United States v. Dugan

Decision Date15 September 2000
Docket NumberNo. 00-1477,00-1477
Parties(8th Cir. 2001) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE, v. DONALD LEE DUGAN, APPELLANT. . Submitted:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.

Before Hansen, Heaney, and Morris Sheppard Arnold, Circuit Judges.

Hansen, Circuit Judge.

A seven-count indictment named Donald Lee Dugan, a car salesman and owner of Dugan Auto Sales, in two counts, charging him with conspiring to knowingly and intentionally distribute or possess with the intent to distribute marijuana and conspiring to commit money laundering. The jury acquitted Dugan of the marijuana conspiracy count but convicted him of conspiring to launder money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and (h). The money laundering count was predicated on Dugan's purchase of a motor home for Donald Zakrzewski using proceeds of the illegal drug trafficking offense and concealing Zakrzewski's ownership. Dugan now appeals his conviction, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, and we affirm the judgment of the district court. 1

There is sufficient evidence to support a verdict if "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The standard for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is strict, and a guilty verdict should not be lightly overturned. United States v. Ryan, 227 F.3d 1058, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000). "We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, giving the verdict the benefit of all reasonable inferences, and [we] will reverse only if the jury must have had a reasonable doubt concerning one of the essential elements of the crime." United States v. Sandifer, 188 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 1999).

The elements of a 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) money laundering violation are: (1) that the defendant conducted a financial transaction involving the proceeds of unlawful activity; (2) that the defendant knew the proceeds involved in the transaction were the proceeds of an unlawful activity; and (3) that the defendant intended "to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity." 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (1994); see also United States v. Rounsavall, 115 F.3d 561, 565 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 903 (1997). "To prove a conspiracy to launder money, the government must establish that a defendant knowingly joined a conspiracy to launder money and an overt act in furtherance of that conspiracy." United States v. Hildebrand, 152 F.3d 756, 762 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1033 (1998). The object of the money laundering conspiracy here was to conceal the nature of Zakrzewski's drug proceeds, his control of those proceeds, and his ownership of the Winnebago.

Dugan contends that in considering whether the government satisfied the elements necessary to demonstrate a money laundering conspiracy, we should not use any evidence that related to his own involvement in the conspiracy to distribute or possess marijuana, because he was acquitted of that charge. We disagree. An acquittal of a charge may be based on any number of reasons, including an inclination to be merciful. See United States v. Whatley, 133 F.3d 601, 606 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 940 (1998). The same jury may nevertheless reasonably conclude that the evidence supports a guilty verdict on another charge. See id. The only question before us is whether there was enough evidence presented at trial to support Dugan's conviction. See id. On this question, we consider the entire record.

The record demonstrates through several witnesses that Dugan was aware of Zakrzewski's marijuana trafficking activity. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury could have found that Dugan knowingly supplied a Winnebago motor home, as well as other vehicles, to aid Zakrzewski's illegal drug activity, that Dugan knew he was dealing with the cash proceeds of this illegal drug activity, and that he knowingly aided in concealing Zakrzewski's role as the source of the unlawful proceeds. Specifically, the evidence demonstrates the following.

Mary Kania, an employee of Dugan Auto Sales and a romantic interest of Dugan's, and Kania's son, Brad Cancienne, were both marijuana users. Dugan introduced Zakrzewski to them as someone from whom they could obtain large amounts of marijuana. Kania twice accompanied Dugan to Tuscon, Arizona, for the purpose of picking up marijuana for Zakrzewski. (Dugan made a third trip to Tuscon as well, which is discussed later.) Upon their return, the marijuana-filled boxes were unloaded in Dugan's garage, and Zakrzewski and Cancienne arrived at Dugan's garage to break down the boxes into deliverable portions. Dugan did not participate in that activity but was aware it was happening in his garage.

Tonya Statler made several trips to Tuscon to transport marijuana to St. Louis for Zakrzewski. On one occasion, Zakrzewski sent her to Dugan Auto Sales to pick up a white truck for the trip. When she arrived, Dugan handed her the keys to the vehicle without speaking a word to her and without expecting her to pay him any money. Cancienne used the same truck to deliver drug money to Tuscon and subsequently simply returned the truck to Dugan's business. Statler also purchased a minivan from Dugan, which she used to pick up marijuana in Tuscon.

Zakrzewski's half sister, Theresa, was married to Billy Ysaguirre. Both were heavily addicted to drugs, and both aided Zakrzewski's illegal marijuana enterprise in many ways. They took several trips to Tuscon to transport marijuana to St. Louis and to deliver drug...

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