United States v. Ellis

• Decision Date: 02 March 1942
• Docket Number: No. 8626.,8626.
• Citation: 43 F. Supp. 321
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. ELLIS et al.

43 F. Supp. 321

UNITED STATES v. ELLIS et al.

No. 8626.

District Court, W. D. South Carolina, Spartanburg Division.

March 2, 1942.

Oscar H. Doyle, U. S. Atty., and Thomas A. Wofford, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Greenville, S. C., and Arthur B. Caldwell, Sp. Asst. to the Atty Gen., for the United States.

Wolfe & Fort, of Gaffney, S. C., for defendants.

WYCHE, District Judge.

The indictment in this case charges the defendants F. E. Ellis, John E. Wright and T. E. Meetze, of the City of Gaffney, County of Cherokee, in the State of South Carolina, with having violated section 51, title 18 U.S.C.A. in four counts. The first count charges that the defendants on or about the second day of September, 1940, at Gaffney, in Cherokee County, in said State of South Carolina, in the Spartanburg Division of the Western District of South Carolina, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, did unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly combine, conspire, confederate, and agree together, with intent to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate one Lottie P. Gaffney, a citizen of the State of South Carolina, and of the United States of America, in the free exercise and enjoyment of a certain right and privilege secured to her by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, that is to say, the right to vote in the General Election held in the State of South Carolina, County of Cherokee, within the Western District of South Carolina, for the purpose of electing Presidential Electors and a representative in the Congress of the United States of America, the right and privilege to vote in said election being granted and secured to her as a citizen of the United States of America by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, etc.

This count continues as follows: "that in furtherance of said conspiracy, combination, confederation and agreement, the said F. E. Ellis, John E. Wright and T. E. Meetze, on or about the second day of September, 1940, and immediately prior thereto, while acting as members of the Election Registration Board, did refuse, deny and prevent, by threats and intimidation, the said Lottie P. Gaffney from registering before the said Board, and did deny and refuse to issue to the said Lottie P. Gaffney a certain registration certificate, to which the said Lottie P. Gaffney was then and there entitled as a citizen of the United States of America and as a qualified elector of the county and state aforesaid, and without the possession of said certificate she was then and there prevented from voting in the General Election * * *", etc.

The three remaining counts are the same as the first, except they name different citizens as being the victims of the alleged conspiracy.

The defendants demur to the indictment and move to quash it upon the following grounds:

"1. That it appears upon the face of the indictment that it does not charge an offense under the statutory law to wit: Section 51, Title 18 U.S.C.A. in that the right contemplated by said section is one secured to the complainant by the Constitution of the United States and it does not appear upon the face of said indictment, that such a right was involved in that it is alleged that the members of the Board of Registration, to wit: the defendants herein, `did deny and refuse to issue to the said Lottie P. Gaffney, Bernice Bonner and Lillian Bonner a certain registration certificate' whereas Amendment XV of the Constitution of the United States specifically applies to the right to vote, it being therein stipulated that `the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude.'

"2. It is submitted that the Board of Registration created by Section 2269, Vol. 2, Code of Laws for South Carolina 1932, is therein clothed with certain powers with reference to issuing registration certificates to qualified electors in the State of South Carolina and that the defendants were acting at the time alleged, in the capacity of such officers and were discharging their duties as prescribed by Section 2267 of said Vol. 2 of said Code and Subsection (d) of section 4, of Article 2 of the Constitution of 1895, South Carolina, and that the offense alleged in the indictment presupposes the existence of the qualifications to vote, which qualifications are determined by the Board in the exercise of these powers. That it is necessary under the Section of the Code which has been referred to, and the provisions of the Constitution, that any person who shall apply for registration by said Board of Registration shall have been a resident of the State for two years and in the County for one year and shall have proved to the satisfaction of said Board that he or she could both read and write any section of the Constitution submitted to the applicant for registration, or in the alternative, that he or she possesses property in the assessed valuation of $300.00 and that the taxes thereon collectable during the previous year, to wit, 1939, were paid, and it is not alleged that these requisites were met by the complainants.

"3. The indictment fails to charge the offense of conspiracy in that the defendants were members of a Board at the time alleged, constituted under the law of the State of South Carolina as a Board of Registration and were acting as a Board and not in their individual capacity in all matters pertaining to the discharge of their duties as a Board of Registration at the time and that as such, they could not commit a `conspiracy' having had no individual status other than as members of said Board.

"4. That said indictment is fatally defective in that it does not allege that the said Lottie P. Gaffney, Bernice Bonner and Lillian Bonner presented themselves to the said Board of Registration at the proper time and at the proper place and complied with the necessary pre-requisites to the issuance of the said registration certificates and qualified in the particulars hereinabove stipulated for said registration certificates, and that thereupon, said registration certificates were definitely refused as a result of the alleged conspiracy on the part of the defendants."

(1) Section 51, Title 18 U.S.C.A. is not limited merely to the protection of a citizen against conspiracies to injure or intimidate him in his right to vote in a general election where members of Congress are to be elected. It provides that, if two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, they shall be punished, etc. Therefore, it is apparent that the Congress in enacting this law intended it for the protection of the free enjoyment of any right or privilege under the Constitution or laws of the United States. It has been decided that the statute applies to the right to make a homestead entry (United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 5 S.Ct. 35, 28 L.Ed. 673); to the right to be protected in the execution and enforcement of a decree of a United States Circuit Court (United States v. Lancaster, C.C., 44 F. 885); to the right to the equal protection of the laws (United States v. Blackburn, Fed.Cas.No. 14,603); to a witness in his right to be protected in giving testimony before the land office in a contest which involves the right of entrymen under the land laws of the United States (Foss v. United States, 9 Cir., 266 F. 881); to the right of citizens to hold office and exercise its functions (United States v. Patrick, C.C., 54 F. 338); to the right to be free from slavery (Smith v. United States, 8 Cir., 157 F. 721, certiorari denied 208 U. S. 618, 28 S.Ct. 569, 52 L.Ed. 647); to the right of a citizen under indictment and in custody of United States Marshal on United States offense, to be protected against lawless violence (Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 12 S.Ct. 617, 36 L.Ed. 429); to the right of a citizen under indictment for a federal offense to speedy and public trial (Logan v. United States, supra); to the right and privilege to aid in the execution of the laws by giving information to the proper authorities of violation of those laws. Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 20 S.Ct. 993, 44 L.Ed. 1150.

The right to vote preceded the enactment of the 15th Amendment. It springs from Art. 1, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. The 15th Amendment prohibits the denial of the right to vote because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Under this statute, it is clear that the race, color, or previous condition of servitude is wholly immaterial. The words "any citizen" must necessarily include both negro and white. Felix v. United States, 5 Cir., 186 F. 685.

Section 4 of Article 1 of the Constitution says: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations * * *." From this it is apparent that the Constitution places authority in Congress over General Elections. The Federal Statutes applying to conduct and control of Federal Elections are too well known and too numerous to mention here. It is sufficient to say the law and decisions are well settled that the right to vote is protected under this statute. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 35 S.Ct. 904, 59 L.Ed. 1355; Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 35 S.Ct. 926, 59 L.Ed. 1340, L.R.A.1916A, 1124; Aczel v. United States, 7 Cir., 232 F. 652; Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 4 S.Ct. 152, 28 L.Ed. 274; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L. Ed. 1365. It is fundamental that the right to vote includes the right to be permitted to comply with the State requirements for voting and any citizen who attempts to fulfill the State requirements,...