United States v. Dodaj
| Decision Date | 11 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | 17-CR-219 (VSB) |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. ANTHONY DODAJ, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Before me is the motion of Anthony Dodaj ("Defendant" or "Dodaj") pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), to "reduce his sentence to time served with a condition of home confinement" because of his "serious health condition and the threat that COVID-29 poses to his wellbeing." (Dodaj Mot. 2.)1 Because the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) counsel against a reduced sentence, Dodaj's motion for compassionate release is DENIED.
"On December 12, 2016, Ivy Katz voluntarily entered an inpatient rehabilitation program for opioid dependence at a hospital located in New York, New York (the "Hospital")." (PSR ¶ 10.) Nearly two weeks later, Ms. Katz was found unresponsive in her hospital room, with a hypodermic needle in her arm, in cardiac arrest. The needle contained heroin. (Id.) Although Hospital personnel were able to resuscitate Katz, she remained in a coma due to oxygen deprivation to her brain. Her family asked the Hospital to withdraw life support on January 16,2017, and Katz died shortly after. (Id.)
The New York City Police Department initiated an investigation into Katz's death. The case agent who initiated the investigation obtained Katz's cellular phone and learned that she was a heroin user. (Id. ¶ 11.) Katz would obtain heroin from Duane Martinez ("Martinez"), who she contacted using her cellular phone. (Id.) Patients at the Hospital's inpatient rehabilitation treatment program had access to several payphones. Records revealed that between December 30, 2016, and December 31, 2016, several calls were placed to Martinez from a Hospital payphone. (Id. ¶ 12.) On December 30, 2016, after receiving five calls from a Hospital payphone, Martinez made a call to a cellphone registered to Dodaj. (Id. ¶ 13.) Martinez and Dodaj spoke five more times on December 31, 2016. (Id.)
On December 31, 2016, Katz completed a Visitor Request Form to permit two people to visit her on January 1, 2017. One was "Anthony Dordasch"—the last name appears to be a phonetic spelling of Dodaj—and the other was "Duane Martinez". (Id.) On January 1, 2017, Dodaj "signed a visitor log located at a security desk in the Hospital indicating that he was visiting Katz." (Id. ¶ 14.) Dodaj entered the inpatient rehabilitation unit at 2:20 p.m. and met with Katz until approximately 2:44 p.m. when they walked towards the exit from Katz's unit. (Id.) While walking together, Katz momentarily entered her room, leaving Dodaj in the hallway. (Id.) Katz then escorted Dodaj to the exit door for her unit and returned to her room. Approximately 30 minutes after Dodaj left, Katz was found comatose in her room with a needle containing heroin in her arm. (Id.)
Dodaj was indicted on April 6, 2017. (Doc. 6.) A superseding indictment was filed on January 31, 2018, and charged Dodaj and his co-defendant Martinez with participating in anarcotics conspiracy from on or about September 2016 to March 2017 that resulted in the death of Ivy Katz, and the distribution and possession with intent to distribute heroin during that same time period. (Doc. 74.)
On August 1, 2018, Dodaj pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to Count One of a superseding information charging him with participating in a narcotics conspiracy from November 2015 until April 2017. (Doc. 101.) Defendant's applicable guideline range was 240 months' imprisonment, (PSR ¶ 139), and the Probation Department recommended a sentence of 240 months' imprisonment. (Id.) Dodaj was sentenced on April 18, 2019. After considering the factors contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), I granted Dodaj a variance and sentenced him to 65 months' imprisonment, and five years of supervised release. (See generally Doc. 125.) Dodaj is currently housed in FCI Allenwood Medium ("Allenwood"), and his release date is November 8, 2021. Find an Inmate, Fed. Bureau of Prisons (last visited June 2, 2021), https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/.
Dodaj filed this pro se motion on August 11, 2020. (Doc. 129.) On December 15, 2020, Dodaj's CJA counsel filed a supplemental motion for compassionate release. (Doc. 139.) The Government filed its opposition on January 8, 2021, (Doc. 140), and Dodaj filed his reply on January 22, 2021, (Doc. 141).
"A court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except pursuant to statute." United States v. Gotti, 433 F. Supp. 3d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) of title 18 of the United States Code, the compassionate release statute, provides one such exception. The compassionate release statute permits a court to "reduce" a term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), if "it finds that . . .extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."3 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Until recently, a court could not order compassionate release unless the BOP requested such relief on a prisoner's behalf. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; see also Gotti, 433 F. Supp. 3d at 614. However, in December 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act, which did away with BOP's unilateral ability to deny a prisoner compassionate release but did not remove the BOP from the process entirely. See id. The statute clearly states that a court may only grant compassionate release "upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Requiring inmates to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking court intervention serves several purposes. First, it protects administrative agency authority by guaranteeing agencies the "opportunity to correct [their] own mistakes," and second, it promotes efficiency, since claims "generally can be resolved much more quickly and economically in proceedings before an agency than in litigation in federal court." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,89 (2006) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992)).
"The provenance of an administrative exhaustion requirement determines its scope." United States v. Monzon, No. 99cr157 (DLC), 2020 WL 550220, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2020). There are two types of exhaustion requirements: jurisdictional ones and non-jurisdictional ones. Jurisdictional exhaustion requirements "govern a court's adjudicatory authority" and are not subject to any exceptions. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Non-jurisdictional requirements, also referred to as "claim-processing rules," can be "forfeited if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point." Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004). The Second Circuit has not yet squarely answered the question of whether the exhaustion requirement of § 3582(c) is jurisdictional.4 Monzon, 2020 WL 550220, at *2. !
On July 8, 2020, Dodaj petitioned the warden at Allenwood for compassionate release or, in the alternative, a sentence reduction. (Dodaj Supp. 8.)5 Dodaj's request was denied on July 29, 2020. (Id.) Dodaj provided the a copy of warden's response confirming that his "request forCompassionate Release/RIS has been reviewed" and that the warden denied his request because "[his] concern about being potentially exposed to, or possibly contracting, COVID-19 [did] not [] warrant early release." (Dodaj Mot. 6.) As the Government concedes, (Govt. Opp. 2, fn. 1),6 Dodaj has satisfied § 3582(c)'s exhaustion requirement.
Dodaj contends that "[a]s an HIV+ individual with hypertension and a former heavy cigarette smoker, [he] has multiple health conditions that may place him at heightened risk of death or severe complications if he contracts COVID-19." (Dodaj. Supp. 1.) Dodaj also claims he has "chronic kidney disease," is at "high risk for diabetes," and suffers from "mental complications/depression." (Dodaj Mot. 4.) Dodaj's submissions focus primarily on the first three health issues listed above, arguing that "as an individual with three health conditions that may place him at heightened risk for death or severe illness if he contracts COVID-19, the risk is even greater for [] Dodaj and every day that he remains incarcerated poses a threat to his life and health." (Dodaj Supp. 6.)
The Government argues that only Dodaj's history as a former smoker "qualifies as a condition putting him at greater risk of COVID-19 that qualifies as an extraordinary and compelling reason supporting his release." (Govt. Opp. 4.) The Government further argues that it is "unclear, at best, that Dodaj would be less exposed to COVID-19 if released." (Id.) The Government contends that New Jersey—the state Dodaj intends to reside in if released—has more COVID-19 cases per 100,000 residents than Pennsylvania. (Id.) Lastly, the Government argues that Dodaj's release would be inconsistent with Section 3553(a). (Id. at 6.)
Dodaj asserts that the "'[t]he more underlying medical conditions someone has, the greater their risk is for severe illness from COVID-19.'" (Dodaj Supp. 6.) Dodaj argues that even though neither his HIV+ or hypertension diagnoses alone constitute medical conditions that put him at an increased risk of serious illness from COVID-19 the combination of the two, as well as his status as a former smoker, put him at increased risk of severe illness.
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC")...
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