United States v. Eleazar Ripley

• Decision Date: 01 January 1833
• Citation: 32 U.S. 18,8 L.Ed. 593,7 Pet. 18
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Plaintiffs in error, v. ELEAZAR W. RIPLEY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

32 U.S. 18

7 Pet. 18

8 L.Ed. 593

UNITED STATES, Plaintiffs in error, v. ELEAZAR W. RIPLEY.

January Term, 1833

ERROR to the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. In the district court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana, the United States, on the 7th of September 1822, instituted proceedings, by two petitions; claiming in one, 'the sum of $13,163.10, as due by Eleazar W. Ripley, late major-general in the army of the United States, which, on the 9th day of April 1821, at the treasury department, was found against him, on a statement and settlement of his account;' and claiming in the other, 'the sum of $4154.95, which on the 5th day of May 1821, at the treasury department, was found against him on the settlement and statement of his account.' To those petitions, the defendant pleaded, that he was not indebted to the United States; and the case was, afterwards, on the 28th of May 1830, submitted to a jury, and a verdict was found for the defendant in the following terms. 'Verdict for the defendant as follows:

"Amount of his account, less $500 lost, $13,060 22

"Extra services at Washington, 2,000 00

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$15,060 22

"Deducting therefrom balance due the United States, 11,929 32

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$3,140 90

'New Orleans, 29th of May 1830.

A. CHARBONNET.'

Upon the verdict, the court ordered that the United States take nothing by their petitions; and the United States prosecuted this writ of error.

On the trial of the cause, the district-attorney of the United States took the following bills of exception. 'Be it remembered, that on this 28th day of May 1830, on the trial of this cause, the defendant offered the following testimony: The defendant entered in the army of the United States in the year 1812, as a lieutenant-colonel; was promoted at different periods until he attained the rank of major-general by brevet, which rank he held until the day of his resignation of his commission, in the year 1817. During this interval, the defendant was engaged in active service, and received the pay and emoluments to which his rank entitled him, under the laws of the United States, and the regulations of the president of the United States, and of the department of war. Large sums of money passed through his hands, and were passed over by him to various officers in the army under his command, and to others who have been appointed by him to act as such, or were disbursed by him for the supplies of the troops by him commanded. He claimed to be allowed a commission on these disbursements, and offered evidence to prove that similar allowances had been made to other officers of the line of the army, who had been charged with the disbursements of public moneys; and also offered evidence to prove what would be a fair rate of compensation for such services. The defendant also claimed an allowance of extra pay or compensation for services performed by him, not within the line of his duty, in preparing plans for fortifications, and for procuring and forwarding supplies of provisions, &c., to troops of the United States, beyond the limits of his military command, and offered testimony to prove the value of said services. To the introduction of all which testimony, the attorney for the United States objected, on the ground that no other or further compensation could be allowed for disbursements made, or extra services rendered as aforesaid, than such as were sanctioned or defined by the laws of the United States, by instructions of the president of the United States, or by regulations of the war department, legally made. But the court overruled the objection and admitted the testimony.

'- And be it further remembered, that on the trial of this cause, the testimony in the case having been closed, the attorney of the United States prayed the court to instruct the jury, that no allowance in the form of commissions or otherwise, for moneys disbursed as aforesaid, or extra compensation for services rendered under the circumstances hereinbefore stated, could be admitted as a legal and equitable set-off against the claims of the United States; other than such as were sanctioned and defined by the laws of the United States, by instructions of the president of the United States, or by regulations of the department of war, legally made. But the court refused to instruct the jury, but stated to them that the defendant was entitled to credit for commissions on disbursements, and allowances for extra services, and that they must judge of the rate and extent of such commissions.'

The case was argued, for the plaintiffs in error, by Taney, Attorney-General of the United States; no counsel appeared for the defendant in error.

For the United States, it was contended, that from the bill of exceptions and the verdict of the jury, it appeared, that some of the services for which extra compensation was claimed were rendered by General Ripley in the line of his duty, and that it did not appear that others were so performed, but the government had the advantages of the services. The receiving and paying money for which commissions are claimed, were of the former description, and are not represented otherwise. Other charges are made on the allegation that they are for services out of, or beyond, his duty.

The question to be decided by the court, depends upon the fourth section of the act of congress of 1797. (1 U. S. Stat. 515.) By that law, no claims can be made which could not be allowed by the accounting officers of the treasury in the settlement of accounts. It was not intended, that claims which could not be presented to those officers, claims for services which were not, by the law regulating the duties of those who made the claims, authorized and designated, and for which the officers of the treasury could not admit a right to compensation should be submitted to a court and jury. The errors of the accounting officers, in their construction of the laws, could alone be brought before a court and jury. The term 'justly,' which is found in the fourth section of the act, was not intended to enlarge the powers of the court and jury beyond that given to the accounting officers.

It is admitted, that if the credits or debits claimed against the government were of such a nature that they should have been allowed by the accounting officers, a court and jury have a right to judge of their amount or extent, but they must have been previously submitted at the treasury. There is no difference in the application of this rule to debtors and creditors of the United States. The principle which is implied in these positions is, that the law never meant to invite resistance, in courts of justice, by those upon whom the government had claims, by referring the credits of which they could not avail themselves with the accounting officers of the treasury, to courts of law; a contrary deduction from the statute would require strong language to sustain it. To illustrate...