United States v. Epstein

• Decision Date: 19 March 2015
• Docket Number: Cr. No. 14–287 FLW.
• Citation: 91 F.Supp.3d 573
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Mendel EPSTEIN, Jay Goldstein, David Aryeh Epstein, and Binyamin Stimler, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

91 F.Supp.3d 573

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff

v.Mendel EPSTEIN, Jay Goldstein, David Aryeh Epstein, and Binyamin Stimler, Defendants.

Cr. No. 14–287 FLW.

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

Signed March 19, 2015.

R. Joseph Gribko, U.S. Attorney's Office, Newark, NJ, Sarah M. Wolfe, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Trenton, NJ, Glenn J. Moramarco, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Camden, NJ, for Plaintiff.

Laura Gasiorowski, Robert G. Stahl, Law Offices of Robert G. Stahl, LLC, Westfield, NJ, Aidan P. O'Connor, Pashman Stein, Hackensack, NJ, Henry Edward Mazurek, Clayman & Rosenberg LLP, New York, NY, Nathan Lewin, Lewin & Lewin, LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

OPINION

WOLFSON, District Judge:

Defendants Rabbi Mendel Epstein, Rabbi Jay Goldstein, David Epstein and Rabbi Binyamin Stimler (collectively, “Defendants”), have been charged with multiple kidnapping-related crimes allegedly involving coercive gets obtained from Jewish husbands in Orthodox Jewish divorce proceedings. Before and during trial, the Court has decided numerous evidentiary issues raised by Defendants. While those rulings have been placed on the record, the Court expands upon, in this written Opinion, issues concerning Defendants' religious-based defenses and arguments. Specifically, Defendants seek the dismissal of the Superseding Indictment on the basis that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) forbids their prosecution. In that connection, on similar grounds, Binyamin Stimler (“Stimler”) had moved to sever his trial. Alternatively, Defendants seek to introduce evidence of their Orthodox religious beliefs to negate their criminal intent and mount a consent defense to kidnapping. The Government has opposed these motions. For the reasons set forth on the record, and for the reasons set forth in this Opinion, Defendants' motions are DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On September 11, 2014, a grand jury in Trenton, New Jersey, returned a five-count Superseding Indictment against Binyamin Stimler, Mendel Epstein, Jay Goldstein (“Goldstein”), and David Aryeh Epstein.¹ Defendants are all Orthodox Jewish men and their prosecutions arise out of allegations that Defendants engaged in criminal means to facilitate Orthodox Jewish divorces.

According to the Superseding Indictment, to effectuate an Orthodox Jewish divorce, a husband must provide his wife with a document known as a “get.” See Super. Ind. at ¶ 1(i). A get serves as documentary proof of the dissolution of a marriage under Jewish law, and a divorce cannot be effected until a get is given by the husband. The get is a dated and witnessed document wherein the husband expresses his intention to divorce his wife and sever all ties with her. The get is written by an expert scribe, known as a “sofer,” who acts as the husband's agent. After the get is written by the sofer, the husband hands it to his wife in the presence of two witnesses, who also sign the get. A wife may also have an agent accept on her behalf. Once the marriage is dissolved, a rabbinical court, known as a “beth din,” will give both parties a certificate confirming their new marital status. Id. at ¶ 1(i).

If a husband refuses to give his wife a get, the wife may sue for divorce in a beth din, which may order the husband to issue the get. Id. If the husband does not comply, he may be subjected to various penalties to pressure him into consenting to the divorce. Id. A woman whose husband will not give her a get is known as an “agunah” (“agunot” in plural), a chained woman who cannot remarry. Id.

Count I of the Superseding Indictment charges all Defendants with conspiracy to commit kidnapping. The object of this conspiracy was to obtain money from the agunot and to threaten and coerce Jewish husbands to give their wives gets, i.e., kidnappings. Id. at ¶ 3. The remaining four Counts charge the various Defendants with three kidnappings and one attempted kidnapping; the conduct alleged in these substantive counts are also alleged in Count I as part of the overt acts in the conspiracy charge.²

Several of the defendants' arrests stemmed from a “sting” operation³ in which two undercover FBI agents posed as an agunah and her brother. Id. at ¶ 7(d). In summary, the Indictment alleges that Mendel Epstein charged the undercover agents approximately $10,000 for Mendel Epstein to arrange for the kidnapping and beating of the fictitious husband in order to coerce him to give a get. Id. at ¶ 7(i). The undercover agents wired Mendel Epstein an additional $20,000 on October 2, 2013, and the agents were instructed to pay the final $30,000 at the time of the fictitious kidnapping. Id. at ¶ 7(u). Ultimately, Defendants Stimler and Goldstein were arrested at the scene of the purported kidnapping.

The Superseding Indictment further asserts three actual kidnappings, wherein the various defendants are accused of acting with others to kidnap Jewish men and coerce them to agree to give their wives gets.See Id. at ¶ 7(a) to ¶ 7(c). As part of these kidnappings, Defendants are accused of tying up and beating the victim-husbands.⁴ Id.

DISCUSSION

I. RFRA

Stimler, joined by his co-defendants, moves to dismiss the Superseding Indictment under Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b) on the basis that Defendants' criminal prosecution would violate RFRA. Indeed, the Act requires that the Government “shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless “the application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(a) to 1(b) ; Holt v. Hobbs, ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 853, 860, 190 L.Ed.2d 747 (2015). Furthermore, “[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.” Id. at § 2000bb–1(c).

Invoking RFRA, Defendants insist that their prosecution substantially burdens their Orthodox religious beliefs, and that even if the Government has a compelling interest, the prosecution of Defendants is not the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Stimler argues, in the alternative, that his prosecution, separate and apart from the other three defendants, violates RFRA.⁵ Simply put, it is Defendants' position that an exception to the kidnapping statutes exists because the alleged kidnappings were done in furtherance of sincerely held religious beliefs. That position is not sustainable.

For one, I conclude that the Government's decision to prosecute Defendants does not constitute a substantial burden on Defendants' religious exercise. Further, even if a substantial burden does exist, I find that the Government has a compelling interest in preventing crimes of violence, and moreover, the arrest and prosecution of individuals who violate such criminal laws is the least restrictive means of enforcing that interest.

1. Substantial Burden on Religion

Stimler argues that prosecution of the defendants in this case substantially burdens the exercise of their religion. Stimler Br. at 7. In support of that position, Stimler offers the expert declaration of Rabbi Yitzchok Breitowitz, who states that it is a “mitzvah”—that is, a religious commandment—to serve as a witness to a get, and to assist an agunah in obtaining a get. Stimler Br. at 9–10, Breitowitz Decl. at ¶¶ 13, 14, 16. On January 28, 2015, this Court ruled on the record that Stimler had not shown a substantial burden on his religious practice, because there was no evidence that his religion required the use of force. Following this ruling, Stimler submitted a Supplementary Declaration of Rabbi Breitowitz, which states that Jewish law authorizes “certain forms of force,” and that freeing an agunah “is a ‘mitzvah’ even if force is necessary to secure the husband's expression of consent.” Breitowitz Supp. Decl. at ¶ 6. The Government, responding to the Supplemental Declaration, asserts that even if Jewish law permits the use of violence to obtain a get,⁶ it does not condone the use of violence in exchange for money.⁷ Gov't Renewed Br. at 7–8.

“Whether a burden is ‘substantial’ under RFRA is a question of law, not a question of fact.” Geneva Coll. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 442 (3d Cir.2015). In a case like this, a substantial burden exists where “ ‘the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.’ ” Id. (quoting Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir.2007) ). Conversely, there is no substantial burden “if the government action does not coerce the individuals to violate their religious beliefs or deny them ‘the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.’ ” Id. (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988) ). While the definition is expansive, the test does not mean that “any incidental effect of a government program which may have some tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs satisfies the substantial burden standard.” Klem, 497 F.3d at 279. Importantly, not every burden is substantial; “RFRA's reference to ‘substantial’ burdens expressly calls for a qualitative assessment of the burden that the accommodation imposes on the ... exercise of religion.” Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at 442.

One way to qualitatively assess the burden that a government practice places on religious exercise is to consider whether an adherent has acceptable alternative means to practice his religion. For example, in Klem,⁸ an inmate argued that his religion required that he read four books a day, and that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections' (“DOC”) policy which only permitted the inmate to keep ten books in his cell at one time constituted a substantial...