United States v. Elsea

• Decision Date: 23 February 2022
• Docket Number: 2:20-CR-00074-1-JRG-CRW
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CHARLES ELSEA, JR.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CHARLES ELSEA, JR.

No. 2:20-CR-00074-1-JRG-CRW

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Greeneville

February 23, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RONNIE GREER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Charles Elsea Jr.'s motion [Doc. 415], in which he moves the Court to dismiss the indictment [Doc. 3] and superseding indictment [Doc. 280], citing a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. The United States has responded in opposition to his motion. [United States' Resp., Doc. 476]. Mr. Elsea previously waived his right to representation and is acting pro se. See [Mem. Op & Order, Doc. 181, at 13]. For the reasons herein, the Court will deny Mr. Elsea's motion.

I. The Speedy Trial Act

Under the Speedy Trial Act, Mr. Elsea has a right to a speedy trial, which means that his trial must begin within seventy days of the filing of the indictment or his initial appearance, whichever occurs later. § 3161(c)(1). The Speedy Trial Act, however, “gives the district court discretion-within limits and subject to specific procedures-to accommodate limited delays for case-specific needs, ” and “[m]uch of the Act's flexibility” for the accommodation of limited delays “is furnished by” § 3161(h)(7), which governs “ends-of-justice continuances.” Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 498-99 (2006). Section 3161(h)(7) states:

The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in computing the time within which the trial of any such offense must commence: ....

(7)(A) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this paragraph shall be excludable under this subsection unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

3161(h)(7)(A). If the United States delays trial beyond the seventy-day time limit and does not exclude delays under § 3161, the Court must dismiss the indictment upon a defendant's filing of a motion to dismiss, which Mr. Elsea has now filed. § 3161(a)(1)-(2). Mr. Elsea can establish a prima facie violation of the Speedy Trial Act by showing that the United States has not brought him to trial within the seventy-day period. United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 717 (6th Cir. 2007). If he can establish a prima facie violation, the United States then carries “the burden of showing that, after taking into account time excludable from the seventy-day period, [Mr. Elsea] [will be] brought to trial during the statutorily mandated period.” Id. (citation omitted).

II. Analysis

The United States indicted Mr. Elsea and his co-defendants on September 1, 2020, on two charges: a conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), and a conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (h). [Indictment, Doc. 3, at 1-4]. On the charge of conspiracy to commit money laundering, the United States alleged that the specified unlawful activity underlying the conspiracy was the distribution of methamphetamine. [Id. at 4]. Mr. Elsea made his initial appearance on these charges on October 26, 2020, and he entered a plea of not guilty. [Minute Entry, Doc. 72, at 1]. The speedy-trial clock therefore began to run on October 26, 2020. See § 3161(c)(1) (“In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” (emphasis added)).^[1] Without an excludable delay, the speedy trial clock would have expired on January 4, 2021, the seventy-day deadline. Because Mr. Elsea was not brought to trial by this date, he has established a prima facie violation of the Speedy Trial Act.^[2]

On December 14, 2021, the United States filed a superseding indictment, in which it levied two new charges against Mr. Elsea and his codefendants: a conspiracy to distribute a hundred kilograms or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), and a conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (h). [Superseding Indictment, Doc. 280, at 2].^[3] On the charge of conspiracy to commit money laundering, the United States, this time, alleged that the specified unlawful activity underlying the conspiracy was the distribution of methamphetamine and/or marijuana. [Id.]. On December 15, 2021, a day after the filing of the superseding indictment, Mr. Elsea and co-defendant Robert McClure- the only remaining defendants who had yet to enter into plea agreements-made their initial appearances together on the superseding charges and each entered a plea of not guilty. [Minute Entry, Doc. 284, at 1].

On this date, a separate speedy trial clock began to run on the new charges. See United States v. Rojas-Contreras Sylvester, 474 U.S. 231, 240 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“In light of Congress' intent to bring defendants quickly to trial, it would make little sense to restart . . . [the] 70-day period[] whenever there is a superseding indictment.”); Sylvester v. United States, 868 F.3d 503, 508-09 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he [Speedy Trial] Act does not provide for a resetting of the Speedy Trial Clock for existing charges where the government has filed a superseding indictment adding new charges to existing ones.... Although this Circuit has not addressed this issue directly, the majority of our sister circuits have held that ‘[t]he filing of a superseding indictment does not affect the speedy trial clock for offenses charged in the original indictment.'” (quotation and citations omitted)); Sylvester v. United States, 110 F.Supp.3d 738, 748 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (“Rather than restarting the speedy trial clock, the Court should have started separate speedy trial clocks for the new charges.”), aff'd, 868 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 2017). This speedy trial clock will expire-in the absence of an excludable delay-on February 23, 2022, the seventyday deadline. Mr. Elsea has therefore established a prima facie violation of the Speedy Trial Act as to the superseding charges.

Although Mr. Elsea has established a prima facie violation of the speedy trial clock, the United States argues that it “has shown that when considering the excludable time, the defendant will be brought to trial within the requisite 70-day period.” [United States' Resp. at 8]. The Court agrees that the United States, in response to Mr. Elsea's prima-facie showing, has met its burden of demonstrating that he “[will be] brought to trial during the statutorily mandated period.” Gardner, 488 F.3d at 717 (citation omitted).

A. The Charges in the Original Indictment

Between October 26, 2020, and the currently scheduled trial date of March 1, 2022- the relevant timeframe for the Court's analysis-the Court granted numerous ends-of-justice continuances in response to requests from multiple defendants, including Mr. Elsea. The Court will now review each continuance for compliance with the Speedy Trial Act, while mindful that, first, “under section 3161(h)(7) an exclusion as to one defendant applies to all codefendants, ” United States v. Holyfield, 802 F.2d 846, 848 (6th Cir. 1986), and second, for a delay to be excludable under §3167(h)(7)(A), the Court must articulate its “reasons for granting an ‘ends of justice' continuance, ” United States v. Monger, 879 F.2d 218, 220-21 (6th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). Although the Court must state its reasons “with particularity, ” its “order need not be lengthy.” United States v. Smith, 510 Fed.Appx. 390, 395 (6th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); see id. at 395-96 (acknowledging that “a detailed motion stating the reasons for a continuance in conjunction with the district court's order provided explicit findings to support a valid ends-of-justice continuance” (citation omitted)).

1. Nonexcludable Time

October 26, 2020, to October 29, 2020: Again, October 26, 2020, the date of Mr. Elsea's initial appearance, is the date that triggered the speedy trial clock. The period between October 26, 2020, and October 29, 2020, is non-excludable time under the Speedy Trial Act. This period accounts for three days of non-excludable time.^[4]

2. Excludable Time

October 30, 2020, to February 9, 2021: On October 29, 2020, the Court granted an ends-of-justice continuance in response to the multiple parties' requests for further time “to complete discovery and consider necessary motions.” [Order, Doc. 80, at 1]. Under § 3161(h)(7)(A), the Court expressly stated that “[t]he ends of justice served by the granting of [this continuance] outweigh the best interests of the public and Defendant in a speedy trial.” [Id. at 2]. The Court also stated that the period between October 29, 2020, and February 9, 2021 the scheduled trial date, is excludable time...