United States v. Elias, No. 20-3654

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge.
• Citation: 984 F.3d 516
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lisa M. ELIAS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 20-3654
• Decision Date: 06 January 2021

984 F.3d 516

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Lisa M. ELIAS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-3654

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: November 19, 2020
Decided and Filed: January 6, 2021

ARGUED: Matthew Ahn, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellant. Vanessa V. Healy, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Matthew Ahn, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellant. Vanessa V. Healy, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: McKEAGUE, THAPAR, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge.

984 F.3d 518

The passage of the First Step Act in 2018 expanded access to compassionate release by allowing inmates to bring compassionate-release motions on their own behalf. Prior to that Act, only the Bureau of Prisons could bring compassionate-release motions. However, the removal of the Bureau of Prisons as the sole gatekeeper to compassionate release raised questions of whether the Sentencing Commission's policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, remained applicable to inmate-filed motions. This Court spoke on those questions recently, stating that § 1B1.13 is not applicable to inmate-filed compassionate-release motions. United States v. Jones , 980 F.3d 1098 (6th Cir. 2020). We follow that reasoning here.

In 2016, Lisa Elias was convicted of a drug-related conspiracy. This year, she utilized the expanded compassionate release process by moving for compassionate release on her own behalf, arguing that her hypertension placed her at an elevated risk of death if she were to contract COVID-19. The district court denied her motion, finding that Elias failed to show "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a sentence reduction as the statute requires. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Elias claims that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion. We find her arguments to be without merit and AFFIRM .

I

Before granting a compassionate-release motion, a district court must engage in a "three-step inquiry:" the court must "find" that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant [a sentence] reduction," ensure "that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission," and "consider[ ] all relevant sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)." United States v. Jones , 980 F.3d 1098, 1101 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) ). If each of those requirements are met, the district court "may reduce the term of imprisonment," but need not do so. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Congress provided no statutory definition of "extraordinary and compelling reasons," instead delegating that task to the Sentencing Commission. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). Despite this command, the Sentencing Commission released its only policy statement related to compassionate-release motions in 2006, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, over two decades after § 3582(c) was enacted. That statement describes four categories of extraordinary and compelling reasons. The first three are related to an inmate's serious medical conditions, age, and status as a caregiver. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)–(C). Finally, the last category is a catch-all provision titled "Other Reasons," which reads: "As determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the defendant's case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C)." Id. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(D).

Historically, only the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") could bring compassionate-release motions. See Jones , 980 F.3d at 1100. And the BOP rarely exercised this power. "A 2013 report from the Office of the Inspector General revealed that, on average, only 24 incarcerated people per year were released on BOP motion." United States v. Brooker , 976 F.3d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 2020). Not only that, the program was plagued by mismanagement, as the BOP's "implementation of the program ... [was] inconsistent and result[ed] in ad hoc decision making," and the BOP "ha[d] no timeliness standards for reviewing ... requests."

984 F.3d 519

Id. at 231–32 (alterations in original) (quotation omitted).

Recognizing this problem, Congress sought to expand compassionate release through the passage of the First Step Act in December 2018. See Jones , 980 F.3d at 1104–05 (discussing how "a bipartisan coalition in Congress sought to boost grants of compassionate release by reforming § 3582(c)(1)(A) ’s procedures"). The key step Congress took was removing "the BOP from its preclusive gatekeeper position" by permitting inmates to file compassionate-release motions on their own behalf. Id. at 1105 ; see also United States v. McCoy , 981 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 2020) (noting that the First Step Act "remove[d] the Bureau of Prisons from its former role as a gatekeeper over compassionate-release petitions").

However, this significant change by Congress called into question whether § 1B1.13 remained an "applicable policy statement" for compassionate-release motions brought directly by inmates, as certain portions of the guideline suggested it only referred to motions brought by the BOP. If the guideline remained applicable, district courts would be precluded from determining extraordinary and compelling reasons on their own initiative and would be bound by the reasons listed in the guideline. See United States v. Ruffin , 978 F.3d 1000, 1006 (6th Cir. 2020).

This "raise[d] a difficult legal question" that has divided district courts...