United States v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 22 February 2022
• Docket Number: No. 21-1874,21-1874
• Citation: 26 F.4th 449
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Antonio EDWARDS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

26 F.4th 449

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Antonio EDWARDS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-1874

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued February 9, 2022

Decided February 22, 2022

Aaron R. Bond, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

John T. Kennedy, Attorney, Evanston, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before Flaum, Brennan, and St. Eve, Circuit Judges.

St. Eve, Circuit Judge.

Antonio Edwards and several accomplices robbed three cellphone stores in northeastern Illinois. Each time, the team would enter around 5:30 p.m. wearing hats and hooded sweatshirts, wait until all the customers had left, announce a robbery, point a gun at an employee, force the employee to assist them, stuff black garbage bags with cellphones, and flee through the back door of the store.

A grand jury indicted Edwards on multiple counts of Hobbs Act robbery stemming from each of the three crimes and brandishing a firearm in connection with two of the robberies. Edwards pleaded guilty to robbing two stores but claimed not to be involved in the third robbery. The government sought to introduce evidence of the two admitted crimes to prove Edwards's identity through a common modus operandi in conducting each of the robberies. The district court admitted the evidence subject to a limiting instruction. A four-day trial ensued. After beginning deliberations, the jury sent a note asking if one of the witnesses identified Edwards. The district judge instructed the jury to "please rely on your collective memory of the testimony."

The jury thereafter convicted Edwards on the remaining charges.

On appeal, Edwards contends that the district court erred by admitting evidence from the other two robberies and that the court should have provided the jury with a trial transcript in response to its question. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion either by admitting the evidence or instructing the jury to rely on its collective memory. We therefore affirm.

I. Background

A. The Robberies

Antonio Edwards, along with several others, robbed three cellphone stores in northeastern Illinois: a T-Mobile store in Chicago, a Verizon store in Waukegan, and an AT&T store in Bradley.

The Chicago Robbery. On March 29, 2017, at 5:30 p.m., Edwards and an unknown accomplice entered a T-Mobile store in Chicago. They first went to the sales counter and asked about cellphones and service plans. Shortly after, Andrew McHaney, another member of the group, came in and locked the front door. The unknown accomplice pulled a gun out, cocked it, and pointed it at the store clerk, one of two employees at the counter. The crew told the two clerks to go to the back room and open the safe. An employee did so, as McHaney worked to stuff cellphones into a black garbage bag. At the same time, Edwards led a clerk to the front of the store, where he removed the store register with gloved hands. The crew then tore some of the security equipment off the walls and attempted to put the clerks into the closet. While the two clerks tried to squeeze into the closet, the three robbers exited through the backdoor.

The Waukegan Robbery. On April 25, 2017, again at 5:30 p.m., Edwards walked into a Verizon store with a hat and hooded sweatshirt on. He spoke to one of the owners of the store, Jorge Acosta, while browsing around. After the last customer had left, Anthony Johnson and an unknown accomplice entered the store with hoods to cover their heads. Edwards told Johnson to lock the front door. He then pulled out a gun, cocked it, and pointed it at Jorge, who was working that day with two sales associates, Diego Acosta and Kayla McKenzie. Edwards ordered them all to the back of the store.

The crew made Jorge open the safe, which he did, before they forced him to his knees with the two employees. The unknown associate, wearing gloves, put all the cellphones into two black garbage bags with Johnson's help. After the crew was done, they demanded the store's security recordings, then fled through the back door into a getaway car.

The Bradley Robbery. On April 30, 2017, at the now familiar 5:30 p.m. time, Edwards and McHaney entered a AT&T store, both wearing a hat and hood. McHaney forced the employee into the store's back room with a gun, as Edwards locked the front door. They demanded the employee's keys to the safe. Edwards grabbed the keys, opened the safe, and loaded the merchandise into two black garbage bags. The two men then took the employee's wallet and cellphone, removed the store's cash register, and fled through the store's back door.

B. Indictment and Trial

The grand jury indicted Edwards on conspiracy to obstruct, delay or affect commerce by robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) ; Hobbs Act robbery for the Chicago T-Mobile, Bradley AT&T, and Waukegan Verizon stores, id. ; and brandishing a firearm during the Bradley and Waukegan robberies, id. § 924(c)(1)(A). Edwards pleaded guilty to conspiracy and two of the Hobbs Act robberies—the Chicago robbery and the Bradley robbery. He maintained his innocence, nonetheless, on the three remaining charges—brandishing a firearm during the Bradley robbery, the Hobbs Act robbery for the Waukegan Verizon store, and brandishing a firearm during the Waukegan robbery.

After learning on the eve of trial that Edwards intended to plead guilty to the conspiracy charge, the government filed a motion in limine to introduce evidence of the Chicago and Bradley robberies to establish Edwards's modus operandi and identity as a participant in the Waukegan Robbery. The government noted that it further intended to introduce this evidence as direct evidence that Edwards brandished a weapon in connection to the Bradley robbery. Edwards objected to the modus operandi evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), contending that the government's theory relied on impermissible propensity reasoning. The district court admitted the evidence and gave the jury a limiting instruction regarding it.

The trial lasted four days. The government presented surveillance video from each robbery; testimony from James Bates, a cooperating defendant who drove the getaway car; testimony from FBI Special Agent Dustin Gourley about Edward's guilty plea for the Bradley robbery; eyewitness testimony from employees who identified Edwards at the Chicago T-Mobile store and Bradley AT&T store; testimony from the owner and employees of the Waukegan Verizon Store, including from Diego Acosta; testimony about the evidence recovered from the getaway car, including 70 cellphones and two LG watches in large black trash bags; call logs and contact lists from Bates's phone for the robberies, connecting him with Edwards and McHaney on the dates of the Waukegan and Bradley robberies; and cell-site information about Edwards's phone, which showed that he was in the area of all three robberies.

At the close of trial, the district court instructed the jury that "transcripts of trial testimony are not available to you. You must rely on your collective memory of the testimony." During deliberations, the jury sent a note asking if Diego identified Edwards at the Waukegan store. Edwards proposed sending a rough transcript of Diego's trial testimony, but the district court denied the request. Instead, the court instructed the jury to "please rely on your collective memory of the testimony." The jury found Edwards guilty of the remaining three charges, and the district court sentenced him to 224 months of imprisonment.

II. Discussion

A. Rule 404(b) Evidence

Edwards first argues that the district court erred by admitting evidence of the Bradley and Chicago robberies to show identity through a modus operandi for committing the Waukegan robbery. We review Rule 404(b) decisions for abuse of discretion and defer to the district court's determination "unless no reasonable person could adopt its view." United States v. Buncich , 926 F.3d 361, 367 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Norweathers , 895 F.3d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 2018) ).

As a preliminary matter, evidence of the Bradley robbery was admissible as direct evidence of the § 924(c)(1)(A) offense. Rule 404(b) simply "does not apply to direct evidence of the crime charged." United States v. Bowling , 952 F.3d 861, 869 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Ferrell , 816 F.3d 433, 443 (7th Cir. 2015) ). Section 924(c)(1)(A) criminalizes the brandishing of a firearm during a crime of violence. The government had to prove that Edwards committed the underlying predicate offense—the Bradley robbery—to successfully convict him of brandishing a firearm during the offense. United States v. Morrow , 5 F.4th 808, 815 (7th Cir. 2021). The Bradley robbery evidence then directly related to the government's case and thus was admissible. See United States v. Miller , 959 F.2d 1535, 1538–39 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (acknowledging that evidence could be admitted both as direct evidence and as evidence to mark "the handiwork of the accused"); United States v. Boone , 951 F.2d 1526, 1540 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the disputed evidence was both direct evidence and evidence of a modus operandi and determining that because "the jury was already evaluating evidence of similar acts, the district [court] did not abuse its discretion in determining that the [evidence's] probative value outweighed its prejudicial effects").

Rule 404(b)(1) prohibits using evidence of other acts to show that a defendant had a propensity to commit a crime. United States v. Morgan , 929 F.3d 411, 427 (7th Cir. 2019) ("[A] court may not allow in evidence of prior acts to show that the defendant is ‘the kind of person who would do such a thing.’ "). Rule 404(b)(2) provides, however, that the evidence may be admitted "for another purpose, such as proving" identity or a modus operandi. United States v. Brewer , 915 F.3d 408, 415 (2019). United States v. Gomez sets out the relevant procedure. 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc); see...