United States v. Dixon

• Decision Date: 14 March 1978
• Docket Number: Crim. No. HM77-0564.
• Citation: 446 F. Supp. 236
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Jerry Lee DIXON.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

446 F. Supp. 236

UNITED STATES of America v. Jerry Lee DIXON.

Crim. No. HM77-0564.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

March 14, 1978.

Russell T. Baker, Jr., U. S. Atty., David Dart Queen, Asst. U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.

Charles G. Bernstein, Michael Schatzow, Asst. Federal Public Defenders, Baltimore, Md., for defendant.

HERBERT F. MURRAY, District Judge.

Defendant was indicted on two counts for violation of the fourth paragraph of section 474 of Title 18 which states:

Whoever has in his control, custody, or possession any plate, stone, or other thing in any manner made after or in the similitude of any plate, stone, or other thing, from which any such obligation or other security has been printed, with intent to use such plate, stone, or other thing, or to suffer the same to be used in forging or counterfeiting any such obligation or other security, or any part thereof; . . . Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or both.

The United States presented all facts by stipulation. The facts establish that defendant had in his possession photographic negatives of the front and the back of a ten dollar federal reserve note. The negatives could not be used to print currency directly but defendant intended to use the negatives in a counterfeiting process.

After submission of the stipulated facts, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal and asserted two arguments in support thereof. First, defendant contended that the government had the burden to show that the negatives possessed by defendant had been used to print a note. The government did not offer such proof and could not have done so because the negatives had not been used to print any notes. To support his contention, defendant argued that the clause "from which any such obligation or other security has been printed" in section 474 modifies the first reference to "plate, stone, or other thing" in section 474, rather than the second such reference as contended by the government.

Defendant's contention would result in an interpretation of the statute which would require that the "plate, stone, or other thing" possessed by defendant be one "from which any such obligation or other security has been printed." The government, on the other hand, contended that the clause modifies the second reference such that the object in defendant's possession must be one "made after or in the similitude of any plate, stone, or other thing" and the latter object must be one "from which any such obligation or other security has been printed."

Both parties admit that the legislative history does not aid in the interpretation of the statute's meaning and that the case law is not helpful. Defendant urged that because a comma separates the disputed modifying clause from the clause immediately preceding it, the rules of grammar indicate that it does not modify the clause immediately preceding it as the government contended.

If the construction urged by defendant made sense, the court perhaps would be persuaded by the grammatical argument, but defendant's reading of the fourth paragraph of section 474 renders it meaningless. Accepting defendant's theory, the object possessed is modified by two phrases which are independent of each other. First, the object possessed must have been used to print security obligations. Secondly, the object possessed, — the "plate, stone, or other thing" — must itself be one which was "made after or in the similitude of any plate, stone, or other thing." This second phrase, when not considered to be modified by the phrase "from which any such obligation or other security has been printed" is meaningless as a modifier.

It is equally possible that the phrase "in any manner made after or in the similitude of any plate, stone, or other thing" modifies only the possession of an object which is an "other thing." The statute would still be meaningless under defendant's construction. The statute would require defendant to be in possession of an object, and if the object were not a plate or stone, but was an "other thing", as it is in this case, that other thing must be made "after or in the similitude of a plate, stone, or other thing." Again, the failure to qualify this last phrase makes it meaningless as a modifier to the object possessed.

Because the court does not find that the statute would have any meaning if defendant's interpretation of the modifying clause were adopted, the court rejects defendant's contention. The court holds that the clause "from which any such obligation or other security has been printed" modifies the language which immediately precedes it. In light of this construction, the government did not have the burden to show that the photographic negatives which defendant possessed had been used to print security obligations. Moreover, because ...