United States v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 27 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. 3:13-cr-00012-1,3:13-cr-00012-1
• Citation: 456 F.Supp.3d 953
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Charles Jeffrey EDWARDS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

456 F.Supp.3d 953

UNITED STATES of America

v.Charles Jeffrey EDWARDS

No. 3:13-cr-00012-1

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

Filed April 27, 2020

Henry C. Leventis, Stephanie N. Toussaint, U.S. Attorney's Office, Nashville, TN, for United States of America.

Lawrence James Arnkoff, Law Office of Lawrence Arnkoff, Brentwood, TN, for Charles Jeffrey Edwards.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ELI RICHARDSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release (Doc. No. 475, "Motion"), whereby Defendant seeks reduction of his 72-month sentence and immediate release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Like numerous other federal inmates in this district around the country, Defendant claims that the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, as applied to his specific situation—including his particular medical profile and the current and developing circumstances in the BOP facility where he is confined—constitutes "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warranting so-called "compassionate release" under Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

The Government has filed a response in opposition (Doc. No. 477), which does not address the Motion on the merits but instead claims the Motion is premature because Defendant has not administratively exhausted his remedies within the BOP as is, accordingly to the Government, absolutely required under Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The Government claims that the exhaustion requirement set forth within this provision—which contemplates a defendant's motion for compassionate release "after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier"—¹ is unqualifiedly mandatory and cannot be disregarded by the Court.² Since Defendant has neither (i) fully exhausted his administrative rights to appeal a failure of the BOP to bring a compassionate release motion, nor (ii) waited 30 days since requesting that the BOP bring such a motion, the Government argues, the Motion is premature and thus should either be denied now without prejudice or stayed pending the occurrence of the earlier of alternatives (i) and (ii) above.³

In reply, Defendant does not dispute that the exhaustion requirement has not been satisfied. Instead, he asserts that in this particular case, the Court can and should disregard the exhaustion requirement and thus should decide the Motion now, without awaiting the time of exhaustion. (Doc. No. 478). The Court disagrees, for the reasons set forth below, and thus denies the Motion without prejudice to being refiled after the time of exhaustion.

DISCUSSION

The issue currently before the Court—i.e. , whether the Court can disregard the exhaustion requirement in the case of an inmate seeking compassionate release based on the COVID-19 pandemic's effect or potential effect on the inmate—is, relatively speaking, extremely novel. Nevertheless, the Court does not write on a clean slate, but rather already has available guidance from other courts around the country. The Sixth Circuit has not ruled upon or addressed this issue in any way. And it appears that until last week, only one circuit had addressed this issue, namely, the Third Circuit in United States v. Raia , 954 F.3d 594 (3d Cir. 2020), decided at the beginning of this month. The Court realizes that Raia did not specifically state that courts could never disregard the exhaustion requirement, but it does seems to assume or imply this, and as further discussed in cases quoted below, it tends to support the notion that courts cannot disregard the exhaustion requirement. Earlier this week, the Fifth Circuit happened to mention the issue without deciding (and without being called upon to decide) it.

Second, our reasoning on [the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act's] exhaustion requirement does not foreclose federal prisoners from seeking relief under the First Step Act's provisions for compassionate release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Though that statute contains its own administrative exhaustion requirement, several courts have concluded that this requirement is not absolute and that it can be waived by the government or by the court, therefore justifying an exception in the unique circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g. , United States v. Russo , No. 16-cr-441 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2020) (holding that, "[d]espite the mandatory nature of [the statute's] exhaustion requirement," the exhaustion bar is "not jurisdictional" and can therefore be waived); United States v. Smith , No. 12 Cr. 133 (JFK) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2020) (citing cases); see also Vigna (identifying the difficulties of the First Step Act exhaustion question while ultimately deferring a ruling until the petitioner exhausted his remedies); but see United States v. Raia , 954 F.3d 594, –––– (3d Cir. 2020) ; United States v. Clark , No. 17-85-SDD-RLB, 451 F.Supp.3d 651, 654–55 (M.D. La. Apr. 1, 2020).

Valentine v. Collier , 956 F.3d 797, 807 (5th Cir. 2020).

Of course, Third Circuit and Fifth Circuit opinions—even ones that set forth applicable holdings and not mere observations or other dicta—are not binding on this Court. Neither are district court opinions from around the country, including those from within this circuit. Nevertheless, the Court does find it telling and persuasive that cases from district courts within the Sixth Circuit—for this Court, a particularly relevant subset of district court cases, even if they do not rely on (non-existent) Sixth Circuit precedent—have overwhelmingly found that the exhaustion requirement cannot be disregard.

The Court below quotes in some detail from an opinion from, as far as the Court can tell, every district judge in this circuit that has addressed the issue and mentions Raia .⁴ It does so for several reasons. First, so doing serves to show how dominant the view that courts may not disregard the exhaustion requirement is within the circuit. Second, so doing serves to describe the reasons supporting this view, including those suggested in Raia . Finally, except for the last case set forth below, such descriptions reflect the Court's thinking on the issue, and collectively do so in such a manner and degree that the Court could not hope to improve upon their collective wisdom and analytical rigor.

To summarize in advance, with one exception, every case either expressly held, or (in one case, United States v. Girod , No. CR 5:15-087-DCR, 2020 WL 1931242 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 21, 2020) (Reeves, J.)) strongly implied that the exhaustion requirement could not be waived.

1. Case law from Eastern District of Kentucky

In United States v. Cornett , No. CR 7:10-2-KKC, 2020 WL 1912211 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 20, 2020) (Caldwell, J.), the court explained:

Defendant moves the Court to modify that sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which provides for what is commonly referred to as "compassionate release." The defendant asserts that he faces a high risk of death from the novel coronavirus disease COVID-19 because FCI Gilmer, where he is incarcerated, has failed to take adequate steps to protect prisoners from the virus.

Prior to the First Step Act, PL 115-391, 132 Stat 5194 (Dec. 21, 2018), a motion for compassionate release could be brought by only the director of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), not the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2017). The First Step Act amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow a defendant to file a motion for such relief on his own, but only if he has first "fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf" or if 30 days have lapsed since the warden of the defendant's facility received the defendant's request to file a motion on his behalf, whichever is earlier. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582(c)(1)(A) ; PL 115-391, 132 Stat 5194 § 603 (Dec. 21, 2018).

The defendant does not assert that he has met either of these prerequisites to filing this motion. Instead, he argues that the Court should waive these prerequisites given the dangers posed by COVID-19. These prerequisites are jurisdictional, however, meaning that this Court has no power to grant relief on a motion for compassionate release unless the prerequisites are met.

The Supreme Court has recently addressed whether statutory filing prerequisites should be deemed to limit the jurisdiction of the court. Fort Bend Cty., Texas v. Davis [––– U.S. ––––], 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1848 [204 L.Ed.2d 116] (2019). As would be expected, it all depends on the wording of the statute at issue. "If the Legislature clearly states that a prescription counts as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue; but when Congress does not rank a prescription as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character." Id. (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 [126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097] (2006) ) (brackets omitted). In Fort Bend , the Supreme Court determined that Title VII's requirement that a plaintiff file a complaint with the EEOC before filing an action in court was not jurisdictional because it does not "speak to a court's authority" or "refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts." Id. at 1850-51 (quoting E.P.A. v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. , 572 U.S. 489, 512 [134 S.Ct. 1584, 188 L.Ed.2d 775] (2014) and Arbaugh , 546 U.S. at 515 [126 S.Ct. 1235] ).

Unlike the Title VII provisions, however, § 3582(c) does speak to the Court's authority to modify a defendant's sentence after it has been imposed. The statute explicitly states that this Court "may not" modify a prison term except in certain delineated circumstances. One of these circumstances is when a defendant brings a motion

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