United States v. Dillon

Decision Date03 May 2013
Docket NumberCriminal No 12–CR–12 (JDB).
Citation943 F.Supp.2d 30
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Simon A. DILLON, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Fernando Campoamor–Sanchez, Gordon Michael Harvey, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for United States of America.

Christopher Michael Davis, Davis & Davis, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN D. BATES, District Judge.

The government has moved for the involuntary medication of defendant Simon Dillon, who suffers from mental illness, to render him competent to stand trial. Pursuant to Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003), the Court must consider whether involuntary medication is medically appropriate and necessary to significantly further an important government interest. Upon consideration of the pleadings, the record, and the arguments and evidence presented at the April 17 and 26, 2013 Sell hearing, the Court determines that the government has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence 1 that the Sell standards have been met and that involuntary medication is appropriate and necessary. The government's motion to involuntarily medicate defendant is therefore granted.

BACKGROUND

On or about December 10, 2011, defendant allegedly threatened the President of the United States with bodily harm by sending an email to a United States Secret Service (“USSS”) agent stating that, if the President refuses to meet with him, he “will get the worse Christmas present ever,” “will suffer for 30 days,” and “will wish for death, but death will not come to him.” Indict. at 1–2 [ECF No. 3]. Defendant was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 871. A warrant was issued with the return of the indictment, and the USSS arrested defendant on that warrant on January 17, 2012. Gov't's Mem. Supp. Invol. Medication at 2 [ECF No. 32].

On January 20, 2012, the Court ordered defendant committed to the custody of the Attorney General for a competency evaluation. Defendant was evaluated at the Metropolitan Correctional Center, and William J. Ryan, Ph.D and Elissa R. Miller, Ph.D authored the competency report diagnosing him with Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type. See Competency Report at 15 (March 14, 2012). Drs. Ryan and Miller found that although defendant has a mental illness that compromises his insight and his recognition that he is mentally ill, he nonetheless has a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him and is capable of assisting counsel with his defense. Id. at 14. However, the conclusion that defendant was competent to stand trial was made “with less than the usual degree of psychological certainty” because defendant was “unable to rationally consider an Insanity Defense to which he may be entitled.” Id. at 14–15.

The Court subsequently found defendant competent to stand trial. However, both defendant and the government later orally moved for further psychiatric evaluation. The Court granted the motions and ordered defendant committed to the custody of the Attorney General for further evaluation at Butner Federal Medical Center (“Butner”). Once at Butner, defendant was diagnosed with Delusional Disorder, Grandiose Type in a forensic report authored by Heather H. Ross, Ph.D. See Forensic Report at 16 (Aug. 24, 2012). Dr. Ross found that, although defendant is able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him, he suffers from a severe mental disease or defect that prevents him from assisting properly in his defense. Id. at 19. Dr. Ross concluded that defendant was not competent to proceed, and recommended that he be committed for mental health treatment. Id.

A competency hearing was subsequently held, and the Court found defendant incompetent and ordered him committed to the custody of the Attorney General for a Competency Restoration Study. Jill R. Grant, Psy. D. and Jill C. Volin, M.D. authored the Study and diagnosed defendant with Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Type.2See Gov't's Ex. 2, Competency Restoration Study at 19 (Feb. 14, 2013) (hereinafter Competency Restoration Study). The Study concluded that defendant is incompetent to stand trial as he “is unable to understand the significance of his charges or the criminal process in a rational manner due to his psychotic illness,” and “would be unable to assist in his defense due to his ingrained delusional beliefs.” Id. at 21. Drs. Grant and Volin also found that defendant's prior medical record indicates that defendant responded favorably to psychotropic medication in the past, and that there was a substantial probability that he could be restored to competency with the administration of antipsychotics. Id. at 20, 31. As a result, Drs. Grant and Volin requested a judicial order for the involuntary treatment of defendant with antipsychotic medication to restore him to competency. Id. at 21.

On February 20, 2013, the government orally moved to have defendant involuntarily medicated. Defendant opposed the motion, and a Sell hearing was held on April 17 and 26, 2013. At the hearing, the government provided testimony from forensic psychologist Dr. Jill Grant and psychiatrist Dr. Jill Volin via videoconference from Butner. Drs. Grant and Volin had previously evaluated defendant for the February 14, 2013 Competency Restoration Study.

Dr. Grant, whom the court qualified as an expert witness in the area of clinical forensic psychology, testified that, in her opinion and to a medical degree of certainty, defendant suffers from Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Type. 4/17/13 Hr'g Tr. at 10:15–17, 17:2–3. In particular, Dr. Grant testified that defendant has bizarre delusions, hallucinations, and mood problems that vary from mania to depression. Id. at 17:8–14, 21:11–16, 24:16–19. She further testified that defendant lacks insight into his illness and that his psychotic disorder “directly interferes with his ability to help prepare his defense and understand what is going on in the courtroom.” Id. at 15:5–8, 23:10–11.

Dr. Volin, whom the court qualified as an expert witness in the area of forensic psychiatry, also testified that, in her opinion and to a medical degree of certainty, defendant suffers from Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Type. Id. at 65:17–19, 66:25–67:1. Dr. Volin testified that defendant lacks insight into his mental illness, and that treatment of defendant's mental illness with antipsychotics is medically appropriate and substantially likely to restore him to competence. Id. at 68:15–18, 73:6–11, 76:5–6. She also testified that defendant's lack of negative symptoms of psychosis3 and his previous positive response to antipsychotic medicine 4 are important factors that support the likelihood that antipsychotics can restore his competency. Id. at 82:1–83:2. Dr. Volin noted that defendant previously experienced hallucinationsand sadness after taking an antipsychotic, 5 and stated that these effects were symptoms of defendant's mental illness, not side effects of the medication. Id. at 86:23–88:2. Dr. Volin further testified that antipsychotic medication is substantially unlikely to result in side effects that will interfere significantly with defendant's ability to assist his counsel in his defense. Id. at 88:3–11. In particular, Dr. Volin stated that most of the likely side effects would have no effect on cognition and could be monitored and treated with other medication if necessary, and that such treatment would not be expected to have an adverse effect on defendant's competency. Id. at 88:19–20, 89:2–3, 91:2–16.

Also at the Sell hearing, defendant testified concerning his competency 6 and his past experience with antipsychotic medication. In particular, defendant testified that he believes antipsychotic medication caused him to suffer severe depression and numbness in his extremities. Id. at 129:6–14, 130:1–7. He also stated that he is not delusional and that he does not need any treatment. Id. at 134:13–21. However, defendant then testified that he was “the King of Gia,” was reincarnated as Simon Peter about 2,000 years ago, and that he would prove he was the “Star of Seven” at trial. Id. at 135:2–16.

DISCUSSION

Although an individual has a constitutionally protected interest in avoiding involuntary medication, that interest can be overcome by an “essential” or “overriding” state interest in some circumstances. Sell, 539 U.S. at 179–80, 123 S.Ct. 2174. In particular, a court may order the administration of medication to render a mentally ill defendant competent to stand trial on criminal charges if:

(1) doing so advances an important government interest, such as bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime;

(2) the medication is substantially likely to render defendant competent to stand trial, and substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere significantly with defendant's ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial defense;

(3) alternative less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same result; and (4) administration of the medication is medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best interest in light of his medical condition.

Id. at 180–82, 123 S.Ct. 2174.

1. Important Government Interest

To meet the first Sell factor, the government must establish that involuntary medication will advance an important government interest, such as bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime. Id. at 180, 123 S.Ct. 2174. To determine if an important government interest is at stake, the Court must consider whether the defendant is charged with a serious crime and whether any special circumstances, such as the defendant already having been confined for a significant period of time, undermine the importance of the government's interest in prosecution.7Sell, 539 U.S. at 180, 123 S.Ct. 2174.

Here, the government has an important interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of the serious crime of...

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3 cases
  • Garay v. Liriano
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 3 d5 Maio d5 2013
  • United States v. Dillon
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • 12 d3 Março d3 2014
    ...establishing “that the Sell standards have been met and that involuntary medication is appropriate and necessary.” United States v. Dillon, 943 F.Supp.2d 30, 32 (D.D.C.2013). This appeal followed. Dillon argues that the District Court erred in failing to consider whether the possibility of ......
  • United States v. Gamarra
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 19 d5 Outubro d5 2018
    ...that interest can be overcome by an 'essential' or 'overriding' state interest in some circumstances." United States v. Dillon, 943 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2013), aff'd, 738 F.3d 284 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 179-80). The Supreme Court in Sell "prescribed a detailed, fo......

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