United States v. Edson, 73-1323.
| Decision Date | 23 October 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 73-1323.,73-1323. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. James Edward EDSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Joseph F. Flynn, Rockland, Mass., for defendant-appellant.
Henry H. Hammond, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom James N. Gabriel, U. S. Atty., was on brief, for appellee.
Before ALDRICH and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judges.
Defendant appeals from an order of the district court setting bail pending trial. The facts are somewhat unusual. On March 1, 1972 defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty of possessing heroin with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1). Following indictment, defendant had been incarcerated because of his inability to supply bail set by the court in the amount of $25,000 with surety. On his plea he was sentenced to eight years imprisonment with the additional parole term provided by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), with credit for time served. On September 24, 1973 the judgment of conviction was vacated because the sentencing judge had failed to comply with F.R.Crim.P. 11.1 Defendant was then brought before a magistrate for a determination of bail.
At this time defendant had served twenty-five months, and, taking into account good time credits, would have been eligible for parole in seven months. We are informed that because of his good prison record he had been granted three "furloughs" and would have been allowed to attend classes at a local university which had accepted him for the current semester.
The magistrate recommended that bail be set again at $25,000 with surety. This recommendation was "adopted and approved" the same day by the district court without evidentiary or other hearing. There is no contradiction of defendant's claim that he is unable to comply. Defendant is twenty-four years old and unemployed and has no demonstrated resources, nor have his parents. The undisputed effect of this order is that defendant not only remains incarcerated, but, ironically, unlike the situation when he stood convicted, he is no longer entitled to furloughs or to attend school.
Passing the diminished strength that we are disposed to accord to district court findings that merely adopt, without even opportunity for a hearing, the report of a magistrate,2 the defendant has a considerable burden on appeal. However, in view of the substantial errors contained in the magistrate's memorandum, we proposed under the special circumstances of this case to exercise the authority vested in us by virtue of the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3147(b), and order our own bail conditions.
The magistrate's finding commences, after reciting the procedural history, with a statement that he proposed to disregard the fact that two jail officers had supplied letters expressing their opinion that defendant was sufficiently rehabilitated to resume the responsibilities of living in a free society. He considered the previous sentence to have been awarded not for rehabilitation, but for "punishment . . . not yet complete." Defendant argues from this last that the magistrate was disregarding the presumption of innocence which was fully restored by the setting aside of his conviction. We agree, except that so far as bail is concerned the presumption is not that, but, as to an untried defendant, a "presumption in favor of releasability." United States v. Leathers, 1969, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 38, 412 F.2d 169, 171. We add that, rather than being "of no consequence," the opinions of the jail officials had a direct bearing upon defendant's "character and mental condition," as to which the magistrate was specifically directed to inquire. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b).
Next, the magistrate drew the conclusion that following another trial the defendant would receive "no less a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Motamedi
...evidence of guilt, the statute neither requires nor permits a pretrial determination that the person is guilty. See United States v. Edson, 487 F.2d 370, 372 (1st Cir.1973); United States v. Alston, 420 F.2d 176, 179 (D.C.Cir.1969). These factors may be considered only in terms of the likel......
-
U.S. v. Barnett, CRIM. 97-60033.
...States v. Honeyman, 470 F.2d 473, 474 (9th Cir.1972); United States v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir.1991). See also United States v. Edson, 487 F.2d 370, 372 (1st Cir.1973). C. Presumptions Against Although the government argued at the August 22 detention hearing that there is a statutory ......
-
O'Shea v. United States, 73-1333.
...Reed v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 1 Cir., 1972, 459 F.2d 121; Rainha v. Cassidy, 1 Cir., 1972, 454 F.2d 207; cf. United States v. Edson, 1 Cir., 1973, 487 F.2d 370; the burden of decision remains exclusively on the judge. See TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 7 Cir., 1972, 460 F.2d 348; Dye v. Cowan,......
-
United States v. Bundy, Case No. 2:16-cr-00046-GMN-PAL
...the evidence of guilt, the statute neither requires nor permits a pretrial determination that the person is guilty. See United v. Edson, 487 F.2d 370, 372 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Alston, 420 F.2d 176, 179 (D.C.Cir. 1969). These factors may be considered only in terms of the likeli......