United States v. Escatel-Pintado, 012121 NMDC, CR 20-0076 JB/LF
| Party Name | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. HUGO CESAR ESCATEL-PINTADO, Defendant. |
| Attorney | John C. Anderson United States Attorney Mark C. Pfizenmayer Assistant United States Attorney United States Attorney's Office Albuquerque, New Mexico Attorneys for the Plaintiff Margaret A. Katze Federal Public Defender Federal Public Defender's Office Albuquerque, New Mexico Attorney for the Defe... |
| Case Date | January 21, 2021 |
| Court | United States District Courts, 10th Circuit, U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
John C. Anderson United States Attorney Mark C. Pfizenmayer Assistant United States Attorney United States Attorney's Office Albuquerque, New Mexico Attorneys for the Plaintiff
Margaret A. Katze Federal Public Defender Federal Public Defender's Office Albuquerque, New Mexico Attorney for the Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Defendant's Objections to the Presentence Report and Sentencing Memorandum, filed November 2, 2020 (Doc. 38)(“Objections”). The Court will sentence Defendant Hugo Cesar Escatel-Pintado on January 22, 2021. See Notice of Hearing as to Hugo Cesar Escatel-Pintado, filed December 18, 2020 (Doc. 41). The primary issue is whether the Court should sustain Escatel-Pintado's Objection to the United States Probation Office's (“USPO”) application of a 2-level enhancement under United States Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”) § 2D1.1(b)(12), based on the USPO's determination that Escatel-Pintado was convicted of a drug trafficking crime, and, in the process, “‘maintained a premises for the purposes of distributing a controlled substance.'” Presentence Investigation Report as to Hugo Cesar Escatel-Pintado ¶ 19, at 5, filed October 6, 2020 (Doc. 33)(“PSR”)(quoting U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (b)(12)). The Court will overrule Escatel-Pintado's Objection to the USPO's application of a 2-level enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12), because the Court determines that, in accordance with U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1's application note seventeen, Escatel-Pintado “maintained” the premises -- his apartment in Albuquerque, New Mexico -- for the “primary purpose” of distributing heroin, even if Escatel-Pintado also used his apartment for simultaneous living purposes. U.S.S.G § 2D1.1. Application Note 17. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. The Court concludes that Escatel-Pintado maintained his apartment for the primary purpose of distributing heroin, because (i) before Escatel-Pintado's arrest, law enforcement made controlled purchases of heroin from Escatel-Pintado at the apartment, see PSR ¶ 9, at 3-4; (ii) when law enforcement arrested Escatel-Pintado and searched the apartment, it found almost two kilograms of heroin and drug paraphernalia related to the sale of heroin, see PSR ¶ 10, at 4; and (iii) Escatel-Pintado admitted to law enforcement that distributing drugs was the primary purpose of him coming to the United States, see PSR ¶ 12, at 4. See also United States v. Lozano, 921 F.3d, 944, 946-47 (10th Cir. 2019); United States v. Murphy, 901 F.3d 1185, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 2018); United States v. Cantrell, 817 Fed.Appx. 614, 619 (10th Cir. 2020)(unpublished); United States v. Martinez, 803 Fed.Appx. 204, 207 (10th Cir. 2020)(unpublished). The Court, therefore, concludes that the USPO's application of the 2-level enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12), is not contrary to the U.S.S.G. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1; U.S.S.G § 2D1.1. Application Note 17. Accordingly, the Court overrules Escatel-Pintado's Objection.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Court takes its facts from the PSR. See PSR ¶ 1-13, at 3-4. The Court provides these facts for background. It does not adopt them as the truth, and it recognizes that these facts are largely Plaintiff United States of America's version of events.
In July 2019, law enforcement received information from a confidential informant that Escatel-Pintado was looking for customers to purchase heroin from him. See PSR ¶ 9, at 3. After receiving the information, law enforcement conducted two controlled purchases of heroin from Escatel-Pintado's apartment, located in Albuquerque, New Mexico. See PSR ¶ 9, at 3-4. The drug amounts that law enforcement obtained at this time are unknown, because they are not in discovery. See PSR ¶ 9, at 4. On December 13, 2019, a search warrant was authorized for Escatel-Pintado's apartment. See PSR ¶ 10, at 4. On December 20, 2019, law enforcement executed the search warrant on Escatel-Pintado's apartment.
See PSR ¶ 10, at 4. At the apartment, law enforcement located “2046 grams of heroin, ” which was later confirmed by laboratory reports to total 1, 802 net grams of heroin. PSR ¶ 11, at 4. The heroin was “located in the bottom of the kitchen oven in a single package.” PSR ¶ 11, at 4. In addition, law enforcement located “a digital scale, three boxes of clear plastic baggies, balloons, a suspect cutting agent, and a suspected drug ledger.” PSR ¶ 11, at 4. Law enforcement subsequently took Escatel-Pintado into custody, during which, Escatel-Pintado admitted to law enforcement that (i) he was “the sole occupant of the residence, ” PSR ¶ 12, at 4; (ii) he had “packed and sold the heroin that law enforcement located for profit, ” PSR ¶ 12, at 4, and (iii) an “unknown individual recruited him from Mexico, ” and he had “agreed to come to the United States under the direction of an unknown individual in order to deliver drugs, ” PSR ¶ 12, at 4. On January 9, 2020, Escatel-Pintado was charged with a single count of “Possession with Intent to Distribute 1 Kilogram and More of Heroin.” PSR ¶ 1, at 3. On July 27, 2020, Escatel-Pintado pleaded guilty to one count of “Possession with Intent to Distribute 1 Kilogram and More of Heroin, ” in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). PSR ¶ 2, at 3.
RELEVANT LAW REGARDING THE GUIDELINES
In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court of the United States of America severed the mandatory provisions from the Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976, thus making the Guidelines sentencing ranges effectively advisory. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. In excising the two sections, the Supreme Court left the remainder of the Sentencing Reform Act intact, including 18 U.S.C. § 3553: “Section 3553(a) remains in effect, and sets forth numerous factors that guide sentencing. Those factors in turn will guide appellate courts, as they have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
Congress has directed sentencing courts to impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, ” to comply with the four statutorily defined purposes that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) enumerates: (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D). [A] defendant who has been found guilty of an offense described in any Federal statute . . . shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of this chapter so as to achieve the purposes set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of § 3553(a)(2) to the extent that they are applicable in light of all the circumstances of the case.
18 U.S.C. § 3551(a). To achieve these purposes, § 3553(a) directs sentencing courts to consider: (i) the Guidelines; (ii) the offense nature and the defendant's character; (iii) the available sentences; (iv) the policy favoring uniformity in sentences for defendants who commit similar crimes; (v) the need to provide restitution to victims; and (vi) any pertinent United States Sentencing Commission policy statements in effect on the date of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
Although the Guidelines sentencing ranges are no longer mandatory, both the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have clarified that, while the Guidelines are one of several factors which § 3553(a) enumerates, they are entitled to careful consideration. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 349 (2007)(“The Guidelines as written reflect the fact that the Sentencing Commission examined tens of thousands of sentences and worked with the help of many others in the law enforcement community over a long period of time in an effort to fulfill [its] statutory mandate.”); United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 593 (10th Cir. 2006)(describing the Guidelines as more than “just one factor among many”), overruled on other grounds by Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 35 (2007). The Guidelines are significant, because “the Guidelines are an expression of popular political will about sentencing that is entitled to due consideration . . . [and] ‘represent at this point eighteen years' worth of careful consideration of the proper sentence for federal offenses.'” United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d at 593 (quoting United States v. Terrell, 445 F.3d 1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds by Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. at 349). A reasonable sentence is one that “avoid[s] unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261-62.
The Tenth Circuit has “joined a number of other circuits in holding that a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Terrell, 445 F.3d at 1264. This presumption, however, is an appellate presumption, and not one that the trial court can or should apply. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 90-91 (2007); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. at 46-47; Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. at 350-51 (repeating that the presumption of reasonableness “is an appellate court presumption” (emphasis in original); United States v. Conlan, 500 F.3d 1167, 1169-70 (10th Cir. 2007)(stating...
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