United States v. Dillon, 30633.
Decision Date | 02 July 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 30633.,30633. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Billy Ray DILLON, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
W. F. Leigh, Pecos, Tex., court appointed, for defendant-appellant.
Seagal V. Wheatley, U. S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., Ralph E. Harris, Asst. U. S. Atty., El Paso, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before AINSWORTH, INGRAHAM and RONEY, Circuit Judges.
Billy Ray Dillon appeals his conviction for violation of the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312, in that he transported a 1960 Cadillac from Missouri to Texas, with knowledge that the vehicle had been stolen. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction, that the trial court's denial of his right to have a material witness subpoenaed was prejudicial error, and that the court's charge deprived the jury of its traditional fact-finding function. We conclude that the district judge's final instructions to the jury exceeded the limits of fair comment, and that he practically directed a verdict of guilty against appellant. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Dillon testified that he had purchased the vehicle in question from a white man. A rebuttal witness for the Government, Agent Galbraith of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, impeached Dillon's testimony by stating that Dillon had told him that the purchase was made from a Negro. The Government introduced convincing evidence to show that the vehicle had been stolen and had been transported in interstate commerce. The trial judge, however, withdrew from the jury's consideration both of these elements necessary under the statute for proof of guilt by remarking that theft and the interstate transportation of the vehicle had been proved, and by repetitious comments that the only issue remaining for the jury's consideration was the veracity of the witnesses relative to defendant's knowledge of the theft. Having thus narrowed the jury's role to a credibility determination, the trial judge then effectively removed any remaining vestige of doubt by outlining the reasons why the jurors should accept the Agent's testimony and reject that of defendant. He charged the jury in pertinent part as follows:
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