United States v. Egelak
| Decision Date | 12 May 1959 |
| Docket Number | 1668.,Cr. No. 1661 |
| Citation | 173 F. Supp. 206 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Joseph EGELAK, Defendant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Robert R. BLODGETT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Alaska |
Russell R. Hermann, U. S. Atty., Nome, Alaska, for plaintiff.
James A. von der Heydt, Nome, Alaska, for defendants.
Fred D. Crane and Warren Wm. Taylor, Fairbanks, Alaska, Amicus Curiae.
On March 19, 1959, the defendant Joseph Egelak was indicted by the grand jury for the crime of manslaughter, in violation of Sec. 65-4-4 A.C.L.A.1949. On March 23, 1959, the defendant Robert R. Blodgett was indicted for the crime of assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of Sec. 65-4-22 A.C.L.A.1949. Both defendants have moved to dismiss the indictment upon the grounds: (1) that the District Court for the District of Alaska or the District Court for the Territory of Alaska is without jurisdiction to function in the State of Alaska; (2) that the indictment returned by the Grand Jury does not contain the endorsement of the names of the witnesses examined before the Grand Jury, as required by the provisions of Sections 66-8-52 and 66-11-1, Alaska Compiled Laws Annotated, 1949. On April 24, 1959, oral argument was had before the Court on the motion in the Egelak case, with the understanding that the issues involved would apply likewise in the Blodgett case.
At the time of hearing the defendants took the position that the decision of the Honorable J. L. McCarrey, Jr., in the case of United States v. Starling, D.C. Third Division 1959, No. 3973, Cr., and associated cases, 171 F.Supp. 47, upholding the constitutionality of the transition measures provided by Sec. 18 of the Alaska Statehood Act (Public Law 85-508, 85th Congress), 48 U.S.C.A. preceding section 21, was dicta insofar as the jurisdiction of this court in cases involving violations of state statutes is concerned, for the reason that this case involved such jurisdiction in cases arising under Federal statutes. It also appeared at such time that no written opinion had been rendered by the District Judges of Alaska precisely touching upon jurisdiction in state cases, although similar motions or challenges to the jurisdiction of the court had been denied orally. United States v. Kosters, Fourth Division; United States v. Deere, Fourth Division. This Court was therefore requested to expressly pass upon the issues raised by such motion, although it appears that such issues were then and are now pending for determination by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Subsequently, this court has received the opinion of Judge McCarrey in the case of United States v. Marrone, D.C. Third Division, No. 4033, 172 F. Supp. 368, in which the issues raised by these motions are determined adversely to the contentions of the defendants. The position taken by defendants and amicus curiae is that the court is without jurisdiction for two reasons: first, the provisions of Sec. 18 of the Statehood Act are unconstitutional in that Congress may not impose upon the State of Alaska a judicial system, as each state must be admitted to the Union on an equal footing with all others; and, second, under the provisions of Sec. 12 of the Statehood Act the appellate jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to hear appeals from this court was repealed, without provision for continuance of such right of appeal, and, therefore, that the defendant is left without any statutory right of appeal from the judgments of this court. Both of these issues were squarely presented in the Marrone case.
In this decision the Court directs attention to the provisions of Sec. 17, Art. XV, of the Constitution of the State of Alaska, and finds as follows:
With respect to the second contention, the Court concludes:
"I am of the opinion that there is a simple answer to this problem and that is that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit never lost its appellate jurisdiction over the present United States District Court in Alaska in either state or federal matters."
This decision, with which I fully concur, is stare decisis and determinative of such issues in this court. State v. Mellenberger, 163 Or. 233, 95 P.2d 709, 128 A.L.R. 1506. However, I would add the following observations as additional compelling reasons for the holding that the State of Alaska has accepted the provisions of Sec. 18 of the Statehood Act.
The State Legislature has provided a system of Supreme and Superior Courts of the State of Alaska by Ch. 50, S.L.A. 1959, approved March 19, 1959. Secs. 31 and 32 of Art. III of this Act provide as follows:
Nothing could be more specific than the declaration of intent of the Legislature to accept the present courts and vest them with jurisdiction until the State courts are established. Therefore the contention of the defendants that Congress cannot create or establish a state court system for Alaska, and the contention of the amicus curiae that Congress has "imposed" such system upon the State "entirely within the discretion of the President of the United States", cannot be sustained. In the same manner the contention of the defendants that Congress cannot create courts within a state other than in conformity with Article III, Sec. 1 of the Constitution of the United States is without merit, as such constitutional provision relates only to "the judicial Power of the United States", relating solely to the Federal courts.
It should be further observed that the cases relied upon by defendants and amicus curiae of Benner v. Porter, 9 How. 235, 50 U.S. 235, 13 L.Ed. 119; American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 26 U.S. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242, and Forsyth v. United States, 9 How. 571, 50 U.S. 571, 13 L.Ed. 262, have no real application to the issues in this case, as such relate to the continued jurisdiction of territorial courts in Federal cases, on admission of the Territory into the Union, as fully discussed by Judge McCarrey in the Starling case.
With respect to the second contention, the Legislature has likewise made ample provision for appeals from this court during the interim period by an amendment to Sec. 32(4), Article III, of the Judiciary Act (Ch. _____ S.L.A.1959), providing that in the event that the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit finds itself without jurisdiction to hear appeals from this court, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska shall be immediately established, with jurisdiction over appeals from this court. Hence, it cannot be said that a defendant in this court would in any event be without right of appeal.
The sole question presented here is whether or not there is any actual conflict between the provisions of Sec. 66-8-52 A.C.L.A.1949, requiring that when an indictment is found the names of witnesses examined before the grand jury must be inserted at the foot of the indictment or endorsed thereon, read in conjunction with Section 66-11-1 A.C.L. A.1949, providing that the indictment must be set aside by the court when the names of the witnesses examined before the grand jury are not so inserted or endorsed thereon, and the provisions of Rule 7(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., prescribing the "nature and contents" of an indictment or information, making no reference to such endorsement; and the construction and application of the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upon this identical question in the case of Soper v. United States, 220 F.2d 158, 15 Alaska 475.
This question appears to be again pending upon an appeal to the Circuit Court in the case of Short v. United States, the appellant's brief in which case is directed to the attention of the Court. Defendants direct attention to the mandatory provisions of the Alaska statutes and earnestly contend that there is no real conflict between such statutes and the Federal Rule; and that the decision in the Soper case is dicta and not binding on this court, and in conflict with a prior decision of the Circuit Court in the case of Stephenson v. United States, 9 Cir., 211 F.2d 702, 14 Alaska 603, 53 A.L.R.2d 812, wherein the court found no conflict between...
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