United States v. Duplessis
| Docket Number | 20-20350 |
| Decision Date | 22 December 2021 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. TEVIN DUPLESSIS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Before the court is Defendant Tevin Duplessis's motion to suppress evidence (a handgun and ammunition) obtained from the search of a vehicle's trunk. (ECF No. 58.) Police officers responding to an early-morning 911 call located Defendant sitting alone in a black Nissan Altima with a Florida license plate; his car and general appearance matched a description given by two 911 callers minutes earlier from a house just two blocks away. The callers told dispatch that the driver had poured sugar into a car's gas tank and more importantly, had discharged shots at his girlfriend. Because officers searched the vehicle based mainly on information provided by the two 911 callers, Defendant contends there was not sufficient particularized probable cause supporting a complete search of the Nissan. The motion has been fully briefed, and the court finds that a hearing on the matter is not necessary. E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons explained below, the court will deny the motion.
Defendant has been charged with felon in possession of a firearm, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). (ECF No. 20.) Starting at 2:31 a.m. on April 7th, 2020, Detroit Police received three 911 calls from two different female callers requesting police assistance at 19356 Sussex Street, Detroit, Michigan. The first caller stated that “her best friend's boyfriend had put sugar in [the caller's] gas tank.” (ECF No. 61, Ex. 2.) The caller gave her name and sounded quite agitated throughout the call. (Id.)
At 2:38 a.m., dispatch received a second call from a different female caller (police later learned she was a minor); the caller stated that “my cousin's boyfriend put sugar in her best friend's car, ” and that “he put his hands on my cousin and he shot at her” before driving away. (ECF No. 61, Ex. 3.) After leaving, the suspect had called someone at the home “threatening to come back and shoot up the house.” (Id.) The second caller also indicated that she did not know the suspect's name but that the dispute was “happening now, ” and she described the suspect as “a black male” driving “a black Nissan.” (Id.) Because she took a picture of the Nissan's Florida license plate with her phone, she was able to provide a plate number to the dispatcher. (Id.) As the caller talked with the dispatcher, screaming could be heard in the background. (Id.)
The second caller placed another call to 911 at 2:43 a.m. to correct the last digits of the plate number she had previously provided. She stated that the suspect was still on the phone with someone at the home and threatening to return. (ECF No. 61, Ex. 4.) The caller also indicated that the car “was a rental” and provided her name. (Id.) Unredacted versions of all three recordings have been provided to the court.
As the first two responding scout cars turned onto Sussex from W. 7 Mile Road, they “observed a black Nissan parked on Sussex facing southbound just north of 7 Mile” occupied by a single black male. (ECF No. 61-6, PageID.450, 454, 457.) The car's engine was running and it was parked next to a closed floral business. (Id.) One of the officers checked the rear of the car to confirm it had the reported Florida license plate number; once the plate was verified the officers asked Defendant to step out of the 2019 Nissan Altima and placed him in handcuffs. (Id., PageID.457.)
While officers were at the scene, a black female-who Defendant's briefing describes as his sister-“came up to the location” and “stated she wanted her keys from [Defendant's] vehicle.” (Id., PageID.454.) When questioned by the officer about recent events, she replied by stating that “nothing happened.” (Id.) She also indicated that she did not own a handgun. (Id.)
One of the officers then conducted a search of the vehicle to “check for a gun” and recovered a loaded 9mm Glock handgun with a spent round in the chamber and a second loaded magazine in the trunk. (Id., PageID.457.) The officers then placed Defendant under arrest and impounded the car. (Id.)
Some of the officers responding to the call proceeded to 19356 Sussex Street, less than two blocks from Defendant's location. (Id., PageID.455.) They recovered spent casings from the porch and live ammunition from the yard.[1] (Id.) At the home, they spoke with “IO-1, ” who placed the first call to 911. She told officers she did not know who placed sugar in her car's gas tank and declined to make a report about it. (Id.)
Officers also spoke to “IO-2, ” who confirmed that Defendant had both poured sugar into a car's gas tank and fired shots out front of the home. (Id.) But IO-2 stated that she did not directly witness either incident because they occurred before she arrived at the location. (Id.) IO-2 stated that IO-1 had told her what had happened. (Id.)
Defendant now moves to suppress all evidence recovered and other fruits of the car's search. (See ECF No. 58.)
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is “to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). “[W]hat the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
The Fourth Amendment “contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009) (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995)). Over the course of many years, the Supreme Court developed the “exclusionary rule, ” which “forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial.” Id. The rule is “designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect” and is not a “necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation.” Id. at 139-40, 141 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)); Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-37 (2011) (citations removed) ( ).
The exclusionary rule serves to “prohibit [the] introduction into evidence materials seized during an unlawful search, and of testimony concerning knowledge acquired during an unlawful search.” United States v. Howard, 621 F.3d 433, 451 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-37 (1988)). It also prohibits “the introduction of derivative evidence, both tangible and testimonial, that is the product of the primary evidence, or that is otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful search, up to the point at which the connection with the unlawful search becomes so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.” Id.
A warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it falls into one of the established exceptions. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). “The government bears the burden of demonstrating an exception to the warrant requirement.” Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 334 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)). While the government acknowledges the officers searched Defendant's Nissan Altima without a warrant, the government argues that the officers could legally search the vehicle under the “automobile exception” because the information possessed by the officers gave them probable cause to search the car for evidence of the recently reported assault. (See ECF No. 61.)
The Sixth Circuit has adopted an automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Smith, 510 F.3d 641, 647-48 (6th Cir. 2007). Under this exception, “police officers may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if they have ‘probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.'” Id. at 647 (quoting United States v. Lumpkin, 159 F.3d 983, 986 (6th Cir. 1998)).
“A police officer has probable cause to conduct a search when the facts available to [the officer] would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime is present.” Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Probable cause deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, “[p]robable cause is not a high bar” and “is a fluid concept that is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Facts must be considered together, not apart, since “the whole is often greater than the sum of its parts.” Id. Finally, probable cause “does not require officers to rule out a suspect's innocent explanation for suspicious facts.” Id. Instead, “the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent' or ‘guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13 (1983)).
In the context of the automobile exception, courts have...
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