B.P. explained that she was scared and entered his car. Dewald drove her back to his home in Bloomsburg, Columbia County. While en route, Dewald forced her to perform oral sex. When they arrived at Dewald's apartment, Dewald raped her. He then drove B.P. back to Delaware County, and threatened her not to tell anyone.
After this encounter, Dewald continued to communicate with B.P. using an unspecified application that allows free text messages and phone calls, and Dewald asked B.P. to meet him a second time. Police reviewed text messages between Dewald and B.P. and confirmed the time and location of this meeting. With B.P.'s father's consent, police recorded a conversation between B.P. and Dewald as he drove toward Delaware County. In this conversation, Dewald acknowledged the age difference between himself (a 40-year-old man) and B.P., and told the B.P. that he expected her to perform oral sex on him. Dewald also stated that he was worried about getting caught by police.
Police assembled at the location Dewald intended to meet B.P., and when he arrived, he was taken into custody without incident. When police asked Dewald what he was doing, he stated that he was there to meet his friend, B.P. After securing Dewald, police confiscated an iPhone that they saw in the center console of Dewald's car.
According to police, sometime thereafter Dewald's mother and sister became worried about Dewald's whereabouts and turned over a laptop computer to Bloomsburg police hoping that the device contained information that could help locate Dewald. Dewald's sister told police that she removed the laptop from Dewald's apartment before learning that he was arrested. She also told police that Dewald talks to people online.
With Dewald in custody and Dewald's iPhone and laptop in hand, police applied for two search warrants—one to search the iPhone, and one to search the laptop.2 In those searches, police discovered sexually explicit communications between Dewald and B.P., as well as communications between Dewald and four other victims.3 Dewald had solicited both sex and sexual pictures from these victims. Communications between Victims # 1 and # 2 were found on the laptop, while communications between Victims # 4 and # 5 were found on the iPhone.
Based in part on this evidence, Dewald was federally indicted on five counts relating to inducing minors to engage in sexually explicit conduct and transporting images of that conduct through interstate commerce.4 Dewald plead not guilty,5 and filed the present motion to suppress evidence obtained from the iPhone and laptop.6 Dewald argues that the warrants authorizing searches of his iPhone and laptop violated the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement.7 The government denies that the warrants were unconstitutionally general or overbroad, and argues that even if they were, any evidence obtained from them need not be suppressed because officers acted in good faith.8 This Court convened an evidentiary hearing on January 14, 2019 and the matter is now ripe for disposition.
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on "unreasonable searches and seizures,"9 police must generally obtain a warrant before conducting a search.10 A valid search warrant must be (1) be based on probable cause; (2) be supported by a sworn affidavit; (3) describe particularly the place of the search; and (4) describe particularly the persons or things to be seized.11
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement is to prevent general exploratory searches.12 A warrant offends the particularity requirement when it amounts to a "general warrant" or one that is unconstitutionally overbroad. A general warrant "vest[s] the executing officer with unbridled discretion to conduct an exploratory rummaging ... in search of criminal evidence."13 An overbroad warrant "describe[s] in both specific and inclusive generic terms what is to be seized, but ... authorizes the seizure of items as to which there is no probable cause."14
Dewald argues that search of his iPhone was effectuated pursuant to an unconstitutional general warrant. He contends that the affidavit of probable cause was not expressly incorporated into the iPhone warrant, and as a result, the warrant's authorization to search for and seize "[a]ll images, text message [sic], social media data, and applications related to the criminal investigation into PA Title 18, Section 3121, 2901, 3123 and related offenses" amounted to a general warrant.15 Dewald further argues the phrase "and related offenses" does not identify with particularity which offenses are related to rape ( 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121 ), kidnapping ( 18 Pa.C.S. § 2901 ) and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse ( 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123 ).16 Thus, according to Dewald, the warrant authorized a general, exploratory search violating the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement.17
Dewald's argument fails. First, the iPhone warrant incorporated the probable cause affidavit. The Supreme Court has explained that a warrant may incorporate a supporting application or affidavit "so long as the warrant cross-references the supporting document and the document accompanies the warrant."18 Here, both the warrant and probable cause affidavit are located in one, contiguous, five-page document titled "Application for Search Warrant and Authorization"— the warrant occupies page one, and the probable cause affidavit occupies pages two through five.19 The warrant twice references the probable cause affidavit.20 All pages are numbered in sequence. And the officer executing the iPhone warrant testified that the entire five-page document was present at the time of the search.21 These factors suggest that the affidavit is either part of the warrant itself, attached to it, or incorporated by reference.22
At the suppression hearing, Dewald narrowed his objection to sections titled "Identify Items to be Searched for and Seized" and "Specific Description of Premises and or Person to be Searched," arguing that the affidavit is not specifically mentioned therein. But he cites to no authority that would suggest that an affidavit is only incorporated when it is expressly mentioned in those locations. Indeed, courts would seem to reject such an overly technical reading.23 Therefore, I conclude that the iPhone warrant incorporated the probable cause affidavit.
Second, the iPhone warrant is not a general warrant. For a warrant to be invalidated as general, it must "vest the executing officers with unbridled discretion to conduct an exploratory rummaging through [defendant's] papers in search of criminal evidence."24 Here, the warrant confined the officers' discretion by limiting their search to a specific place (Dewald's iPhone) and limiting their search to specific categories of evidence (images, text messages, social media data, and applications) related to specific statutory offenses (rape, kidnapping, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse).
The supporting affidavit enhanced the specificity of the warrant because it identified Dewald's victim, B.P., and identified the nature of the unlawful communications believed to be on Dewald's iPhone in violation statutes criminalizing sexual offenses. Courts have not suppressed evidence obtained pursuant to warrants that identify specific devices, enumerate specific crimes, and categorically delineate the type of evidence police are authorized to seize.25 In sum, the warrant did not authorize officers to engage in exploratory rummaging; they were authorized only to search for and seize evidence of the sexual abuse offenses as set forth in the warrant and in the accompanying affidavit.26
To the extent Dewald argues that allowing officers to search for evidence for "related offenses" transforms the warrant into a general warrant, his argument fails. Read as a whole in a "common sense, nontechnical manner,"27 the warrant and affidavit limited officers' discretion by authorizing their search for and seizure of electronic data related to certain offenses. That is, the warrant and accompanying affidavit do not authorize a search for evidence related to any criminal offense, but to the criminal offenses of rape, kidnapping, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, other similar or "related" offenses.28
In sum, the iPhone warrant does not amount to an unconstitutional general warrant, and consequently, the warrant does not offend the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement.
Dewald alternatively argues that the iPhone warrant only authorized searching for and seizing evidence related to communications between Dewald and B.P.29 According to Dewald, then, evidence regarding communications between Dewald and Victim # 4 and...
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