United States v. Espinoza

• Decision Date: 22 January 2018
• Docket Number: No. 16-50033,16-50033
• Citation: 880 F.3d 506
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Angelica Urias ESPINOZA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

880 F.3d 506

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Angelica Urias ESPINOZA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50033

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 10, 2017 Pasadena, California

Filed January 22, 2018

Michael Marks (argued), Federal Public Defenders of San Diego Inc., San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Colin M. McDonald (argued), Assistant United States Attorney; Helen H. Hong, Chief, Appellate Section; Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, San Diego, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before: Richard A. Paez, Marsha S. Berzon, and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

Angelica Urias Espinoza appeals her conviction for importation of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. We consider whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of third-party culpability.¹ As the district court applied the wrong legal standard in excluding the evidence of third-party culpability, it necessarily abused its discretion. Because the error was not harmless, we reverse Urias Espinoza’s conviction and remand for a new trial.²

I.

On April 22, 2015, a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agent stopped Urias Espinoza at the United States-Mexico border as she attempted to legally enter the United States through the Otay Mesa Port of Entry in California. As a Mexican national, Urias Espinoza had acquired a border crossing card that permitted her to legally enter the United States. In 2014, Urias Espinoza opened a business importing clothing from the United States to sell in Mexico; as a result, she crossed the border often to purchase clothes.

At the border entry point, the CBP agent asked Urias Espinoza for identification and whether she had anything to declare. She provided her border crossing card and stated that she was not bringing anything into the United States. The border agent suspected otherwise, and after some initial questioning, decided to conduct a search of her vehicle with assistance from several other agents. The search revealed that the car’s rear seats had been hollowed out and stuffed with approximately twelve kilograms of methamphetamine.

The government charged Urias Espinoza with importing methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. At trial, the government called two CBP agents to testify about the discovery of methamphetamine in Urias Espinoza’s car. Agent Tan testified that he noticed a bulge in the back seat of the car, poked around, and used a density reading machine, which recorded a high reading. Agent Tan further testified that he subsequently discovered cellophane packages underneath the upholstery of the back seats, and that Urias Espinoza did not react when he examined the seat and discovered the drugs. Agent Tan then handcuffed Urias Espinoza and called for backup. Agent Wallis testified next, detailing how he retrieved both the drugs and a cell phone from Urias Espinoza’s car.

Finally, Agent Perea from the Department of Homeland Security testified. He explained that Urias Espinoza had crossed the border fourteen times between February 27, 2015 and April 22, 2015. He also relayed a string of WhatsApp messages found on Urias Espinoza’s cell phone that were date-stamped from the week before her arrest. The messages revealed a conversation that discussed delivery of a "product," as well as Urias Espinoza’s plan to apply for a CBP pass that would have allowed her to gain expedited clearance when she entered the United States. Agent Perea confirmed that Urias Espinoza operated a clothing store in Mexico and that several receipts from Los Angeles found in her car matched the dates that Urias Espinoza previously had crossed the border.

After the prosecution’s case in chief, Urias Espinoza presented her defense: that she did not know the drugs were in the vehicle she drove across the border because her next-door neighbor in Mexico had packed her car with methamphetamine without her knowledge and used her as a "blind mule" to smuggle the drugs into the United States. As part of her presentation, Urias Espinoza sought to present evidence from which the jury could conclude that her next-door neighbor knew she frequently traveled to the United States; knew that her car was parked on the street; knew how to obtain methamphetamine; was unable to drive across the border himself because of a prior deportation; set up Urias Espinoza as a "blind mule" to transport the methamphetamine into the United States; and then fled his home after he discovered that Urias Espinoza had been arrested.

The evidence Urias Espinoza sought to introduce in support of her defense was: (1) a screen shot of a Facebook page with her neighbor’s photo and a statement that "he’s been a drug dealer on the streets of L.A.," (2) the neighbor’s prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana in Los Angeles, (3) the neighbor’s prior conviction for importation of methamphetamine, (4) the neighbor’s prior deportation, and (5) photographs of the neighbor. The district court excluded the evidence on the ground that the defense’s theory of what happened was too speculative.

Although the district court excluded the bulk of Urias Espinoza’s evidence, she was able to introduce some information through the testimony of four witnesses. The witnesses' testimony revealed that: (1) it was well known that Urias Espinoza traveled to the United States to buy clothes, (2) Urias Espinoza’s house and her neighbor’s house were in close proximity to each other, (3) Urias Espinoza parked her car on the street, and (4) shortly after Urias Espinoza’s arrest, the neighbor’s house was found vacant and in disarray. Urias Espinoza argued, however, that without the excluded evidence, the limited evidence that the district court did admit was insufficient to persuade the jury that her neighbor—who had the motive, knowledge, and opportunity to do so—set her up as a "blind mule" to transport methamphetamine into the United States on his behalf.

After a three-day trial, a jury found Urias Espinoza guilty of importing methamphetamine and the district court sentenced her to a term of imprisonment of ninety months followed by five years of supervised release. This timely appeal followed.

II.

We review the district court’s exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Evans , 728 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013). First, we "determine de novo whether the trial court identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief requested." United States v. Hinkson , 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). If the trial court identified an incorrect legal rule, "we must conclude it abused its discretion." Id. If the trial court identified the correct legal rule, then we must "determine whether the trial court’s application of the correct legal standard was (1) illogical, (2) implausible, or (3) without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

We conclude that the district court necessarily abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard to determine whether third-party culpability evidence should be admitted.

III.

This case centers on the threshold requirement for the admissibility of third-party culpability evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence. In United States v. Armstrong , 621 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1980), we set forth the standard for the admissibility of such evidence, holding that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, "[f]undamental standards of relevancy, subject to the discretion of the court to exclude cumulative evidence and to insure orderly presentation of a case, require the admission of testimony which tends to prove that a person other than the defendant committed the crime that is charged." Id. at 953. In other words, Armstrong dictates that all evidence of third-party culpability that is relevant is admissible, unless barred by another evidentiary rule.³ We consistently applied this standard in a string of cases following Armstrong . See, e.g. , United States v. Wells , 879 F.3d 900, 937 (9th Cir. 2018), amending 877 F.3d 1099, 1136 (9th Cir. 2017) ; United States v. Stever , 603 F.3d 747, 756 (9th Cir. 2010) ; United States v. Vallejo , 237 F.3d 1008, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) ; United States v. Crosby , 75 F.3d 1343, 1347 (9th Cir. 1996).

Despite this clear line of authority stemming from Armstrong , the district court excluded Urias Espinoza’s evidence of third-party culpability by relying on two cases it believed enunciated a different rule for the admissibility of third-party culpability evidence: Perry v. Rushen , 713 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1983), and Territory of Guam v. Ignacio , 10 F.3d 608, 615 (9th Cir. 1993). According to the district court, these cases stand for the proposition that "[e]vidence of third-party culpability is not admissible ‘if it simply affords a possible ground of suspicion against such person; rather, it must be coupled with substantial evidence tending to directly connect that person with the actual commission of the offense.’ " Ignacio , 10 F.3d at 615 (citing Perry , 713 F.2d at 1449 ). The district court was mistaken. These cases do not enunciate our rule for the admission of third-party culpability evidence, or establish a higher standard than that set forth in Armstrong .

We begin with a brief discussion of Perry and Ignacio to explain why the district court erred in relying on those cases. We then turn to whether the excluded evidence satisfies Armstrong ’s standard of relevance, and conclude that it does. Finally, we hold that the erroneous exclusion of evidence was not harmless and therefore reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.

A.

In Perry , we reviewed the denial of Cornelius Perry’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from his state conviction for aggravated assault. 713 F.2d at 1448. At his state court trial, Perry sought...