United States v. Eason, No. 16-15413

• Decision Date: 24 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. 16-17796,No. 16-15413, No. 18-12848
• Citation: 953 F.3d 1184
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Marlon EASON, Defendant - Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Carlton Styles, Defendant - Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Jeffrey Lamot Lawson, Defendant - Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

953 F.3d 1184

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Marlon EASON, Defendant - Appellant.

United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Carlton Styles, Defendant - Appellant.

United States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Jeffrey Lamot Lawson, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 16-15413

No. 16-17796

No. 18-12848

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

March 24, 2020

Nicole D. Mariani, Aileen Cannon, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney Service - Southern District of Florida, Anita White, U.S. Attorney Service - SFL, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee in 16-15413.

Valentin Rodriguez, Jr., Valentin Rodriguez, PA, West Palm Beach, FL, for Defendant-Appellant Marlon Eason.

Aileen Cannon, Laura Thomas Rivero, Lisa Tobin Rubio, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney Service - Southern District of Florida, Anita White, U.S. Attorney Service - SFL, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee in 16-17796.

Joaquin Mendez, Jr., Joaquin Mendez, PA, Coral Gables, FL, for Defendant-Appellant Carlton Styles.

Aileen Cannon, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney Service - Southern District of Florida, Jason Wu, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney Service - SFL, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee in 18-12848.

Andrew L. Adler, Federal Public Defender's Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Eric M. Cohen, Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Christian Scott Dunham, Federal Public Defender's Office, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey Lamot Lawson.

Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR and WALKER,^* Circuit Judges.

JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge:

These consolidated direct criminal appeals each present the same issue: whether a conviction for Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the answer is no. We therefore vacate each defendant's sentence and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

The advisory Sentencing Guidelines contain a sentencing enhancement for a defendant who qualifies as a "career offender." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A defendant is a career offender if he meets three criteria: (1) he is at least 18 at the time of the offense of conviction; (2) the "offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense"; and (3) "the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense." Id. The Guidelines define "crime of violence" to mean "any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," that either (1) "has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another"—a definition known as the "elements clause"¹ —or (2) is one of a number of listed offenses in the "enumerated offenses clause," which includes robbery and extortion. Id. § 4B1.2(a). In this case, we examine whether a conviction for Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) satisfies the Guidelines’ "crime of violence" definition under either clause.

A person commits Hobbs Act robbery when he:

obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section.

18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). "Robbery" under the Hobbs Act is defined as:

the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining.

Id. § 1951(b)(1).

Marlon Eason pled guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery. Eason had prior convictions, all in Florida, for strong arm robbery, attempted strong arm robbery, and resisting an officer with violence. A probation officer classified Eason as a career offender based in part on his Hobbs Act robbery conviction. Eason objected, arguing that his Hobbs Act robbery conviction was not a crime of violence; the district court overruled the objection and sentenced him as a career offender.

The other two defendants’ stories are similar. Carlton Styles also pled guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery. Based on his previous convictions in Florida for robbery, Styles was classified as a career offender. Although Styles objected to the use of his Hobbs Act robbery conviction as a basis for a career offender enhancement, the district court overruled his objection and sentenced him as a career offender.

A jury found Jeffrey Lawson guilty of, among other offenses, Hobbs Act robbery. Based in part on this conviction, a probation officer classified Lawson as a career offender. Lawson objected to the categorization of his Hobbs Act robbery conviction as a crime of violence under the career offender guideline, but the district court overruled his objection and sentenced him as a career offender.

Eason, Styles, and Lawson each appeal their sentences. This Court consolidated their cases for oral argument.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal the defendants argue that Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Specifically, they argue that because the offense can be committed by a threat to person or property, the statute is too broad to qualify as a crime of violence either under the elements clause or as an enumerated robbery or extortion offense.² The defendants emphasize that every circuit to have squarely addressed this issue has agreed that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a). We agree with the defendants and our sister circuits.³

By now our analytical framework for deciding whether an offense qualifies as a crime of violence is familiar. We apply a categorical approach to answer this question, looking to the statutory definition of the offense rather than at the particular facts underlying the defendant's conviction. See Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) ; United States v. Davis , 875 F.3d 592, 597 (11th Cir. 2017). Applying the framework to this case, we compare the scope of the conduct covered by the elements of Hobbs Act robbery with the definitions of "crime of violence" in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). "[I]f the statute sweeps more broadly" than the § 4B1.2(a) definition, then any Hobbs Act robbery conviction "cannot count" as a crime of violence. Descamps v. United States , 570 U.S. 254, 261, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013). "Because we examine what [a Hobbs Act robbery] conviction necessarily involved, not the facts underlying [each] case, we must presume that the [defendants’] convictions rested upon nothing more than the least of the acts criminalized, and then determine whether even those acts are encompassed by" the crime of violence definition. Moncrieffe v. Holder , 569 U.S. 184, 190-91, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013) (alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The government defends the defendants’ career offender sentences on two grounds. First, the government argues that Hobbs Act robbery satisfies the elements clause definition of crime of violence. Second, the government contends that Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as the enumerated offenses of robbery and extortion. See United States v. O'Connor , 874 F.3d 1147, 1150 (10th Cir. 2017) ("Although Mr. O'Connor’s underlying conviction was for Hobbs Act robbery , we nevertheless must determine whether the conviction could fall within any of the enumerated offenses."). We address these arguments in turn.

1. The Elements Clause

The government first defends the defendants’ career offender enhancements on the ground that Hobbs Act robbery satisfies § 4B1.2(a) ’s elements clause. We are unpersuaded.

To apply the categorical approach to the elements clause, we consider whether the Hobbs Act robbery statute criminalizes only conduct that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). By its terms, the Hobbs Act robbery statute—which can be violated with threats of force to "person or property," 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1) (emphasis added), is broader than the Guidelines’ elements clause definition. Because a person can commit Hobbs Act robbery without using, attempting to use, or threatening to use physical force "against the person of another," Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy the elements clause. In reaching this conclusion, we join the only two circuit courts that have squarely considered the issue. See United States v. Camp , 903 F.3d 594, 600-04 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 845, 202 L.Ed.2d 613 (2019) ; O'Connor , 874 F.3d at 1153-58.⁴

The government nonetheless argues that these circuits ruled incorrectly. The government makes three primary arguments, but none holds water.

First, the government argues that because Hobbs Act robbery requires that property be taken "from the person or in the presence of another, against his will," 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1), this "proximity to the victim ... bonds the offense as an inherently violent act against a person, not merely to property." Lawson Appellee's Br. at 21; see United States v. Tellez-Martinez , 517 F.3d 813, 815 (5th Cir. 2008) (following this logic to conclude that robbery under California Penal Code § 211 is a crime of violence under the Guidelines).⁵

The problem with the government's reading is that it excises the words "or property" from the statute, "violat[ing] the well-established rule of statutory construction that we must give effect to every word of a statute when possible." Accardo v. U.S. Att'y Gen. , 634 F.3d...