United States v. Doaty
| Decision Date | 22 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Criminal Action No. 3:19-CR-77-RGJ |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff v. James DOATY, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
Alicia P. Gomez, U.S. Attorney Office, Louisville, KY, for United States of America.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant James Doaty's Motion to Suppress [DE 23]. The United States responded [DE 24; DE 33] and Doaty replied [DE 35]. Magistrate Judge Colin H. Lindsay issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R"), recommending that the Motion be denied. [DE 37]. Doaty timely filed objections. [DE 39]. This matter is now ripe. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Doaty's Motion to Suppress [DE 23], OVERRULES Doaty's Objections [DE 39], and ACCEPTS Magistrate Judge Lindsay's R&R [DE 37].
On August 29, 2016, Doaty voluntarily reported to his probation officer, Brian Richardson ("Officer Richardson"). [DE 33-1 at 85]. Originally, Doaty was to report to probation on September 1, 2016, but he requested to report earlier. Id. at 85, 90.
Before Doaty's arrival, Officer Richardson learned of a possible violation of the terms of Doaty's probation agreement. Id. at 86. Officer Richardson received a community complaint earlier in the month of August from Doaty's ex-girlfriend, Lorica Lewis ("Lewis"). Id. at 86, 92. Lewis told Officer Richardson that Doaty was a "drug investor" and that Doaty would give a drug dealer $3,000 to $4,000 and would receive his money back after the drugs had been sold plus a little more. Id. at 93, 100. Lewis stated that Doaty and his brother possessed guns and stored a lot of guns in a house near the ex-girlfriend's house. Id. at 100. Doaty had reported to Officer Richardson that he was living with Lewis at Lewis's address. Id. at 94.
Officer Richardson also reviewed Doaty's Twitter account and observed posted photos of a 100 round ammunition drum magazine; a photo of a masked person holding guns; and posts alluding that Doaty was on probation, selling drugs, and paying off the judge. Id. at 105, 107. Doaty's Twitter posts included:
[DE 33-3 at 119, 124, 135, 137].
When Doaty reported to Officer Richardson's office, Officer Richardson discussed the community complaint he had received with Doaty. [DN 33-1 at 87]. Officer Richardson then reviewed with Doaty the conditions of Doaty's Probation Agreement that Doaty had signed previously. Id. at 86. The Agreement provided;
After Officer Richardson went over the community complaint and conditions of Doaty's Probation Agreement, Officer Richardson told Doaty that he intended to search Doaty's vehicle. [DE 33-1 at 87]. Doaty then signed a consent to search form for his vehicle that Officer Richardson presented to him. [Id. ; DE 24-2]. While Doaty signed the consent form and before Officer Richardson searched his vehicle, Officer Richardson asked Doaty if there was anything in the vehicle that would violate Doaty's agreement to which Doaty responded that there might be a bullet in his car from when he was moving boxes. [DE 33-1 at 89].
Officer Richardson, along with three other officers, searched Doaty's Mercedes. Id. at 88. When he opened the driver's side door, Officer Richardson spotted a loaded Smith and Wesson handgun lying on the floor under the steering wheel. Id. The probation officers placed Doaty in handcuffs, and notified law enforcement to arrest Doaty for the possession of the firearm. Id. at 89-90.
Doaty moved to suppress evidence of his statements and the firearm recovered from his vehicle. [DE 23].
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 59(b)(1), a district court may refer a motion to suppress to a magistrate judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing, if necessary, and submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition of the motion. This Court must "make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) ; Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3). After reviewing the evidence, the Court is free to accept, reject, or modify the proposed findings or recommendations of the magistrate judge. Id. The Court need not review, under a de novo or any other standard, those aspects of the report and recommendation to which no specific objection is made. Thomas v. Arn , 474 U.S. 140, 150, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985). Rather, the Court may adopt the findings and rulings of the magistrate judge to which no specific objection is filed. Id. at 151, 106 S.Ct. 466.
Doaty objects to the R&R's legal analysis and conclusions, asserting three errors in the R&R. First, Doaty objects to the finding that there "was reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of the defendant's car." [DE 39 at 165]. Second, Doaty asserts that Judge Lindsay's "opinion did not sufficiently address or refute" his argument that "the nexus requirement applies when using the standard of reasonable suspicion, just as it is when there is a probable cause standard." Id. at 166. Third and finally, Doaty objects to the "Magistrate Judge's analysis of the facts of this case as it relates to the reliability of the information relied upon to establish reasonable suspicion." Id.
Mr. Doaty objects to Judge Lindsay's finding that "that there was reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of the defendant's car." [DE 39 at 165]. Doaty argues:
Reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances and has been defined as requiring ‘articulable reasons’ and ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person ... of criminal activity.’ " United States v. Payne , 181 F.3d 781, 788 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ); see United States v. Henry , 429 F.3d 603, 609-10 (6th Cir. 2005). "An officer may make a reasonable suspicion determination ‘based on the reasonable inferences he may draw in light of his experience.’ " Henry , 429 F.3d at 613 (citing United States v. Foster , 376 F.3d 577, 586 (6th Cir. 2004) ).
Officer Richardson had reasonable suspicion to search Doaty's car. Officer Richardson received a community complaint from Lewis in August 2016.2 [DE 33-1 at 92]. She told Officer Richardson that Doaty was a "drug investor" and that he possessed firearms. Id. at 86, 92. Investing in drugs and possessing firearms are illegal activities and violations of the conditions of his diversion. Based on this information, it was reasonable for Officer Richardson to infer that Doaty was involved in criminal activity. Henry , 429 F.3d at 613.
Officer Richardson cross-checked his inference by reviewing Doaty's Twitter page. [DE 33-1 at 105]. Doaty's Twitter page is rife with "tweets" about drug dealing and weapon possession. [DE 33-3]. Judge Lindsay documented several of these "tweets" in his R&R, but additional "tweets" are worth noting:
These posts, like Lewis’ information, also support a reasonable inference that Doaty was involved in illegal activity.
Finally, Officer Richardson had reasonable suspicion to search Doty's car because before he searched it Doty told him that there might be a bullet...
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