United States v. Edelen
| Decision Date | 13 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 12-4711,No. 12-4246,No. 12-4239,12-4239,12-4246,12-4711 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JEFFREY EDELEN, Defendant - Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. KENDALL TAYLOR, a/k/a Shamsideen Salaam, Defendant - Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DARRELL JOSE CARTER, a/k/a Shorty, Defendant - Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
UNPUBLISHED
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District Judge. (8:11-cr-00288-DKC-2; 8:11-cr-00288-DKC-3; 8:11-cr-00288-DKC-1)
Before MOTZ and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Gerald Chester Ruter, Baltimore, Maryland; Julie L. B. Johnson, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellants. Jerome M. Maiatico, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant Darrell Jose Carter. Steven H. Levin, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant Jeffrey Edelen. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
A federal grand jury indicted Appellants Darrell Carter ("Appellant Carter"), Kendall Taylor ("Appellant Taylor"), and Jeffrey Edelen ("Appellant Edelen") (collectively "Appellants") for conspiracy to kidnap, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c), and use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Following a jury trial, all three Appellants were convicted of the conspiracy charge. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the firearms charge, and the district court declared a mistrial on that count. The court sentenced Appellant Carter to 420 months imprisonment, Appellant Taylor to 420 months imprisonment, and Appellant Edelen to 360 months imprisonment. On appeal, Appellants raise a host of challenges to their respective convictions and sentences. For the reasons below, we affirm.
The relevant facts adduced at trial are as follows. On the evening of January 13, 2011, LaKendra McNair ("Ms. McNair"), a bank manager employed in Washington, D.C., left work and returned to her home in Fort Washington, Maryland. Appellants, who were lying in wait outside her home, accosted her and forced their way inside. Ms. McNair testified that themen, who were carrying guns and wearing hoods, masks, and gloves, repeatedly threatened to kill her.
Ms. McNair's twelve-year-old son, who was upstairs, heard the commotion and locked himself in a bathroom. He called his father and advised him that someone was breaking in, at which point his father called the police. Appellants, who were now inside the home, forced Ms. McNair to coax her son into the open. When she did so, Appellants bound his wrists and legs, covered his head, and separated him from his mother. Both victims testified that the men continued to point guns at them and threaten their lives.
Having secured her son, Appellants led Ms. McNair into the kitchen, instructing her that they intended to hold the boy hostage until she complied with their demands. Specifically, they wanted Ms. McNair to go "back to the bank" to get "money out of the vault." J.A. 337.1 When she advised that she could not enter the bank vault without the assistance of a co-worker, one of the Appellants, apparently in an effort to impress upon her the gravity of the situation, recited various personal details about her friends and family.
While the three men were interrogating Ms. McNair, numerous police officers arrived at the scene. Appellants directed Ms. McNair to answer the door and assuage the officers' concerns. As she did so, Ms. McNair saw that her son had been left unattended in the living room. She seized the opportunity, took the boy, and fled through the front door. During the prolonged standoff that ensued, police officers observed Appellants moving throughout the home. Eventually, one by one, Appellants walked out of the house and surrendered to the police. None were carrying guns or wearing masks.
Although police officers conducted a search of the premises on the night of the attack, they did not recover any firearms from the scene. In the ensuing months, however, Ms. McNair and her son continued to find various items hidden throughout their home, including a ski mask, a pair of gloves, a taser gun, a .40 caliber firearm, and a .45 caliber firearm.
On May 23, 2011, a federal grand jury in the District of Maryland returned a two-count indictment charging Appellants with conspiracy to kidnap, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c), and use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). On November 23, 2011, following a ten-day trial, a jury found all three Appellants guilty of the conspiracy charge. The jury was unableto reach a unanimous verdict as to the firearms charge, and the district court declared a mistrial on that count.
The district court sentenced Appellants Taylor and Edelen on March 26, 2012, and Appellant Carter on September 5, 2012. For all three Appellants, the court found a base offense level of 32, pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G." or "Guidelines") §§ 2X1.1(a) and 2A4.1(a), and applied two enhancements -- the two-level weapons enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(b)(3) and the two-level vulnerable victim enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b). With respect to Appellants Taylor and Carter, the district court also applied the two-level obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Prior to any Chapter Four enhancements, then, Appellants Taylor and Carter had an adjusted offense level of 38, and Appellant Edelen had an adjusted offense level of 36.
Inasmuch as Appellant Taylor did not qualify as a career offender, the district court determined that his total offense level was 38 and his criminal history category was III. Although this resulted in a guideline range of 292 to 365 months, the court varied upward and sentenced him to 420 months. Appellant Carter, on the other hand, did qualify as a career offender based on his two prior convictions for robbery in Virginia state court. Nevertheless, his offense level remained 38 because the guideline range produced by the career offenderdesignation, 37, was lower. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). Although the career offender designation did raise Appellant Carter's criminal history score from V to VI, this change did not affect his guideline range, which remained 360 months to life in prison; ultimately, the court sentenced him to 420 months in prison. The court also determined that Appellant Edelen qualified as a career offender based on his prior drug distribution and armed robbery convictions in Washington, D.C. Consequently, his guidelines were governed by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, which resulted in an offense level of 37, a criminal history category of VI, and guideline range of 360 months to life in prison. The court sentenced him to 360 months in prison.
These consolidated appeals followed. We possess jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
On appeal, Appellants raise eight issues relating to their convictions and sentences, three of which warrant discussion.2 First, Appellant Taylor contends the district court abused its discretion in accepting his pre-trial waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel. Second, all three Appellantscontend the district court erred by admitting a text message into evidence at trial. Third, Appellants Taylor and Carter contend the district court erred by applying the two-level obstruction of justice enhancement contained in U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 to their respective sentences. We address each of these issues in turn.
We turn first to Appellant Taylor's argument that the district court abused its discretion in accepting his pre-trial waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel. This challenge presents two separate, but interrelated, inquiries: (1) whether Appellant Taylor knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to conflict-free representation, which we review de novo, see United States v. Brown, 202 F.3d 691, 697 (4th Cir. 2000); and (2) whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in permitting Appellant Taylor to waive his attorney's conflict and proceed to trial, which we review for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1321, 1324 (4th Cir. 1996). We answer both of these questions in the affirmative.
On July 12, 2011, over a month after Appellant Taylor's initial appearance, Arthur McKinley Reynolds, Jr. ("Mr. Reynolds") filed a Notice of Appearance indicating he had beenretained as Appellant Taylor's counsel. On October 26, 2011, thirteen days before the jury trial was set to begin, the Government filed a letter alerting the district court to a potential conflict of interest on the part of Mr. Reynolds, i.e., that Mr. Reynolds represented an "unindicted co-conspirator," William "Puffy" Cole ("Mr. Cole"), who had "provided information to [Appellants], which resulted in [Appellants'] targeting of [Ms. McNair]." J.A. 61.
The district court took up the issue at a pretrial motions hearing on November 1, 2011. During that hearing, the Government elaborated:
I believe that Mr. Reynolds represents or has represented William Cole in state court on robbery charges in Prince George's County. Mr. Cole is believed to be the unindicted co-conspirator in this case. The government provided discovery back in June and I believe Mr. Reynolds also has the state discovery and in that there are text messages and phone records which indicate that Mr. Cole was in contact with [Appellants] while they were in the...
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