United States v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 22 August 2017
• Docket Number: No. CR 16–3068 JB,CR 16–3068 JB
• Citation: 266 F.Supp.3d 1290
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. James EDWARDS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

266 F.Supp.3d 1290

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.James EDWARDS, Defendant.

No. CR 16–3068 JB

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

Filed August 22, 2017

James D. Tierney, Acting United States Attorney, Nicholas J. Marshall, Novaline D. Wilson, Assistant United States Attorneys, United States Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, New Mexico Attorneys for the Plaintiff.

Marshall J. Ray, Nicole Moss, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorneys for the Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JAMES O. BROWNING, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the United States' Motion In Limine to Prohibit Discussion of Sentencing or Punishment at Trial, filed May 26, 2017 (Doc. 44)("Motion in Limine").¹ The Court held a hearing regarding this motion, and other similar motions, on June 22, 2017. See Transcript of Hearing (taken June 22, 2017)("2017 Tr.").² The primary issue is whether the Court should allow Defendant James Edwards to discuss sentence-related issues in front of the jury during trial, inviting the possibility of jury nullification. The Court will grant the Motion in Limine. The Supreme Court of the United States' recent decisions about the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America's right to a jury trial suggest that the Supreme Court is willing to reconsider precedent by addressing whether a particular practice is necessary to the jury trial right as it existed at the time that the States ratified the Sixth Amendment. Historical sources and precedent show that the common-law jury at the Founders' time knew the ramifications of a guilty verdict and used that knowledge in reaching a verdict, frequently choosing a verdict because it would mitigate a defendant's punishment. Moreover, although courts at the Founders' time instructed the jury that the court's role is to provide the jury the law and that the jury's role is to apply that law to the facts as the jury finds them, the courts also instructed the jury that its role included ultimately deciding both the facts and the law. Additionally, courts at the Founders' time allowed lawyers to argue openly to the jury that it should exercise its ability to decide the law in the case and nullify the law that the court gives. Accordingly, the common-law jury in the Framers' era knew about and exercised its power to acquit even when the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty, or to mitigate the defendant's sentence, regardless whether application of the law given by the court to the facts which the jury found provided otherwise. The Court concludes that Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent allowing the jury to know about sentencing ramifications only if its participation in sentencing is required, and precedent preventing the jury from learning about its nullification right, are inconsistent with trial practices at the Founders' time, and that these practices have eroded the Sixth Amendment jury trial right as the Framers understood that right. Nevertheless, because, as a district court, the Court must faithfully apply controlling Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent, the Court will grant the United States' motion to prevent Edwards from discussing sentencing-related issues in front of the jury during trial.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND ³

Edwards is a medicine man from the Acoma Pueblo, in Cibola County, in the District of New Mexico. See Indictment at ¶ 1 at 1 filed July 12, 2016 (Doc. 2). See also 2017 Tr. at 42:17–18 (Ray). The alleged victim went to Edwards for a traditional healing rub.⁴ See 2017 Tr. at 27:25–28:3 (Marshall, Ray). The victim offered Edwards a traditional gift of corn meal, which he denied, because, according to Edwards, it was not needed for the procedure that was to occur on that day. See Transcript of Appeal of Detention Proceedings at 34:18–20 (taken December 8, 2016), filed March 21, 2017 (Doc. 41)("2016 Tr.")(Toersbijns). Edwards, during the rub, approached the victim's vaginal area, and his mouth contacted her genitalia. See 2016 Tr. at 35:10–13 (Toersbijns). The victim then ended the rub and left Edward's home. See 2017 Tr. at 28:15–17 (Marshall).

The Indictment alleges, based on the events above, that on or about December 25, 2014, and continuing through January 31, 2015, Edwards unlawfully and knowingly engaged in and attempted to engage in a sexual act with Jane Doe by force. See Indictment ¶ 1, at 1. The alleged sexual act, specifically, was the contact between Edward's mouth and Jane Doe's vulva. See Indictment ¶ 1, at 1. The Indictment charged Edwards with violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 2241(a), and 224(2)(B). See Indictment ¶ 1, at 1. The Indictment also established that both Edwards and Jane Doe are Indians. See Indictment ¶ 1, at 1.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A federal grand jury indicted Edwards for unlawfully and intentionally engaging in and attempting to engage in a sexual act by force with Jane Doe on or about December 25, 2014, and continuing through January 31, 2015. See Indictment at ¶ 1, at 1. Both parties throughout the pre-trial process filed numerous "Motions in Limine. "⁵ The United States begins the Motion in Limine by asking that the Court prohibit "defense counsel from mentioning to the jury, on direct or cross-examination or in argument, that Defendant James Edwards faces up to lifetime incarceration, or that if convicted Defendant will be required to register as a sex offender." See Motion in Limine at 1. The United States next asserts that allowing the jury to consider punishment in deliberations would open the door for jury nullification. See Motion in Limine at 1. The United States claims the Tenth Circuit has held that there is no right to jury nullification. See Motion in Limine at 1 (citing Crease v. McKune, 189 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 1999) ; United States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383, 1385 (10th Cir. 1980) ). The United States goes so far as saying: "The Tenth Circuit has thus fashioned a bright line rule that ‘[u]nless a statute specifically requires jury participation in determining punishment, the jury shall not be informed of the possible penalties.’ " Motion in Limine at 2 (quoting United States v. Parrish, 925 F.2d 1293, 1299 (10th Cir. 1991) ) (internal quotations omitted). The United States then compares the Tenth Circuit's position to other circuits' positions. See Motion in Limine at 2. The United States asserts that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated:

When a jury has no sentencing role, providing sentencing information invites jurors to ponder matters that are not within their province, distracts them from their fact-finding responsibilities, and creates a strong possibility of confusion. Indeed, the only possible purpose that would be served by informing jurors of the mandatory sentence would be to invite jury nullification of the law.

Motion in Limine at 2 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 62 F.3d 849, 850–51 (6th Cir. 1995) )(internal parenthetical omitted). The United States next provides a string citation to support its contention. See Motion in Limine at 2–3.⁶ The United States concludes this section by stating: "The law on this issue is well-situated, and squarely forecloses defendant's discussion of any possible penalty at trial." See Motion in Limine at 3. The United States then argues that allowing Edwards to discuss punishment would contradict jury instructions regularly given by the Court. See Motion in Limine at 3. The United States quotes two Tenth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions:

Tenth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.04 states that it is the jury's duty "to base [its] verdict solely upon the evidence, without prejudice or sympathy." Similarly, Instruction 1.20 instructs the jury that "[i]f [it] find[s] the defendant guilty, it will be [the Court's] duty to decide what the punishment will be. [It] should not discuss or consider the possible punishment in any way while deciding [its] verdict."

Motion in Limine at 3. The United States then uses these instructions to assert that the Court should prevent discussion of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See Motion in Limine at 3. The United States claims: "Such comments have no place in a trial where the guilt or innocence of the Defendant is decided solely on the evidence at trial." Motion in Limine at 3. The United States next offers a non-exhaustive list of statements and phrases that it feels should not be allowed in trial.⁷ The United States claims these statements and phrases "serve only to put before the jury the matter of what sentence or consequences a defendant might receive and, if it occurs, can only be intended to arouse he jury's sympathy or prejudice." Motion in Limine at 3–4. The United States then asserts that Edwards did not object to the motion. See Motion in Limine at 4. The United States concludes the Motion in Limine by reiterating that the Court prevent Edwards from "arguing sentencing-related issues to the jury" including, but not limited to "application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the potential for registration as a sex offender, and lifetime incarceration." Motion in Limine at 4.

The Court held a pre-trial conference and motion hearing on June 22, 2017, in which it heard argument on various motions, including the Motion in Limine. See 2017 Tr. The parties' discussion of the Motion in Limine was limited, but the Court indicated that it was inclined to grant the motion based on Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent. See 2017 Tr. at 154:21–25, 155:10–11 (Court). The Court explained its belief that jury nullification and punishment were topics that were openly discussed in front of colonial juries, but that the Court had no discretion to depart from established precedent. See 2017 Tr. at 155:2–7 (Court). The Court, in describing its inclination to grant the motion, explained that it would prohibit the discussion of sentencing or punishment during the trial and anything that is related...