United States v. Douglas

• Decision Date: 11 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–1231.,13–1231.
• Citation: 744 F.3d 1065
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee v. John Joseph DOUGLAS, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

744 F.3d 1065

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.John Joseph DOUGLAS, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 13–1231.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Oct. 25, 2013.

Filed: March 11, 2014.

Frederick J. Goetz, argued and on the brief, Minneapolis, MN, for Appellant.

Andrew Dunne, AUSA, argued, Minneapolis, MN (Andrew Dunne, on the brief), for Appellee.

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

RILEY, Chief Judge.

A jury convicted John Joseph Douglas of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1) based on Douglas's possession of a “sawed-off” shotgun. Douglas appeals the district court's ¹ denial of his motion to suppress, arguing the search for, and seizure of, the shotgun violated the Fourth Amendment. We affirm.²

I. BACKGROUND

On May 30, 2011, at 12:10 a.m., Mercedes Adams, a rural resident in the town of Aurora, Minnesota, called 911 to report hearing gunshots from a neighboring property. Minutes later, another caller reported hearing multiple gunshots. Two shots can be heard on the second call. Officers from three different law enforcement agencies responded: Deputy Kim Hanegmon of the St. Louis County Sheriff's Office, Officer Kevin Greene of the Hoyt Lakes Police Department, and Lieutenant Ty Techar of the Gilbert Police Department.

When Deputy Hanegmon arrived at Adams's address, Adams reported the shots sounded as though they were coming from a nearby property that had been vacant since the residence burned down several years before. Adams reported seeing two vehicles traveling together toward the property. While speaking with Adams, Deputy Hanegmon heard gunshots.

All three officers headed toward the property Adams identified. The officers later learned the heavily treed property was owned by Douglas's aunt and uncle, who lived in North Carolina. As the officers neared the property, they observed a bonfire through the trees in a grassy clearing near where the house once stood. Remaining in their vehicles for safety, the officers drove down an overgrown grass driveway through the trees to where the fire was burning.

When they reached the bonfire, the officers found two vehicles roughly matching the description Adams had given. The officers also found a ten-year-old boy and three adult males, including Douglas, a thirty-three-year-old man Deputy Hanegmon knew from prior encounters. Douglas immediately asked the officers to leave, though he readily admitted he did not own the property. Douglas explained his aunt and uncle had given him permission to use the property and asked him to make sure the property was safe and posted with “No Trespassing” signs.

Advising Douglas of the report of gunshots, Deputy Hanegmon asked Douglas where the gun was. Douglas denied having a gun and again demanded that the officers leave because they did not have a search warrant. Douglas even called his aunt, who told Deputy Hanegmon “he wants me to tell you to leave.” The other two adult men at the scene also denied the existence of a gun. The officers placed the men in separate patrol cars to secure the scene and ensure everyone's safety.

Officer Greene performed a protective sweep around the fire, noting beer cans, a bottle of vodka, an empty box of ammunition, and several recently fired shell casings. Officer Greene also found two teenage females hiding behind one of the vehicles. The young women acted scared and smelled of alcohol, despite being underage. Like the men, the women initially denied any knowledge of a gun. Deputy Hanegmon placed the women in her patrol car for safety. After additional questioning, the women admitted to Deputy Hanegmon that Douglas had been firing a shotgun just before the police arrived, but stated they did not know where the shotgun was.

While at the scene, the officers learned Douglas was on probation and that the terms of his probation prohibited him from possessing drugs, alcohol, firearms, and ammunition. When Douglas declined to take a breath test as required by the terms of his probation, the officers placed him under arrest for violating his probation.

After Douglas's arrest, Officer Greene continued to try to locate the shotgun the young women described. Deputy Hanegmon and Officer Greene testified they were concerned a shotgun in an open area presented a public-safety risk. The officerswere also concerned there might be other people on the property hidden by the darkness with access to the shotgun.

As Officer Greene searched the thick brush at the edge of the woods, he saw a rusted-out refrigerator frame lying on the ground approximately twenty to twenty-five yards from the fire. Grass and weeds were growing through the refrigerator, which was lying on its back without any doors. As he approached the refrigerator, Officer Greene noticed a shiny black plastic bag with the corner sticking out of a compartment partially covered by a board. Officer Greene moved the board two to five inches and touched the bag, feeling what he believed to be a gun stock. Officer Greene notified Deputy Hanegmon he thought he had found the missing gun.

Deputy Hanegmon contacted St. Louis County Investigator Mark Steel, who directed her to seize the object. After taking photographs, Deputy Hanegmon removed the plastic bag from the refrigerator and unwrapped it, revealing a “sawedoff” shotgun. None of the officers attempted to obtain a warrant during their investigation. At the suppression hearing, Deputy Hanegmon and Officer Greene stated the officers could have secured the scene and obtained a warrant, but did not.

Police later learned the registered owner of the shotgun was the stepfather of one of the other men at the scene. Douglas has consistently denied any ownership or possessory interest in the bag or the shotgun. Indeed, Douglas denied ever having fired or otherwise possessed the shotgun.

On October 4, 2011, a grand jury indicted Douglas for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Douglas moved to suppress evidence of the shotgun. After a November 29, 2011, suppression hearing, the magistrate judge recommended the district court deny the motion. Despite the government's initial concession to the contrary, the magistrate judge found Douglas “had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the plastic bag left in the rusted-out refrigerator remnants abandoned in the middle of an open field that had no structures near it.” On January 11, 2012, after de novo review, the district court, describing the question as “close,” agreed “Douglas did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the plastic bag.” The district court further concluded, “even if Douglas did have such an expectation, exigent circumstances justified the officers' warrantless search for, and seizure of, the firearm.”

On February 10, 2012, a jury convicted Douglas of being a felon in possession of a firearm after hearing trial testimony from witnesses who saw Douglas fire the shotgun. The district court entered judgment and sentenced Douglas to 240 months imprisonment. Douglas timely appealed his conviction.

II. DISCUSSION

Douglas challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing the officers' search for, and seizure of, the shotgun violated his Fourth Amendment rights. “In an appeal from a district court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this court reviews factual findings for clear error, and questions of constitutional law de novo.” United States v. Hollins, 685 F.3d 703, 705 (8th Cir.2012). “We affirm unless the denial of the motion ‘is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear that a mistake was made.’ ” United States v. Payne, 534 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Stachowiak, 521 F.3d 852, 854 (8th Cir.2008)).

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Since Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), the touchstone of [Fourth] Amendment analysis has been the question whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’ ” ³Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360, 88 S.Ct. 507 (Harlan, J., concurring)). To meet his “burden of proving he had a legitimate expectation of privacy that was violated by the challenged search and seizure,” Douglas must establish (1) he himself “asserted a subjective expectation of privacy” “in the place searched or object seized,” and (2) his “subjective expectation is objectively reasonable.” United States v. Kiser, 948 F.2d 418, 423 (8th Cir.1991). The first question is a question of fact, the second is a question of law. See id.

In denying Douglas's motion to suppress, the district court determined the open-fields doctrine was relevant to determining whether Douglas had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a plastic bag that “was visible to anyone standing near the refrigerator in the open field,” even if the doctrine “in and of itself, did not authorize the warrantless search of the plastic bag.” Cf. United States v. Stallings, 28 F.3d 58, 60 n. 3 (8th Cir.1994) (explaining the open-fields doctrine was “not completely dispositive” where “the real question is not the officers' authority to be upon and search the field but instead their authority to search the zipped tote bag” found in the field). Under the open-fields doctrine, “an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields” because “an individual has no legitimate expectation that open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion by government officers.” Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178, 181, 104 S.Ct. 1735;accord Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68...