United States v. Dion

• Court: U.S. Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MARSHALL
• Citation: United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 106 S.Ct. 2216, 90 L.Ed.2d 767 (1986)
• Decision Date: 11 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-246,85-246
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. Dwight DION, Sr

476 U.S. 734

106 S.Ct. 2216

90 L.Ed.2d 767

UNITED STATES, Petitioner

v Dwight DION, Sr.

No. 85-246.

Argued March 25, 1986.

Decided June 11, 1986.

Syllabus

The Bald Eagle Protection Act (Eagle Protection Act) makes it a federal crime to hunt the bald eagle or the golden eagle, except that such hunting may be authorized, pursuant to a permit issued by the Secretary of the Interior, "for the religious purposes of Indian tribes" or for certain other narrow purposes compatible with preservation of those species. The Endangered Species Act imposes a similar ban on the hunting of the bald eagle. Respondent, a member of the Yankton Sioux Tribe, was convicted after a jury trial in Federal District Court of, inter alia, the shooting of four bald eagles in violation of the Endangered Species Act, but the court before trial dismissed a charge of shooting a golden eagle in violation of the Eagle Protection Act. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and affirmed the dismissal of the other charge, holding that members of the Tribe have a right under an 1858 treaty to hunt bald and golden eagles within the Yankton Reservation for noncommercial purposes, and that neither of the Acts in question abrogated this treaty right.

Held: The Court of Appeals erred in recognizing respondent's treaty defense to the prosecutions. Pp. 738-746.

(a) The Eagle Protection Act abrogated the rights of members of the Yankton Sioux Tribe under the 1858 treaty to hunt the bald or golden eagle on the Yankton Reservation. Congress' intention to abrogate Indian treaty rights must be clear and plain. Here, such intention is strongly suggested on the face of the Eagle Protection Act, and this view is supported by the legislative history. More particularly, Congress' action in 1962 in amending the Act to extend its ban to the golden eagle and authorizing the Secretary to issue permits for Indian hunting reflected an unmistakable and explicit legislative policy choice that Indian hunting of the bald or golden eagle, except pursuant to permit, is inconsistent with the need to preserve those species. Pp. 738-745.

(b) Since the Eagle Protection Act divested respondent of his treaty right to hunt bald eagles, he had no such right to hunt bald eagles that he could assert as a defense to the Endangered Species Act charge. Pp. 745-746.

762 F.2d 674 (CA8 1985), reversed in part and remanded.

MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Jeffrey P. Minear, for petitioner, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court.

Terry L. Pechota, Rapid City, S.D., for respondent.

Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Dwight Dion, Sr., a member of the Yankton Sioux Tribe, was convicted of shooting four bald eagles on the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota in violation of the Endangered Species Act, 87 Stat. 884, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. II).¹ The District Court dismissed before trial a charge of shooting a golden eagle in violation of the Bald Eagle Protection Act, 54 Stat. 250, 16 U.S.C. § 668 et seq. (Eagle Protection Act). Dion was also convicted of selling carcasses and parts of eagles and other birds in violation of the Eagle Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 40 Stat. 755, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 703 et seq. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed all of Dion's convictions except those for shooting bald eagles in violation of the Endangered Species Act. 752 F.2d 1261, 1270 (CA8 1985) (en banc); 762 F.2d 674, 694 (1985) (panel opinion). As to those, it stated that Dion could be convicted only upon a jury determination that the birds were killed for commercial purposes. 752 F.2d, at 1270. It also affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the charge of shooting a golden eagle in violation of the Eagle Protection Act. Ibid. We granted certiorari, 474 U.S. 900, 106 S.Ct. 270, 88 L.Ed.2d 225 (1985), and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it reversed Dion's convictions under the Endangered Species Act and affirmed the dismissal of the charge against him under the Eagle Protection Act.

I

The Eagle Protection Act by its terms prohibits the hunting of the bald or golden eagle anywhere within the United States, except pursuant to a permit issued by the Secretary of the Interior. The Endangered Species Act imposes an equally stringent ban on the hunting of the bald eagle. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, sitting en banc, held that members of the Yankton Sioux Tribe have a treaty right to hunt bald and golden eagles within the Yankton Reservation for noncommercial purposes.² It further held that the Eagle Protection Act and Endangered Species Act did not abrogate this treaty right. It therefore directed that Dion's convictions for shooting bald eagles be vacated, since neither the District Court nor the jury made any explicit finding whether the killings were for commercial or noncommercial purposes.³

The Court of Appeals relied on an 1858 treaty signed by the United States and by representatives of the Yankton Tribe. Treaty with the Yancton (1858 spelling) Sioux, Apr. 19, 1858, 11 Stat. 743. Under that treaty, the Yankton ceded to the United States all but 400,000 acres of the land then held by the Tribe. The treaty bound the Yanktons to remove to, and settle on, their reserved land within one year. The United States in turn agreed to guarantee the Yanktons quiet and undisturbed possession of their reserved land, and to pay to the Yanktons, or expend for their benefit, various moneys in the years to come. The area thus reserved for the Tribe was a legally constituted Indian reservation, see Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 389-390, 22 S.Ct. 650, 656-657, 46 L.Ed. 954 (1902); Wood v. Jameson, 81 S.D. 12, 130 N.W.2d 95 (1964). The treaty did not place any restriction on the Yanktons' hunting rights on their reserved land.

All parties to this litigation agree that the treaty rights reserved by the Yankton included the exclusive right to hunt and fish on their land. See Brief for United States 19; Brief for Respondent 7.⁴ As a general rule, Indians enjoy exclusive treaty rights to hunt and fish on lands reserved to them, unless such rights were clearly relinquished by treaty or have been modified by Congress. F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 449 (1982) (hereinafter Cohen). These rights need not be expressly mentioned in the treaty. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 88 S.Ct. 1705, 20 L.Ed.2d 697 (1968); Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 39 S.Ct. 40, 63 L.Ed. 138 (1918). Those treaty rights, however, little avail Dion if, as the Solicitor General argues, they were subsequently abrogated by Congress. We find that they were.⁵

II

It is long settled that "the provisions of an act of Congress, passed in the exercise of its constitutional authority, . . . if clear and explicit, must be upheld by the courts, even in contravention of express stipulations in an earlier treaty" with a foreign power. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 1025, 37 L.Ed. 905 (1893); cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 100 S.Ct. 533, 62 L.Ed.2d 428 (1979). This Court applied that rule to congressional abrogation of Indian treaties in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566, 23 S.Ct. 216, 221, 47 L.Ed. 299 (1903). Congress, the Court concluded, has the power "to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty, though presumably such power will be exercised only when circumstances arise which will not only justify the government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so." Ibid.

We have required that Congress' intention to abrogate Indian treaty rights be clear and plain. Cohen 223; see also United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 353, 62 S.Ct. 248, 255, 86 L.Ed. 260 (1941). "Absent explicit statutory language, we have been extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights. . . ." Washington v. Washington Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 658, 690, 99 S.Ct. 3055, 3077, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 (1979). We do not construe statutes as abrogating treaty rights in "a backhanded way," Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S., at 412, 88 S.Ct., at 1711; in the absence of explicit statement, " 'the intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress.' " Id., at 413, 88 S.Ct., at 1711, quoting Pigeon River Co. v. Cox Co., 291 U.S. 138, 160, 54 S.Ct. 361, 367, 78 L.Ed. 695 (1934). Indian treaty rights are too fundamental to be easily cast aside.⁶

We have enunciated, however, different standards over the years for determining how such a clear and plain intent must be demonstrated. In some cases, we have required that Congress make "express declaration" of its intent to abrogate treaty rights. See Leavenworth, L., & G. R. Co. v. United States, 92 U.S. 733, 741-742, 2 Otto 733, 741-742, 23 L.Ed. 634 (1876); see also Wilkinson & Volkman 627-630, 645-659. In other cases, we have looked to the statute's " 'legislative history' " and " 'surrounding circumstances' " as well as to " 'the face of the Act.' " Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 587, 97 S.Ct. 1361, 1363, 51 L.Ed.2d 660 (1977), quoting Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505, 93 S.Ct. 2245, 2258, 37 L.Ed.2d 92 (1973). Explicit statement by Congress is preferable for the purpose of ensuring legislative accountability for the abrogation of treaty rights, cf. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-297, 62 S.Ct. 1049, 1054-1055, 86 L.Ed. 1480 (1942). We have not rigidly interpreted that preference, however, as a per se rule; where the evidence of congressional intent to abrogate is sufficiently compelling, "the weight of authority indicates that such an intent can also be found by a reviewing court from clear and reliable...