United States v. Estate Donnelly

Decision Date23 March 1970
Docket NumberNo. 104,104
Citation90 S.Ct. 1033,397 U.S. 286,25 L.Ed.2d 312
PartiesUNITED STATES v. ESTATE of Thomas S. DONNELLY, Sr., et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Matthew J. Zinn, Asst. to the Solicitor Gen., for petitioner.

Daniel N. Pevos. Southfield, Mich., for respondents.

Mr. Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1950, a tax liability of approximately $26,000 was assessed against the taxpayer Donnelly, a resident of Michigan. Upon assessment, a statutory lien was created in favor of the United States 'upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal' belonging to the taxpayer. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 3670. Under § 3672 of the 1939 Code, such a lien could become effective against subsequent purchasers of Donnelly's property in either of two ways: (1) by filing notice of the lien in the state office in which filing of such notice was authorized by state law; or (2) if filing in a state office was not authorized by state law, by filing notice of the lien in the United States District Court for the district in which the property was located.1 A Michigan statute purported to authorize the filing of federal tax lien notices with the county register of deeds. However, the Michigan statute expressly required that notices of federal tax liens upon real property contain 'a description of the land on which a lien is claimed.'2 The standard tax lien notice form used by the Treasury Department made no provision for such a description, but was rather a blanket notice covering all property of the taxpayer in the county. The Department had taken the position that § 3672 permitted state law to dictate the place for filing the notice of lien, but not the form or content of the notice. Accordingly, the Department, believing that state law did not 'authorize' filing of the standard federal notice with the register of deeds, filed its notice of lien on Donnelly's property in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The Eastern District includes the land involved in the case, which was held by Donnelly and his wife as tenants by the entirety. The question is whether the filing in federal court gave the United States priority against a subsequent good-faith purchaser of Donnelly's land.

The Department did not collect in full on Donnelly's tax liability nor did it foreclose its lien on any of his property. Rather, between 1950 and his death in 1963, it obtained waivers from him of the statute of limitations on the assessed liability, the last of which extended the time for collection to December 31, 1966. In the meantime, Donnellt's wife died and he became fee owner of the Livingston County land. Shortly thereafter, in August 1960, he sold the land to respondents Mr. and Mrs. Carlson, who are the real parties in interest in this case. An abstract of title, prepared for the Carlsons by the Livingston County abstract office, disclosed no tax liens affecting real property owned by Donnelly; the same abstract, however, disclaimed any examination of court records, state or federal. The United States concedes that the Carlsons had no actual notice of the lien on Donnelly's land.

After the Carlsons purchased the land, this Court decided in United States v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 368 U.S. 291, 82 S.Ct. 349, 7 L.Ed.2d 294 (1961), that the Department had been right in maintaining that it did not have to conform its lien notices to the Michigan requirement that such notices must contain a description of the land upon which the lien is claimed. Thus, this Court held, the state law did not 'authorize' state filing of federal lien notices, and the filing of a notice in the appropriate federal district court was fufficient to give the lien priority against subsequent purchasers.

In 1966, just before the last statutory waiver executed by Donnelly expired, the United States brought suit in federal court to foreclose its tax lien on the Livingston County property, now owned by the Carlsons. The District Court held that Union Central, supra, was distinguishable, and in any event should not be applied retroactively against a person making a good-faith purchase before its date of decision, and granted summary judgment for the Carlsons. 295 F.Supp. 557 (D.C.E.D.Mich.1967). The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of the opinion of the District Court. 406 F.2d 1065 (C.A.6th Cir. 1969). We granted certiorari, 396 U.S. 814, 90 S.Ct. 57, 24 L.Ed.2d 66 (1969), to consider the apparent conflict with our decision in Union Central, supra, and we reverse.

The District Court distinguished Union Central on the ground that 'an attempt had been made in (that case) to file notice with the Register of Deeds in 1954, which had been refused by the Register of Deeds pursuant to a Michigan Attorney General opinion rendered in 1953, which ruled that federal tax lien notices not containing a description of the property are not entitled to be recorded. In the instant case, there had been no attempt to file with the Register of Deeds.' 295 F.Supp., at 559.

The attempted distinction is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, nothing in this Court's opinion in Union Central or in the record of that case indicates that any attempt was made to file the notice of lien with the register of deeds. Second, whether or not such an attempt was made, state law barred the local office from accepting the federal lien notice, which lacked the description of the land explicitly required by the state statute. The presence or absence of the legally futile act of tendering the noncomplying lien notice to the register of deeds could not be a factor determinative of the priority to be granted the federal lien.3

Further, the District Court held that when the Carlsons purchased Donnelly's land in 1960, they were entitled to rely on the law as it appeared at that time. As the court saw it, the prevailing interpretation of the federal statute in Michigan, stated in Youngblood v. United States, 141 F.2d 912 (C.A.6th Cir. 1944), required the Treasury Department to file a complying notice of lien with the register of deeds in order to gain priority against subsequent purchasers. Conceding that this Court rejected the Youngblood interpretation in its Union Central decision in 1961, the District Court nevertheless concluded that Union Central should not be applied retroactively to give the 1950 federal lien priority over the Carlsons' 1960 goodfaith purchase of the same land, and thus to upset the Carlsons' allegedly justifiable expectation of unclouded title.

In its retroactivity determination, the District Court relied largely on this Court's decision in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940). The petitioner in that case had taken advantage of a federal statute that permitted readjustment of municipal debt, amounting to a reduction of that debt, upon a finding by a district court that the readjustment plan was fair and equitable and upon approval of the plan by holders of two-thirds of the outstanding indebtedness. The respondents, holders of bonds issued by the petitioner, had been parties to that action, had raised no constitutional challenge to the statute, and had not appealed the final decree of the District Court approving the plan. Subsequently, in an unrelated proceeding, the statute was declared unconstitutional. Ashton v. Cameron County District, 298 U.S. 513, 56 S.Ct. 892, 80 L.Ed. 1309 (1936). The respondents then brought suit on the original bonds, which had been canceled by the original decree, claiming that a decree obtained under an unconstitutional statute could not support a plea of res judicata. This Court held that res judicata barred the new action, stressing the fact that the respondents had not raised the constitutional claim in the original action. The Court noted generally that the actual existence of a statute, prior to determination of its unconstitutionality

'is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. * * * Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination.' 308 U.S., at 374, 60 S.Ct., at 318.

The District Court here found that this Court's decision in Union Central amounted to an invalidation of the Michigan statute providing for local filing of federal tax lien notices, and that the Carlsons had justifiably relied upon the state statute, prior to its invalidation, in purchasing Donnelly's property without first searching the records of the federal court. Quoting the above language from Chicot County the court held that the Carlson's reliance on the subsequently invalidated statute was sufficient to give them priority over the earlier filed tax lien.

In our view, Chicot County does not support failure to apply Union Central here. In the first place, the Union Central decision did not invalidate any statute, state or federal. It merely construed § 3672, in accordance with the clear language of the statute, to authorize the filing of tax lien notices in federal court where the state law failed to provide for local filing. It determined, as the courts and other authorities who had considered the question had all agreed, that Michigan law did not authorize the filing of the standard federal lien notice, which lacked the description of the land required by the Michigan filing statute. Finally it held, in accordance witht the will of Congress as expressed in the 1942 amendment to § 3672 and the accompanying legislative history, that state law imposing more onerous requirements of content on lien notices than federal law did not 'authorize' state filing within the meaning of the federal statute.

Thus, the Carlsons did not...

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