United States v. Edgar Biggs

• Citation: 53 L.Ed. 305,29 S.Ct. 181,211 U.S. 507
• Decision Date: 04 January 1909
• Docket Number: No. 289,289
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Plff. in Err., v. EDGAR M. BIGGS, Charles H. Freeman, Charles D. McPhee, and John J. McGinnity
• Court: United States Supreme Court

211 U.S. 507

29 S.Ct. 181

53 L.Ed. 305

UNITED STATES, Plff. in Err.,

v EDGAR M. BIGGS, Charles H. Freeman, Charles D. McPhee, and John J. McGinnity.

No. 289.

Argued December 16, 17, 1908.

Decided January 4, 1909.

Solicitor General Hoyt, Attorney General Bonaparte, and Mr. Edwin W. Lawrence for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 508-510 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Clyde C. Dawson and Charles J. Hughes, Jr., for defendants in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 511-513 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:

It is adequate to an understanding of the question which are here necessary to be decided in general terms to say that the indictment against the defendants in error charged them with conspiracy in violation of the 2d clause of § 5440, Rev. Stat. (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3676), which makes it criminal to conspire to defraud the United States 'in any manner or for any purpose.' The means by which it was contemplated that the United States should be defrauded was charged in the indictment to have been the unlawful obtaining by purchase under the timber and stone act of public land of the United States in excess of the quantity authorized by law to be acquired. The timber and stone act, when originally enacted, in June, 1878, related solely to public lands within particular states. 20 Stat. at L. chap. 151, p. 89, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1545. In 1892, however, that act was amended by striking out the designation of particular states, thus causing the act to apply to 'surveyed public lands of the United States within the public-land states.' 27 Stat. at L. 348, chap. 375, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1545. As it is essential to have that act in mind we excerpt from the opinion of the court below a succinct but comprehensive and accurate statement of its provisions:

'This act in its 1st section specifies the qualifications of purchasers or entrymen thereunder, and limits the amount of land which each may acquire to 160 acres. The 2d section provides that the applicant, at the time of his application, shall file a written statement in duplicate under oath with the register, describing the land which he desires to purchase and its quality, that he has made no other application under this act, and that he does not apply to purchase the same on speculation, but in good faith to appropriate it to his own exclusive use and benefit, and that he has not, directly or indirectly, made any agreement or contract in any way or manner, with any person or persons whatsoever, by which the title which he might acquire from the government of the United States should inure, in whole or in part, to the benefit of any person except himself. It then provides that, if he swears falsely, he shall be guilty of perjury and forfeit the money which he paid for said lands, and all right and title to the same, and any grant or conveyance which he may have made, except in the hands of bona fide purchasers, shall be null and void. The 3d section provides that, on the filing of the applicant's statement, the register shall post a notice of the application in his office for a period of sixty days, and that the applicant shall publish the same notice in a newspaper nearest the location of the premises for a like period of time, and after the expiration of said sixty days, if no adverse claim shall have been filed, the party desiring to purchase shall furnish to the register of the land office satisfactory evidence, 'first, that said notice of the application prepared by the register as aforesaid was duly published in a newspaper, as herein required; secondly, that the land is of the character contemplated in this act, unoccupied, and without improvements,' etc., 'and, upon payment to the proper officer of the purchase money of said land, together with the fees of the register and receiver,' etc., 'the applicant may be permitted to enter said land,' and a patent shall issue thereon. It further provides that any person having a valid claim to any portion of the land may object in writing to the issuance of the patent, and evidence shall be taken thereon as to the merits of said objection.'

The indictment contained one count, supported by averments of fourteen overt acts.

The accused after moving to quash on the ground of the illegality of the organization of the grand jury, demurred to the indictment on a number of technical grounds, and upon the contentions that the facts stated in the indictment were insufficient to charge an offense within any statute of the United States, and that, as the indictment had not been found within three years of the commission of the acts therein alleged, the right to prosecute for the same was barred by the statute of limitations. The court held the indictment stated no offense against the United States, and, sustaining the demurrer upon that ground, discharged the accused without day. It was also held that, if the indictment was construed as embracing but one offense, the three years' bar of the statute of limitations was controlling; but that, if it were held that the indictment stated more than one offense, thus saving one of the offenses from the operation of the statute of limitations, the indictment would be void for duplicity.

The reasons which caused the court to reach the conclusions just stated were expounded in an opinion. Therein, in order to determine whether the indictment stated an offense against the United States, the court came first to construe it in the light of the provisions of the timber and stone act. In doing so the court said:

'We find that the indictment sets in where the 2d section of the timber and stone act leaves off. It charges that the purpose of the conspiracy was to 'hire and under agreements' with entrymen have them pay for the lands with moneys of the corporation and have them make entries. It does not charge the date on which such hiring and agreements to make entries were to be made, nor that the entrymen were hired to make applications, nor that said hiring and agreements were prior to any application. The indictment appears to attempt to challenge some acts done by the entrymen under the provisions of § 3 of said act, to wit: The hiring of and agreement with entrymen (who had made application before that under § 2 of the act) to make entries and pay for the lands with moneys furnished by the corporation. . . . But it is said the indictment charges a violation of § 1 of the act in the acquisition of more land by the corporation than there limited. When it comes to that, the indictment does not charge that the several entrymen were disqualified as such nor that, when they made application, they had outstanding contracts to sell, or were then acting under agreements or hire for said defendants or said corporation. A compliance with the timber and stone act, by the entrymen, in both its spirit and letter, prior to and at time of application, is not challenged by the indictment.'

Having thus construed the indictment, it was then considered whether any offense was therein stated against the United States. In deciding that no offense was stated, it was held that, although it were conceded that the timber and stone act prohibited an entryman or applicant from making an application ostensibly in his own name, but in reality for and on behalf of another, that, if an applicant or entryman made an application in good faith, for his own exclusive use and benefit, the statute contained no prohibition, express or implied, against the right of the entryman, after his application, and before the final action thereon, to sell to...